NEITHER A HAWK NOR A DOVE
Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri
Viking
452 pages; Rs 999
Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri's purported insider account of Pakistan's foreign policy is 800 pages too long and avoidably repetitive. The same events are covered in different places with no apparent logic. It has a stream-of-consciousness feel about it. Nevertheless, it is of interest to Indian readers precisely because so little is known about political decision-making in Pakistan and Mr Kasuri offers us a glimpse, however partial and sometimes self-serving, of the drivers of foreign policy there. The book is of special interest to me since it covers a part of the period that I was foreign secretary and associated, on the Indian side, with some of the developments in India-Pakistan relations.
The fact that back-channel talks were taking place was well known. On the Indian side it was clear that no territorial adjustments would be involved. The aim would be to make the LoC a soft frontier in line with then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's oft repeated dictum, "I do not have a mandate to change India's borders but I do have the mandate to make borders irrelevant." The Pakistani side was talking about joint management. The Indian side was considering something in the nature of a joint consultative mechanism on matters of mutual interest. I do not believe that this crucial difference was resolved.
Further, what was under discussion was not a solution to the Kashmir issue but a means of managing it pending a final solution. When Asif Ali Zardari became Pakistan's president, at the first meeting with Dr Singh in New York, he conveyed that he had been briefed about the back channel talks and wished to continue with them. However, there was little progress and our assessment was that the Pakistani army was not keen to continue with this exercise. Mr Kasuri is, in fact, exaggerating the nature of the deal and the support it enjoyed within the military.
He is right in claiming that the two sides came close to resolving the Siachen and Sir Creek issues. On Siachen, the Pakistani side, in effect, accepted the Indian demand on defining the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), by agreeing to a schedule that would plot withdrawals from existing points of deployment to new agreed positions, thereby creating a well-defined zone of disengagement. There would have been provisions for monitoring including joint patrolling. The principles underlying this agreement were worked out in Murree between the Pakistan Foreign Secretary and I, while the two foreign ministers meeting in another room. Shivshankar Menon, then Indian high commissioner to Pakistan, was present. The agreement was considered at a Cabinet meeting later but was set aside because of unexpected second thoughts among some members. Sir Creek, too, was ripe for settlement and was easier to deliver on. Once the Siachen deal fell through, however, there was little enthusiasm for it on the Pakistani side.
Mr Kasuri acknowledges Pakistan's use of cross-border terrorism as an instrument of state policy but tries to consign it to the pre-Musharraf past. He is unable to shed the tired narrative that it is the unresolved issue of Kashmir, the "core issue," that is feeding militant activity over which the state has only partial control. He is constantly seeking equivalence; the Mumbai terror attack against the Samjhauta Express bombing, terrorism in Kashmir against India's alleged support to the Balochistan insurgency. He projects Pakistan as much a victim of terrorism as India. He glosses over the embarrassment he says he felt over Osama bin Laden being found living in Abbottabad but claims that no complicity of the state has been found.
Some excitement was generated by his revelation that following the Mumbai terror attack in 2008, US Senator John McCain had sought his reaction to a possible punitive air raid by India against Muridke, headquarters of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the Laskhar-e-Toiba, near Lahore. He suggests that this was a serious option India considered and warns that any such action could have disastrous consequences, a none-too-subtle reference to Pakistan's nuclear status. I do not know what retaliatory measures were considered at the time, but Mr Kasuri's "warning" only demonstrates Pakistan's belief that nuclear deterrence allows it to indulge in cross-border terrorism with little risk of punitive retaliation. It is a dangerous assumption to make.
There are several parts of Mr Kasuri's narrative that one may take issue with. What is welcome is his transparent conviction that India and Pakistan are capable of resolving outstanding issues and that there is a broad constituency in both countries who are keen on friendly relations. One may also agree with his contention that the period under Pervez Musharraf and his own tenure as foreign minister saw one of the more productive and hopeful phases in our bilateral relations. In these dark days, it was encouraging to see Mr Kasuri come to India to launch his book and reiterate the message of friendship and goodwill. We need more champions of peace like him on both sides of the border.
The reviewer is a former foreign secretary, currently chairman, RIS and senior fellow, CPR
Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri
Viking
452 pages; Rs 999
Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri's purported insider account of Pakistan's foreign policy is 800 pages too long and avoidably repetitive. The same events are covered in different places with no apparent logic. It has a stream-of-consciousness feel about it. Nevertheless, it is of interest to Indian readers precisely because so little is known about political decision-making in Pakistan and Mr Kasuri offers us a glimpse, however partial and sometimes self-serving, of the drivers of foreign policy there. The book is of special interest to me since it covers a part of the period that I was foreign secretary and associated, on the Indian side, with some of the developments in India-Pakistan relations.
