 "26/11 cost just $40,000: Adrian Levy & Cathy Scott-Clark")
It was an inexpensive operation powered by LeT’s internal politics and owed its success to India’s bureaucratic bungles, say Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark
India has said the masterminds of the attack had the support and protection of the Pakistani establishment, whereas Pakistan has said it was the handiwork of non-state actors. What’s your conclusion? And what was the evidence on the ground?
The evidence on the ground points to the involvement of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) in all of its guises, and suggests that the outfit was splitting following a deep-seated existential crisis that had begun to show itself post 9/11 and came to a head after the Lal Masjid crisis.
After Lal Masjid in 2007, LeT’s divisions were exacerbated, with a significant faction rejecting the Pakistan state, and the Kashmir mission, wanting instead to ape Al Qaeda and its broader campaign.
When Operation Mumbai was mooted, it acted as a sticking plaster offering something to both camps, an Indian target with international components — Jews, Americans, and Europeans as potential targets.
We have seen no evidence that the civilian government in Pakistan knew anything. The foreign minister was in New Delhi for talks, and was equally surprised. Institutionally, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) also seems to have been surprised, from the interviews we carried out. However, individual officers dedicated to Kashmir and Jihad seem to have attached themselves to this operation, assisting David Headley’s training and the training of the fidayeen squad that later hit Mumbai.
Did the planners have a network of Indian sympathisers? Can an attack of such a scale be carried out without local support?
Lashkar and ISI bragged to Headley that they had a small team of ‘mice’ who gathered data for them and did reconnaissance. But then the criminal underclass in Mumbai has often acted for ISI — so nothing new here.
What is remarkable about 26/11 is that it cost around $40,000 to run. So it was a cheap operation, underscored by devastating simplicity, that used new technology against India and the West. No James Bond lair was needed, just Skype-like telephony and a rubber dinghy.
What pushes men like Ajmal Kasab to the jihadists? Is it poverty or is it religious fervour?
Nearly all the interviews we did in and around LeT show that most grassroots recruits are not ideological, religious or fervent. They are nearly all from dysfunctional backgrounds, identified as such by the outfit, and preyed upon for this reason — as the family will not resist. Who else would be prepared to be infantilised by the LeT training process and committed to die in battle?
The original squad was 31 men — but many of these ran away or were claimed back by their families. Who was left? Mostly those without families who could reach out, families without cash and the means to travel. The leadership’s process of recruiting and training is remarkably adaptive and sophisticated. They whittle away at recruits until there is little left other than the will to obey.
Go to southern or eastern Punjab and see also how LeT and its like are the government in the absence of government. Like Hamas, their social functions are remarkable and effective: offering education, health care and more. In these areas who are the role models? The posters still say, not cricket stars or Bollywood — but Jihad.
How are the ten attackers perceived by the average Pakistani: martyrs or misguided youths? Or a bit of both? Did you find support and sympathy for them in Pakistan?
We found no sympathy for them. The families of the 10 had no idea what had happened to their children. They had been visited by LeT and the security agencies and told that their loved ones had died in Kashmir. Most were shown doctored photos ‘proving’ this point.
However, many of these families lived within sight of India, and were steeped in age-old animosities. Elsewhere, outside the Jihad factories, there was nothing but contempt for LeT and its
demagogues.
Would you say Mumbai was totally unguarded when the attacks happened?
We would not say that Mumbai was unguarded, but the Mumbai police felt as if the city was sacrificed. Many attempts by the police to bolster security were thwarted. The Taj finally accepted a comprehensive security audit only to dismantle many of the suggestions that were then put into place when the police officer concerned went on leave before 26/11.
Officers responsible for the coast warned of the need for more resources and surveillance — and could not get heard. Where was the body armour, or munitions repeatedly asked for by Mumbai cops and never given? What was done was due to the persistence of Zone 1 officers in Mumbai, who, for example, fearing a bomb attack on tourists centres, cleared hawkers from the streets around Leopold Café — subsequently saving many many lives.
