Alternative facts on the nuclear deal

Book review of 'A Debate to Remember: The US-India Nuclear Deal'

A Debate to Remember: The US–India Nuclear Deal 

Chaitanya Ravi 

OUP

332 pages; Rs 995

There are by now several detailed books on the Indo-US nuclear deal, and Chaitanya Ravi’s traverses much of the same space as the others. But his interviews with the former US State Department Counsellor Phil Zelikow are interesting because they throw light on some of the fierce debates that took place within the Bush administration on the rationale, indeed the wisdom, of helping orchestrate India’s access to the international civil nuclear energy market while acquiescing in its status as a nuclear weapons state.

Mr Ravi attempts to construct a certain narrative about how the deal was conceived and the often tortuous trajectory that brought it to a successful conclusion. He has relied most heavily on Indian media reports — Siddharth Varadarajan is a favourite — but has inexplicably neglected to interview several dramatis personae who may have provided him material enabling a more rounded view and avoided factual mistakes.

The basics of the story the book tells are already well known:

The deal was made possible due to a growing strategic convergence between India and the US in the post-Cold War global landscape. It removed a negative and constraining legacy from the past, to enable both enhanced mutual trust and expansion of economic, commercial and defence relations.

Precisely because it constituted such a major departure from the traditional foreign policy construct in both countries, it generated sharp domestic political debates that made the negotiating process both difficult and complex.

The role of key actors, in particular the Indian prime minister and the US president, was critical to overcoming the many odds with which negotiators had to contend.

Some of the conclusions the author has drawn are, however, based either on thin evidence or a misreading thereof. For example, he interprets a speech I made at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis on October 24, 2005 on India’s non-proliferation policy as endorsing the inclusion of fast breeder reactors (FBRs) in the category of civilian reactors in the plan that India was drawing up to separate its civilian reactors and facilities from those that would be engaged in the country’s strategic weapons programme. I had made no reference to fast breeder reactors. The issue came up much later in the bilateral negotiations with the US.

The author posits a sharp divide between the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the ministry of external affairs (MEA) with respect to various items on the negotiating agenda, in particular the inclusion of the FBRs in the civilian reactor category. This is simply not true. While I was in charge of negotiating with the US side, the brief for these negotiations were handed over to me, sometimes on the eve of the meetings, by the Apex Committee set up at the Prime Minister’s Office under the chairmanship of then National Security Advisor M K Narayanan in which the MEA was not even represented while the DAE was. Once the committee had decided that FBRs should not be offered as civilian facilities, that was the end of the matter and some credit must be given to the MEA for having sustained this position in the negotiations.

On the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, Prime Minister Singh’s position had all along been that it should be economically viable. There was little clarity on financing for the project, the insurance costs to be incurred because of the risks along the route and the formula to be followed for the pricing of the gas received at the Indian end. He was not willing to lock India into a long-term deal that would force the country to buy gas at high prices because of some intangible peace dividend.

One should also set the record straight on the train of events that led to the Indo-US Joint Statement.  An impression is sought to be created that the text, which was negotiated by the Indian and US negotiators in advance of the prime minister’s visit, was materially different and much more aligned to US demands and different from what finally appeared in public. This, too, is untrue.  As a result of the meeting in the morning between Condoleeza Rice and Dr Singh, there were some tweaks to incorporate additional wording that DAE Secretary Anil Kakodkar wanted, to make the terms acceptable to him. Dr Singh had called Dr Kakodkar in to request in writing the changes he wanted to see in the text and Ms Rice accepted them. My counterpart Nicholas Burns and I then had to rework parts of the text but there were additional complications because the US side also wanted some last-minute additional formulations.

As far as I recall, the changes from our side included a specific commitment to “full civil nuclear cooperation”, a phased separation of civil and military facilities, and that India would conclude “an” Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), implying that it would be specific to India and not the standard format applicable to all non-nuclear weapons states.

Finally, there is reference to an account of the above events provided by Washington Post correspondent Glenn Kessler who claims that Ms Rice “went to Saran’s suite in the Willard Hotel on Sunday July 17 to provide the final push”. No such luck! Ms Rice met the then External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh in the latter’s suite and, indeed, helped push things forward.

This is not a book based on rigorous analysis and is patchy in content. It often draws sweeping conclusions based on flimsy material or speculative media reports. But for some interesting interviews it contains there is little to recommend it to readers.

The reviewer is a former foreign secretary and Senior Fellow, CPR. He was closely involved in the negotiations on the Indo-US nuclear deal