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Mr Kasuri's main contention is that between 2004 and 2007, India and Pakistan had, through a back-channel dialogue blessed by their respective leaders, reached an in-principle agreement on a solution on Kashmir. Its contours rested on the establishment of a joint cross-Line of Control (LoC) mechanism that would "manage" items of shared interest, such as trade and travel, water resources, environmental challenges and cultural exchanges. The mechanism would have elected representatives from both sides of the LoC, covering the entire erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, including Gilgit and Baltistan on the Pakistani side and Jammu and Ladakh on the Indian side; plus representatives of the two central governments. Kasuri acknowledges that the proposal did not go forward once the domestic situation in Pakistan deteriorated following the agitation against Pervez Musharraf on the dismissal of the chief justice.
The fact that back-channel talks were taking place was well known. On the Indian side it was clear that no territorial adjustments would be involved. The aim would be to make the LoC a soft frontier in line with then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's oft repeated dictum, "I do not have a mandate to change India's borders but I do have the mandate to make borders irrelevant." The Pakistani side was talking about joint management. The Indian side was considering something in the nature of a joint consultative mechanism on matters of mutual interest. I do not believe that this crucial difference was resolved.
Further, what was under discussion was not a solution to the Kashmir issue but a means of managing it pending a final solution. When Asif Ali Zardari became Pakistan's president, at the first meeting with Dr Singh in New York, he conveyed that he had been briefed about the back channel talks and wished to continue with them. However, there was little progress and our assessment was that the Pakistani army was not keen to continue with this exercise. Mr Kasuri is, in fact, exaggerating the nature of the deal and the support it enjoyed within the military.
He is right in claiming that the two sides came close to resolving the Siachen and Sir Creek issues. On Siachen, the Pakistani side, in effect, accepted the Indian demand on defining the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), by agreeing to a schedule that would plot withdrawals from existing points of deployment to new agreed positions, thereby creating a well-defined zone of disengagement. There would have been provisions for monitoring including joint patrolling. The principles underlying this agreement were worked out in Murree between the Pakistan Foreign Secretary and I, while the two foreign ministers meeting in another room. Shivshankar Menon, then Indian high commissioner to Pakistan, was present. The agreement was considered at a Cabinet meeting later but was set aside because of unexpected second thoughts among some members. Sir Creek, too, was ripe for settlement and was easier to deliver on. Once the Siachen deal fell through, however, there was little enthusiasm for it on the Pakistani side.
Mr Kasuri acknowledges Pakistan's use of cross-border terrorism as an instrument of state policy but tries to consign it to the pre-Musharraf past. He is unable to shed the tired narrative that it is the unresolved issue of Kashmir, the "core issue," that is feeding militant activity over which the state has only partial control. He is constantly seeking equivalence; the Mumbai terror attack against the Samjhauta Express bombing, terrorism in Kashmir against India's alleged support to the Balochistan insurgency. He projects Pakistan as much a victim of terrorism as India. He glosses over the embarrassment he says he felt over Osama bin Laden being found living in Abbottabad but claims that no complicity of the state has been found.
Some excitement was generated by his revelation that following the Mumbai terror attack in 2008, US Senator John McCain had sought his reaction to a possible punitive air raid by India against Muridke, headquarters of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the Laskhar-e-Toiba, near Lahore. He suggests that this was a serious option India considered and warns that any such action could have disastrous consequences, a none-too-subtle reference to Pakistan's nuclear status. I do not know what retaliatory measures were considered at the time, but Mr Kasuri's "warning" only demonstrates Pakistan's belief that nuclear deterrence allows it to indulge in cross-border terrorism with little risk of punitive retaliation. It is a dangerous assumption to make.
There are several parts of Mr Kasuri's narrative that one may take issue with. What is welcome is his transparent conviction that India and Pakistan are capable of resolving outstanding issues and that there is a broad constituency in both countries who are keen on friendly relations. One may also agree with his contention that the period under Pervez Musharraf and his own tenure as foreign minister saw one of the more productive and hopeful phases in our bilateral relations. In these dark days, it was encouraging to see Mr Kasuri come to India to launch his book and reiterate the message of friendship and goodwill. We need more champions of peace like him on both sides of the border.
The reviewer is a former foreign secretary, currently chairman, RIS and senior fellow, CPR