Beijing and Taliban 2.0

The Comrades And The Mullahs: China, Afghanistan and the New Asian Geopolitics 

Authors: Ananth Krishnan and Stanly Johny

Publisher: Harper Collins

Pages: 304

Price: Rs 599

On 15 August 2021, when India was celebrating its 75th Independence day, Taliban forces captured Kabul while the United States military withdrew. As the Taliban celebrated victory in the “Arg”, Afghanistan’s presidential palace, the world wondered about the implications of the second inning of Taliban — for Asia, and the world. Like Vietnam during Cold War, the fall of Kabul became one of the defining moments of US foreign policy in the 21st century. Another defining feature of the US foreign policy in this century is the intensifying rivalry between the US and China.

The book The Comrades and The Mullahs: China, Afghanistan, and the New Asian Geopolitics, by Ananth Krishnan and Stanly Johny, aims to investigate emerging equations after the fall of Ashraf Ghani’s government. The book emphatically describes the unfolding tragedy of Afghanistan and its implications for the geopolitics of Asia. Stanly Johny is an international affairs editor at The Hindu and a PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University’s West Asia studies department. Ananth Krishnan, a master’s degree holder in social science from the University of Chicago, is a China correspondent of The Hindu and author of India’s China Challenge. 

As the authors have mentioned in the introduction, the motivation behind this book is to analyse what the 21st-century rivalry between the US and China will mean for Afghanistan. The book explores a broad historical perspective, starting with the history of the US with the Taliban, the post-2001 war on terror, and events leading up to the fall of Kabul. The book later explores China’s political, economic, and other interests in Afghanistan, and the domestic factors driving China’s Afghanistan policy. The authors have also explored the contradiction between the Chinese point of view and the Taliban’s point of view.

The first four chapters of the book narrate the history of the Taliban and its links with Deobandi Islam in India. The historical background, especially in the chapter “The Rise of Mullahs”, is written so well that it could easily have been a very short introduction to the contemporary history of Afghanistan.

Later chapters focus on China’s view of Taliban 1.0 and Taliban 2.0, Beijing’s failed attempts to establish a foothold in the country, the “ruthless pragmatism” behind Beijing’s engagement with the Taliban, and the cautious awareness of Afghanistan’s reputation as “graveyard of empires” among Chinese thinkers. Mr Krishnan has enriched the book with his experience of travels in China.

The book has four key takeaways. One, the end of America’s engagement in Afghanistan does not mean the end of American power. Rather, it frees America of a burdensome war to focus on issues in the Indo-Pacific. Two, China’s best strategy to manage the Taliban is pragmatism. This is due to China’s economic, strategic, and political interests in the region. Also, the US’ hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan allowed Beijing to paint Washington as an irresponsible power. Three, there are no “constant winners” in Afghanistan, great powers have tried and failed. Moreover, the Soviet Union (and later Russia), China, Iran, India, and so on all have at some point worked with or against others in Afghanistan. Finally, chaos and more tragedy will follow if the present establishment fails to ensure stability in the country.

On the intensifying US-China rivalry, speculations of China stepping up in Afghanistan, and the end of American power, the authors suggest that Washington is likely to adopt a wait-and-watch approach. They base this on historical observations during the Cold War. For example, the US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 gave the Soviets the confidence to invade Afghanistan in 1979, which proved to be a strategic blunder. Similarly, the authors imply that the fall of Kabul might embolden China to make similar strategic blunders, thus, possibly beginning a new Cold War.

Despite being published just a few months after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, the book is well researched and offers a nuanced perspective on China’s engagement with the Taliban. As events in Afghanistan continue to unfold, this work provides much-needed clarity. Thus, it is among a very few works of scholarship with the potential to be the first point of reference for the US-China-Afghanistan triangle as viewed from India’s perspective.

What makes The Comrades and the Mullahs different is that this book is not another dry political assessment of how China is encroaching on Afghanistan and how the US has failed. This book also highlights the tragedy of Afghanistan, its people, and its ill-fated geography. As the authors have noted, “beyond all the debates and discussions about geopolitical games, the ability of the regime of the day to stabilize the country is what ultimately matters above all else.”

The reviewer is a Research Analyst (China Studies) at The Takshashila Institution. She tweets at @pardhimegha21