In your book, Hasan Gafoor, Mumbai’s commissioner of police, comes across as indecisive. Some people say that is unfair because you have relied heavily on information provided by the rival camp.
Gafoor went against the standard operating procedure, allowing personal animus to cloud his judgement. He dispatched the officer marked down for street-level operations to the control room and vice versa. He then ordered his men to stand down until the National Security Guard (NSG) arrived, at a time when the state had still not requested NSG be mobilised.
The prevarication combined with the disastrous mobilisation of NSG — through no fault of its own, as the special forces were betrayed by the ministry and civil servants around it — allowed the gunmen to settle down.
Taj security repeatedly asked the police to move on the gunmen inside the hotel, where they were cornered. Such decisive action would have ended the siege in hours — potentially. And yet inside the hotel were only a handful of cops, ordered not to move, and armed with side arms and about 50 rounds between them.
The police strategy was sclerotic and only the bravery of a dozen individual officers, including Vishwas Nangre Patil and Rajvardhan Sinha, stand out. Otherwise, the Taj was left to be saved by Taj staffers who sacrificed the most and ensured the death count remained mercifully small.
The biggest lapse in the whole attack was the delay in the deployment of the NSG commandoes. Who do you hold responsible for that?
The bureaucrats ‘satelliting’ around NSG betrayed it. Since 2006 they had failed to act on repeated requests for equipment and a broader mobilisation strategy. On the night itself, NSG was ready to go within 45 minutes and was at Palam waiting. But the transporter was in Chandigarh.
Only through persistence was NSG able to find another plane, borrowing an Ilyshun from Research and Analysis Wing, or RAW. Then there was no crew or lifting gear, and the promised demobilisation procedure, signed off by the home ministry, that was supposed to have been arranged in Mumbai did not happen.
NSG, despite all of this, went on to do its job as best it could. But individual officers concluded the establishment around them had betrayed them.
THE SIEGE: THE ATTACK ON THE TAJ
Author: Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark
Publisher: Penguin
Pages: 344
Price: Rs 499
India has said the masterminds of the attack had the support and protection of the Pakistani establishment, whereas Pakistan has said it was the handiwork of non-state actors. What’s your conclusion? And what was the evidence on the ground?
The evidence on the ground points to the involvement of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) in all of its guises, and suggests that the outfit was splitting following a deep-seated existential crisis that had begun to show itself post 9/11 and came to a head after the Lal Masjid crisis.
Also Read
After 9/11, Lashkar, previously the most disciplined outfit in the Jihad factory, began to question the need to be remain tethered to the Pakistan state. Elements began to rove the world, gathering funds in the UK and operating in France and Germany, preparing for global attacks in these countries and also Australia.
After Lal Masjid in 2007, LeT’s divisions were exacerbated, with a significant faction rejecting the Pakistan state, and the Kashmir mission, wanting instead to ape Al Qaeda and its broader campaign.
When Operation Mumbai was mooted, it acted as a sticking plaster offering something to both camps, an Indian target with international components — Jews, Americans, and Europeans as potential targets.
We have seen no evidence that the civilian government in Pakistan knew anything. The foreign minister was in New Delhi for talks, and was equally surprised. Institutionally, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) also seems to have been surprised, from the interviews we carried out. However, individual officers dedicated to Kashmir and Jihad seem to have attached themselves to this operation, assisting David Headley’s training and the training of the fidayeen squad that later hit Mumbai.
Did the planners have a network of Indian sympathisers? Can an attack of such a scale be carried out without local support?
Lashkar and ISI bragged to Headley that they had a small team of ‘mice’ who gathered data for them and did reconnaissance. But then the criminal underclass in Mumbai has often acted for ISI — so nothing new here.
What is remarkable about 26/11 is that it cost around $40,000 to run. So it was a cheap operation, underscored by devastating simplicity, that used new technology against India and the West. No James Bond lair was needed, just Skype-like telephony and a rubber dinghy.
What pushes men like Ajmal Kasab to the jihadists? Is it poverty or is it religious fervour?
