Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar's signals to the US that India was open to the possibility of signing three defence "foundational agreements", should be broadly welcomed. The US first raised the question of the three pacts - the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), the Communication and Information Security Memorandum Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) - about a decade ago, when the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) was in power. These three agreements would ensure that inter-operability between the Indian and US militaries is smooth. The latter two would, in fact, enable the Indian military to make better use of equipment it has already bought from the US.
But the objection to these agreements, however useful the military might find them, has always been political. During the UPA regime, its Communist parliamentary supporters contended that the agreements would mean India would be obliged to back Washington's agenda. The defence ministry, too, believed the pacts would compromise India's position of military neutrality. Certainly the LSA, which essentially provides access to each other's military bases, provides much ammunition for such political arguments. In the past, permission for US fighter jets to refuel at Mumbai's Sahar airport during the 1991 Gulf War was withdrawn following strong objections from the Opposition. That apart, Russia, India's oldest ally in defence technology transfer, has periodically raised concerns about India's pivot towards the US, especially with the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), a body Washington and New Delhi have established to remove obstacles to the release of technology to India.
Should apprehensions about independence in geopolitical strategy once India signs on to these pacts remain an issue? The principal point of contention for both countries is relations with China. Not only is the People's Republic of China playing a more collaborative role with Pakistan in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US troops, it is also strengthening ties with Russia and, by extension, resource-rich central Asia. It would not, for instance, be helpful if India's interests in, say, Afghanistan, where it wields considerable soft power via a prominent humanitarian role, were stressed due to the US' historically close ties to Pakistan. So Indian negotiators are wary of how these agreements play out in practice.
India could, perhaps, draw profitably on the experience of Sri Lanka, the other South Asian country to sign a similar agreement. That move has not impacted Colombo's gainful relations with Beijing, which continues to be a major investor in the island-nation's infrastructure. Similar agreements between the US and NATO partners like France and Germany did not compel either country to contribute troops to the US-led alliance that invaded Iraq in 2003. And the fact that the US has agreed to rework the language of the drafts of the three agreements suggests a willingness to accommodate India's concerns. On India's part, the US' manifest keenness to close these agreements provides a good opportunity to push for more robust assurances of reciprocity.
