1971
A GLOBAL HISTORY OF THE CREATION OF BANGLADESH
Author: Srinath Raghavan
Publisher: Permanent Black
Pages: 358
Price: Rs 795
Historians extrapolate backwards from known events in a search for causal relationships. While retaining the freedom to emphasise trends as they choose, they also have to avoid a few pitfalls.
One danger lies in the assumption of inevitability. It is easy to think an event was ordained simply because it happened. History is much too messy to allow for inevitability.
Srinath Raghavan's new book on Bangladesh draws upon a wide array of sources in walking away from this pitfall. He starts with the alteration of perspectives. He zooms out the timeline, moving back into the history of Pakistan (and India) in the 1960s in a search for local causal factors. He also zooms out the geopolitical scale, moving beyond narrow subcontinental concerns and beyond the tired old set-pieces of Cold War rivalry. He places the student-led agitations that unseated Ayub Khan and triggered the elections of 1970 in the same globalised context as the agitations that flared up almost concurrently in France, Germany, USA, Egypt and Czechoslovakia.
The broader perspective is one of the things that makes the book unusual. Many of the principal actors of 1971 - military men, diplomats, bureaucrats and politicians - have penned personal memoirs. Archives in various nations have been released. Professional historians have written reams. But nobody has explored 1971 and the events that led up to it across so many dimensions.
Some of the conclusions are sweeping and quite at variance with accepted narratives. Raghavan doesn't think Bangladesh was inevitable. He believes that, quite late into 1971, it could have devolved into greater autonomy for East Pakistan. This is an imponderable but it is true that the government-in-exile said as much in its backdoor negotiations with the US consul in Calcutta.
He also believes that India's greatest military victory was somewhat accidental and may in fact, have arisen from a "grievous strategic error". Indeed, the Indian establishment wasn't expecting such rapid military progress and the aims were initially limited to grabbing some territory to establish a Bangladeshi government.
The assertion of strategic error would be more contentious. Raghavan believes India should have sought an earlier military solution. This was suggested by K Subrahmanyam, debated and rejected. If it had worked, it would have obviated the refugee problem. But it could conceivably have led to India fighting a three-front war, with the Chinese involved. Army chief Sam Manekshaw wanted time to build logistical superiority; he wanted to avoid a monsoon campaign; he also wanted the onset of winter to shut down the Himalayan frontier. Mrs Gandhi wanted time to canvass international opinion.
The book's interpretation of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty is also more nuanced. According to Raghavan, the USSR initially offered the Treaty in August 1971 in the hopes that it would stop India from jumping the gun militarily. India of course, wanted it as insurance against Chinese interference, especially after the US-China Summit.
But the Chinese were deep in the middle of internal trouble. Mao had just disposed of Lin Biao and he was purging the People's Liberation Army and unwilling to get into a war. The Soviets had given China a hammering in border clashes in 1969 and established a massive military presence on the Sino-Soviet border. Hence, Mao wanted to build bridges with the Americans as a hedge against his supposed ideological allies. Brajesh Mishra, who was then Charge d'affaires in Beijing, eventually read the situation right and realised the Chinese would not get militarily involved.
When it comes to the Americans, Raghavan's interpretation gels with earlier accounts. Nixon and Kissinger much preferred the "honest General Yahya" to the duplicitous "old witch". Plus, they needed the Pakistanis to provide a conduit to China for the super-secret negotiations which eventually led to diplomatic relations. Finally, Kissinger was delusional enough to believe that the Chinese would get involved militarily if India invaded East Pakistan.
Apart from presenting logical arguments for the shifts in interpretation, the book adds massive detail on multiple fronts. For example, it offers a macro-economic summary of India and Pakistan. This indicates how Pakistan was reduced to external default as the eastern wing collapsed. It also shows how the refugee problem came close to driving India's finances into the ground. Incidentally, Raghavan deliberately avoids two contentious subjects: one is the final death toll and the other is the demographics of refugee repatriation.
Among other intriguing titbits, there is a description of the secret negotiations between India and Israel for arms transfers to the Mukti Bahini. There is also a mention of the Shah of Iran's secret military treaty with Pakistan, which the Shah reneged on. Comprehensive descriptions of reactions across the Commonwealth, in the Non-Aligned nations, in France and of various moves on the humanitarian front, including the Concert for Bangladesh, are all part of the narrative.
Was the birth of Bangladesh indeed inevitable? Any map of 1970 would depict the Soviet Union, two Vietnams and two Germanys as well as a united Czechoslovakia, one Yugoslavia, one Pakistan, one Ethiopia, one Sudan, and so on. How many of the changes we have seen in the next 40 years were predictable, let alone inevitable? This is a splendidly researched book, which presents a logical well-argued case for revisiting the myths surrounding the birth of Bangladesh.