Nearly all the interviews we did in and around LeT show that most grassroots recruits are not ideological, religious or fervent. They are nearly all from dysfunctional backgrounds, identified as such by the outfit, and preyed upon for this reason — as the family will not resist. Who else would be prepared to be infantilised by the LeT training process and committed to die in battle?
The original squad was 31 men — but many of these ran away or were claimed back by their families. Who was left? Mostly those without families who could reach out, families without cash and the means to travel. The leadership’s process of recruiting and training is remarkably adaptive and sophisticated. They whittle away at recruits until there is little left other than the will to obey.
Go to southern or eastern Punjab and see also how LeT and its like are the government in the absence of government. Like Hamas, their social functions are remarkable and effective: offering education, health care and more. In these areas who are the role models? The posters still say, not cricket stars or Bollywood — but Jihad.
How are the ten attackers perceived by the average Pakistani: martyrs or misguided youths? Or a bit of both? Did you find support and sympathy for them in Pakistan?
We found no sympathy for them. The families of the 10 had no idea what had happened to their children. They had been visited by LeT and the security agencies and told that their loved ones had died in Kashmir. Most were shown doctored photos ‘proving’ this point.
However, many of these families lived within sight of India, and were steeped in age-old animosities. Elsewhere, outside the Jihad factories, there was nothing but contempt for LeT and its
demagogues.
Would you say Mumbai was totally unguarded when the attacks happened?
We would not say that Mumbai was unguarded, but the Mumbai police felt as if the city was sacrificed. Many attempts by the police to bolster security were thwarted. The Taj finally accepted a comprehensive security audit only to dismantle many of the suggestions that were then put into place when the police officer concerned went on leave before 26/11.
Officers responsible for the coast warned of the need for more resources and surveillance — and could not get heard. Where was the body armour, or munitions repeatedly asked for by Mumbai cops and never given? What was done was due to the persistence of Zone 1 officers in Mumbai, who, for example, fearing a bomb attack on tourists centres, cleared hawkers from the streets around Leopold Café — subsequently saving many many lives.
In your book, Hasan Gafoor, Mumbai’s commissioner of police, comes across as indecisive. Some people say that is unfair because you have relied heavily on information provided by the rival camp.
Gafoor went against the standard operating procedure, allowing personal animus to cloud his judgement. He dispatched the officer marked down for street-level operations to the control room and vice versa. He then ordered his men to stand down until the National Security Guard (NSG) arrived, at a time when the state had still not requested NSG be mobilised.
The prevarication combined with the disastrous mobilisation of NSG — through no fault of its own, as the special forces were betrayed by the ministry and civil servants around it — allowed the gunmen to settle down.
Taj security repeatedly asked the police to move on the gunmen inside the hotel, where they were cornered. Such decisive action would have ended the siege in hours — potentially. And yet inside the hotel were only a handful of cops, ordered not to move, and armed with side arms and about 50 rounds between them.
The police strategy was sclerotic and only the bravery of a dozen individual officers, including Vishwas Nangre Patil and Rajvardhan Sinha, stand out. Otherwise, the Taj was left to be saved by Taj staffers who sacrificed the most and ensured the death count remained mercifully small.
The biggest lapse in the whole attack was the delay in the deployment of the NSG commandoes. Who do you hold responsible for that?
The bureaucrats ‘satelliting’ around NSG betrayed it. Since 2006 they had failed to act on repeated requests for equipment and a broader mobilisation strategy. On the night itself, NSG was ready to go within 45 minutes and was at Palam waiting. But the transporter was in Chandigarh.
Only through persistence was NSG able to find another plane, borrowing an Ilyshun from Research and Analysis Wing, or RAW. Then there was no crew or lifting gear, and the promised demobilisation procedure, signed off by the home ministry, that was supposed to have been arranged in Mumbai did not happen.
NSG, despite all of this, went on to do its job as best it could. But individual officers concluded the establishment around them had betrayed them.
THE SIEGE: THE ATTACK ON THE TAJ
Author: Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark
Publisher: Penguin
Pages: 344
Price: Rs 499