A 'Westphalia' for West Asia

Towards a Westphalia for the Middle East

Patrick Milton, Michael Axworthy and Brendan Simms

Hurst and Company,

160 pages; Rs 2,686

The Thirty Years’ War began 400 years ago and ended with the “Peace of Westphalia” negotiated between the contending parties over five years. The war involved the major powers of the day — the Holy Roman Empire, France, Spain and Sweden — and the numerous German principalities that were linked to the empire through a series of complex historic agreements and traditions. The war combined contentions emerging from power rivalries, sectarian differences and, following the religious differences after the Reformation, the need to shape new constitutional arrangements linking the principalities with their emperor.

The peace that ended these bloody conflicts was a marathon diplomatic effort based on innovative practices and processes that ended religious strife and set up a new order in Europe that lasted a century-and-a-half. This book by three distinguished historians of Europe and West Asia contends that Westphalia can provide ideas to provide security to West Asia.

In several respects, the present West Asian scenario is very similar to the contention-ridden Europe of the 17th century. Now, too, we have several conflicts taking place simultaneously that involve states and non-state, and sub-state players battling each other in a strategically vital geographical space, with fluid alliances and infirm coalitions.

These confrontations have emerged from security concerns but are being defined on a sectarian basis, recalling Sunni-Shia divisions that go back to early Islam. As in Europe earlier, while the central competition is between Saudi Arabia and Iran, they are engaged in proxy wars in Syria and Yemen.

These contestations have their roots in the Arab Spring when people’s agitations had demanded wide-ranging reform, including participation in governance. These demonstrations brought down at least four potentates, but also united the Arab potentates against reform and encouraged them to divert popular attention to religious and sectarian threats by demonising their enemies.

Finally, like the earlier wars, these regional conflicts are taking place amidst an over-arching rivalry between the great powers of the day — France and the Emperor then, the US and Russia now. 

The authors contend that the Peace of Westphalia provides the diplomatic tools for peace-making and specific agreements that could serve as models to address the conflicts in West Asia. They assert correctly that, as in the past, a piecemeal approach to resolving regional conflicts will just not work, as the ongoing conflicts are inter-linked. They call for an inclusive peace congress of all the contending players that will take a comprehensive view of regional security, as was done at Westphalia. 

They point out that the major powers would be more amenable to compromise if a regional balance of power is in place. To achieve this, borrowing from the Westphalia precedent, they suggest that some preparatory steps could be taken such as a ceasefire and interim peace arrangements in Syria and Yemen

They do not see the absence of trust between the major powers as an obstacle but recognise that peace talks will work only if there is a genuine desire for compromise on both sides. This will require Iran and Saudi Arabia to set out their core security interests and the legitimate zone of influence acceptable to them. 

Three factors that facilitated the agreement at Westphalia were the presence of mediators that had a major stake in peace and the emergence of a moderate “Third Party” of cross-confessional states that worked behind-the-scenes to promote agreement. Finally, the enforcement of the treaty “in perpetuity” was based on “mutuality and reciprocity” in that it was collectively guaranteed by all the participating parties, thus effectively defining a regional collective security arrangement.

The writers describe the “Third Party” as powers having a direct and abiding interest in peace, willing to co-operate with others similarly impelled, and having enough clout in terms of legitimacy and geopolitical capability to apply pressure on the contending parties when needed. 

The conflicts in West Asia have now continued for eight years and taken the lives of half-a-million people, destroyed cities and civic life, sharpened ethnic, religious and sectarian animosities and encouraged extremist elements. There is also no effective peace effort to address the contentions that divide the main powers and their allies. This book, the product of extensive studies and discussions among western and regional scholars and policymakers, is an important first attempt to promote such an initiative.

The obstacles are several: The contending powers do not have a shared vision for regional order and still believe that, with their allies, they can achieve their interests through ongoing military confrontations. Again, the two principal powers, one regional, the other global —Israel and the US, respectively — do not exhibit any interest in regional peace and the accommodativeness this will require of them. 

Until there are changes in these two areas, West Asia will remain condemned to further conflict. This calls for India to lead and shape a “Third Party” made up of China, Japan and South Korea and bring in Russia, France and Germany, when required.

The reviewer is a former diplomat