The India-Pakistan conundrum

India and Pakistan 

Neighbours At Odds

Avtar Singh Bhasin

Bloomsbury

538 pages; Rs 599

This study is a detailed record of India and Pakistan’s conflict-ridden relations for the past 70 years. Every major or minor event has been presented chronologically, stretching from Jawaharlal Nehru’s time to Manmohan Singh's. It is fitting that the first 13 of the 34 chapters have been devoted to the policies, decisions and actions of India’s first prime minister (1947-1964); he had to grapple with the legacy of partition and the challenges of statecraft confronting the new state of India.

The author has correctly contextualised the origin of India-Pakistan antagonism in the pre-partition Congress versus Muslim League conflicts, which became a permanent cause of hostilities when the two countries were formed. This antagonism resulted in a full-fledged war on October 28, 1947, over Kashmir, until the ceasefire on January 1, 1949. This so-called ceasefire did not bring peace, however, and the author traces the serial failures of all negotiations down the decades.

The weight of the details in this account may have caused the author to ignore some of the obvious deductions from the facts that he himself presents. First, he is hyper-critical of Nehru’s role and his policies, though his own narrative clearly suggests that India’s first prime minister was grappling with difficulties not only on the domestic front but also from western countries. “[A]n opportunity was lost on Article 370 and India got caught in the web of its own making,” he writes and elaborates: “…unfortunately, Nehru had rendered the Maharaja irrelevant and handed over the veto power to Sheikh Abdullah, who used [it] to bring Nehru to his knees in order to prevent full integration”.

The author has not drawn any analytical conclusions from events from 1947-1954 when the Nehru government arrested Abdullah, who had betrayed the confidence that Nehru and Kashmiris had vested in him. If Sheikh Abdullah was creating problems for the Indian leadership, any “solution” to the Kashmir problem was not possible without him. In other words, the author failed to highlight Abdullah’s betrayal.

Second, Lord Mountbatten, the British Commander-in-Chief of India, and the British government in London were all involved in activities that were against India’s interests during the post-partition period. During the war in Kashmir, the British High Commissioner in Pakistan informed his government that “Kashmir’s accession to India was illegal” -- in spite of the fact that the Kashmir Constituent Assembly had ratified the accession of Kashmir to India. The author mentions these facts but does not draw any analytical conclusion from them.

Third, the US and Europe, which dominated every international organisation, especially the UN Security Council, favoured Pakistan — based on a mistaken perception of its status with the oil-rich Islamic regimes of West Asia — and bound the country into US military alliances. Supplying arms to Pakistan provoked an arms race with India. The author appears to have ignored these historical facts, although they are mentioned in his book, so that it is hard to escape the view that his judgement of Nehru seems to be based on personal prejudice.

Two macro-facts that the author highlights are, however, relevant for an understanding of continuing hostilities between the two nations in spite of negotiations for peace. First, he writes, “the root of the problem was Pakistan’s failure to admit or accept that both in size and resources it was no match for India”. Second, he points out that India’s experience of dealing with Pakistan’s civilian governments was no better than dealing with the military generals. These two facts -- Pakistan’s desire for parity with India and the military’s insistence on focusing on Kashmir as the core issue in the relationship -- guide Pakistan’s security policies, whether nuclearisation, state sponsorship of terrorists, and client-state status with the US or, now, China.

P V Narasimha Rao summed it up in 1991: “...every time there was a change (of government), either in Pakistan or India, there is a sense of euphoria created and some new hopes are around. … [H] owever, we have not been quite successful in persuading Pakistan to improve relations with India”.

The author is categorical that the Shimla Agreement between Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto or the repatriation of 93,000 Pakistan soldiers and vacation of territories occupied in the Western part did not contain any secret or confidential agreement on Kashmir. The author has laid to rest the controversy on this issue about the Shimla Agreement because his documentation is “authentic”. The author observes that with the so-called verbal understanding between the two leaders “... Bhutto’s subterfuge had worked on Mrs. Gandhi and he carried the day”. The author does not see any merit in Indira Gandhi’s approach that a “militarily humiliated neighbour” -- his words -- should not be left with the feeling of humiliation, and that the conflict-resolution process should continue.

The author is a master of details but lacks a broad historical perspective to draw analytical conclusions from his rich data. Peace for development guided Nehru’s domestic and foreign policies and this was the framework for the policies pursued by Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh. Terrorism and cross-border infiltration are matters of concern, but cannot be reasons to halt political dialogue. This has been the Indian tradition before jingoist nationalists took over the public discourse.