The US decision to supply eight F-16 aircraft, illogical and wrong as we and many others see it, is a reminder that today's diplomacy game is played at multiple levels. Countries look to levers of control, tools of persuasion, and channels for influence. Behind this lies the flexible management of foreign relationships, plus triangular, quadrilateral and multiple calculations; the final reference point is attainment of one's own goals, whatever the external clothing by way of public justification.
The world around us is in a state of flux and many countries have reconsidered their established postures and knee-jerk thinking. If we trust even a part of our loud proclamation that transformative socio-economic growth is underway in India, we need to rethink major external relationships. We persist with notions of "securitisation of foreign policy", which simply mean that all ideas relating to foreign affairs, including economic cooperation, must pass through a rigid filter, in which China and Pakistan are our permanent, impeccable enemies and that their actions are primarily India-centric. Applied to Islamabad, that is simplistic, even if historically true. As a lodestar to judging the motivation and imperatives of Beijing's policy, the notion is ludicrous. What is the alternative?
First, think like Kautilya. That means a dispassionate, calculated and continual analysis of own interest, in a dynamic, heterogeneous community of states (mandala), where each action creates counter-currents and cross-eddies. Plan several moves ahead, like a chess grand master, anticipating others' reactions, across all dimensions. Kautilya's key lessons are also world firsts: a dispassionate, thorough realpolitik doctrine that took a long view of the state's prosperity; the first international relations theory; a comprehensive treatise on the effective functioning of the state, including the ruler's personal conduct, analysis of finance and taxation, and what would today be called good governance. Kautilya's advice is as trenchant and vibrant as Sun Tzu's. As his legatee, India is yet to internalise his methods, much less apply them. For instance, do we implement a neighbourhood strategic agenda, fleshing out Prime Minister Narendra Modi's "neighbourhood first" doctrine, or are we often reactive to events? The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, South Asian University, and others have embarked on a comprehensive study of the old texts, contextualising the Arthashastra, to draw upon its nuanced meanings. One hopes their research will percolate through to the policy establishment.
Second, consider reality. Pakistan is falling further and further behind India. Have we considered that it may be in our interest that Pakistan should not fall into decline - even prosper - much as this goes against conventional wisdom and our entrenched schadenfreude mindset? A wounded, declining "failed state" (though that term is offensive), is simply not to Indian advantage. Shyam Saran is right ("Revisiting Pakistan", Business Standard, February 10) in suggesting that we lose nothing by reaching out to potential friends and latent constituencies in that country. Why should we assume that we do not, or never will, influence events? If recovery does sprout in Pakistan, surely that would strengthen such elements, notwithstanding Pakistan's twin dominant hostile actors of today - the overweening armed forces and the pervasive terrorist-Islamists whose lethality (5,000 victims a year, against a fraction of that number in India) is producing some backlash.
Third, China is probably in a bind in its China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). All but $9 billion of the $46 billion it publicly promised just a few months back is commercial investment, aimed at garnering profits. A precipitous fall in China's forex reserves - from $5 trillion some years back to $3.22 in 2016 - will toughen its profit quest. Will Gwadar's Baloch dissidents and Islamist across Pakistan permit Gwadar-Karakoram trade to flow smoothly? China's parallel investments in Afghanistan and Iran are driven perhaps by risk mitigation, that is, not placing all its Obor (One Belt, One Road) connectivity eggs in the Pakistan basket. Witness the Chinese goods train that has journeyed to Tehran this month, a run similar to that of a cargo train from China to Spain a year ago. So far the Indian stand on CPEC has been legalist - that the Karakoram Pass and the entire alignment running through Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir is Indian territory, illegally occupied by Pakistan. But does that fit Indian offers to convert the Line of Control in Kashmir into a permanent border?
We could rejoice in China's quandary, but we have another perspective to consider. Which are the investment destinations that China can pursue that meet three fundamentals: depth of market, capital safety and assured profitability? Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria and much of Africa and Latin America hardly fit the bill. Japan is politically anathema. North America, Europe, India and possibly Indonesia are per force the main options, of course in descending order. Simply put, Chinese companies are now seriously attracted to India; investment flows have commenced. The power of Make India is a reality. We need agility, plus hard pragmatism, on China.
The moral: rethink, shed old shibboleths that do not apply today, and go back to Kautilyan roots.
The writer is honorary fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi
Disclaimer: These are personal views of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of www.business-standard.com or the Business Standard newspaper