A GLOBAL HISTORY OF THE CREATION OF BANGLADESH
Author: Srinath Raghavan
Publisher: Permanent Black
Pages: 358
Price: Rs 795
More From This Section
Historians extrapolate backwards from known events in a search for causal relationships. While retaining the freedom to emphasise trends as they choose, they also have to avoid a few pitfalls.
One danger lies in the assumption of inevitability. It is easy to think an event was ordained simply because it happened. History is much too messy to allow for inevitability.
Srinath Raghavan's new book on Bangladesh draws upon a wide array of sources in walking away from this pitfall. He starts with the alteration of perspectives. He zooms out the timeline, moving back into the history of Pakistan (and India) in the 1960s in a search for local causal factors. He also zooms out the geopolitical scale, moving beyond narrow subcontinental concerns and beyond the tired old set-pieces of Cold War rivalry. He places the student-led agitations that unseated Ayub Khan and triggered the elections of 1970 in the same globalised context as the agitations that flared up almost concurrently in France, Germany, USA, Egypt and Czechoslovakia.
The broader perspective is one of the things that makes the book unusual. Many of the principal actors of 1971 - military men, diplomats, bureaucrats and politicians - have penned personal memoirs. Archives in various nations have been released. Professional historians have written reams. But nobody has explored 1971 and the events that led up to it across so many dimensions.
Some of the conclusions are sweeping and quite at variance with accepted narratives. Raghavan doesn't think Bangladesh was inevitable. He believes that, quite late into 1971, it could have devolved into greater autonomy for East Pakistan. This is an imponderable but it is true that the government-in-exile said as much in its backdoor negotiations with the US consul in Calcutta.
He also believes that India's greatest military victory was somewhat accidental and may in fact, have arisen from a "grievous strategic error". Indeed, the Indian establishment wasn't expecting such rapid military progress and the aims were initially limited to grabbing some territory to establish a Bangladeshi government.
The assertion of strategic error would be more contentious. Raghavan believes India should have sought an earlier military solution. This was suggested by K Subrahmanyam, debated and rejected. If it had worked, it would have obviated the refugee problem. But it could conceivably have led to India fighting a three-front war, with the Chinese involved. Army chief Sam Manekshaw wanted time to build logistical superiority; he wanted to avoid a monsoon campaign; he also wanted the onset of winter to shut down the Himalayan frontier. Mrs Gandhi wanted time to canvass international opinion.
The book's interpretation of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty is also more nuanced. According to Raghavan, the USSR initially offered the Treaty in August 1971 in the hopes that it would stop India from jumping the gun militarily. India of course, wanted it as insurance against Chinese interference, especially after the US-China Summit.
But the Chinese were deep in the middle of internal trouble. Mao had just disposed of Lin Biao and he was purging the People's Liberation Army and unwilling to get into a war. The Soviets had given China a hammering in border clashes in 1969 and established a massive military presence on the Sino-Soviet border. Hence, Mao wanted to build bridges with the Americans as a hedge against his supposed ideological allies. Brajesh Mishra, who was then Charge d'affaires in Beijing, eventually read the situation right and realised the Chinese would not get militarily involved.
When it comes to the Americans, Raghavan's interpretation gels with earlier accounts. Nixon and Kissinger much preferred the "honest General Yahya" to the duplicitous "old witch". Plus, they needed the Pakistanis to provide a conduit to China for the super-secret negotiations which eventually led to diplomatic relations. Finally, Kissinger was delusional enough to believe that the Chinese would get involved militarily if India invaded East Pakistan.
Apart from presenting logical arguments for the shifts in interpretation, the book adds massive detail on multiple fronts. For example, it offers a macro-economic summary of India and Pakistan. This indicates how Pakistan was reduced to external default as the eastern wing collapsed. It also shows how the refugee problem came close to driving India's finances into the ground. Incidentally, Raghavan deliberately avoids two contentious subjects: one is the final death toll and the other is the demographics of refugee repatriation.
Among other intriguing titbits, there is a description of the secret negotiations between India and Israel for arms transfers to the Mukti Bahini. There is also a mention of the Shah of Iran's secret military treaty with Pakistan, which the Shah reneged on. Comprehensive descriptions of reactions across the Commonwealth, in the Non-Aligned nations, in France and of various moves on the humanitarian front, including the Concert for Bangladesh, are all part of the narrative.
Was the birth of Bangladesh indeed inevitable? Any map of 1970 would depict the Soviet Union, two Vietnams and two Germanys as well as a united Czechoslovakia, one Yugoslavia, one Pakistan, one Ethiopia, one Sudan, and so on. How many of the changes we have seen in the next 40 years were predictable, let alone inevitable? This is a splendidly researched book, which presents a logical well-argued case for revisiting the myths surrounding the birth of Bangladesh.