THIS BRAVE NEW WORLD
India, China and the United States
Anja Manuel
Simon & Schuster;
384 pages; Rs 699
Ms Manuel is co-founder of a strategic consulting firm together with former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and former Secretary of Defence Robert Gates. The study intends to inform mainly the American public policy establishment but also corporate conglomerates seeking investment opportunities in these rapidly expanding economies about the social structures, political institutions and the goals of the governments of India and China.
It covers all the familiar bases. The first of this three-part exposition focuses on the historical experiences and memories of Chinese and Indians who are now determined to transform themselves into a modern state system and build strong economies so that the scourge of poverty is buried.
For China, the author makes the critical observation that “its history creates on combination of insecurity and bravado” and all its policies and actions are determined with a clear goal of accumulating economic and military power so that no powerful country can dominate and humiliate it as it was done in the past. This well-known history explains why Chinese rulers from Mao to Xi “value the stability of the system and economic prosperity above all else, even if it meant sacrificing individual freedoms”.
India, unlike China, does not carry the burden of its past or feel the need to take aggressive postures in world affairs. The author, however, notes a change inasmuch as “Hindu nationalist in Modi’s cabinet also advocate for a more muscular and military focused foreign policy and a harder line towards China. But, in contrast to China, “India has an astonishing diversity of ethnic, religious, geographic, political and caste affiliations”. This has led to complex coalition politics and a relatively weak central government. Whereas the authority of decision making flows from top to bottom in China, in India it flows from bottom to top because of its federal system.
This historical context is intended to underline the different approaches that are required when negotiating with the two emerging giants. This leads to second part, “Building a Brave New World”, where six chapters are devoted to social problems in these two countries, some of which are remarkably similar. There are no real revelations here: corruption, income and wealth disparities, for instance, are rife in both countries; in terms of demographic problems, China is confronted with an ageing population and India a youth bulge.
The critical difference, which may surprise some Indians, is the relative level of gender equality. In China, it is fairly high not least because of Mao’s observation that women hold up half the sky. She notes, however, that with the swing to market capitalism, “the communist insistence on gender equality is less prominent” and prejudice is creeping back into the system. Still, the plight of China’s women is generations beyond their sisters in India. She recounts visits to Indian slums where poor, labouring-class women are routinely subjected to rape and abuse by men.
Ms Manuel has tackled political systems and dissent in both countries as interrelated themes. She covers the familiar trajectory of the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 1989, a reflection of the Chinese governing establishment’s sensitivity to protest that is extended to the crushing of Muslim Uighur and Turkmen tribes who express unhappiness with the dominance of the Han Chinese majority. On the Indian method of dealing with dissent the author refers to the anti-corruption rallies of Anna Hazare in 2011 and she quotes an elderly man in the protest as saying, “Our government is failing us. We must help it get better. It is our job as Indians.”
The author also traces the focused trajectory of China’s liberalisation as a mercantilist power that encourages an industrial strategy to secure natural resources overseas and create opportunities for state-owned enterprises. India, by contrast, has no comprehensive economic strategy and its economic sway beyond its borders is limited. She castigates Indian trade policy for being protectionist and the bureaucracy for being obstructionist and negative, pointing out that these problems make it difficult for India to compete with China.
These observations, which are not novel, unwittingly reflect the American position vis-à-vis India and its concern with China’s rapid rise and visibly strengthening ties with Pakistan via the One Belt One Road initiative and the tidal wave of investments.
Her overall message is that China and India are rightfully pushing the US to rethink the post-World War II global order. The US, she thinks, should welcome the two as partners “rather than obstinately refuse to acknowledge that the world is changing” and explore ways to leverage their projection of power as opportunities.
India, China and the United States
Anja Manuel
Simon & Schuster;
384 pages; Rs 699
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The 21st century is considered the Asian Century because of China and India’s emergence as the new centres of economic power, not just as destinations for trade and foreign investment but also as competitors to advanced western economies for natural resources and markets. This rebalancing of the global economic power structure has created unique new challenges that scholars cannot afford to ignore, says Anja Manuel, an American public policy expert and writer of this well-researched study of the triangular relationship between America, India and China.
Ms Manuel is co-founder of a strategic consulting firm together with former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and former Secretary of Defence Robert Gates. The study intends to inform mainly the American public policy establishment but also corporate conglomerates seeking investment opportunities in these rapidly expanding economies about the social structures, political institutions and the goals of the governments of India and China.
It covers all the familiar bases. The first of this three-part exposition focuses on the historical experiences and memories of Chinese and Indians who are now determined to transform themselves into a modern state system and build strong economies so that the scourge of poverty is buried.
For China, the author makes the critical observation that “its history creates on combination of insecurity and bravado” and all its policies and actions are determined with a clear goal of accumulating economic and military power so that no powerful country can dominate and humiliate it as it was done in the past. This well-known history explains why Chinese rulers from Mao to Xi “value the stability of the system and economic prosperity above all else, even if it meant sacrificing individual freedoms”.
India, unlike China, does not carry the burden of its past or feel the need to take aggressive postures in world affairs. The author, however, notes a change inasmuch as “Hindu nationalist in Modi’s cabinet also advocate for a more muscular and military focused foreign policy and a harder line towards China. But, in contrast to China, “India has an astonishing diversity of ethnic, religious, geographic, political and caste affiliations”. This has led to complex coalition politics and a relatively weak central government. Whereas the authority of decision making flows from top to bottom in China, in India it flows from bottom to top because of its federal system.
This historical context is intended to underline the different approaches that are required when negotiating with the two emerging giants. This leads to second part, “Building a Brave New World”, where six chapters are devoted to social problems in these two countries, some of which are remarkably similar. There are no real revelations here: corruption, income and wealth disparities, for instance, are rife in both countries; in terms of demographic problems, China is confronted with an ageing population and India a youth bulge.
The critical difference, which may surprise some Indians, is the relative level of gender equality. In China, it is fairly high not least because of Mao’s observation that women hold up half the sky. She notes, however, that with the swing to market capitalism, “the communist insistence on gender equality is less prominent” and prejudice is creeping back into the system. Still, the plight of China’s women is generations beyond their sisters in India. She recounts visits to Indian slums where poor, labouring-class women are routinely subjected to rape and abuse by men.
Ms Manuel has tackled political systems and dissent in both countries as interrelated themes. She covers the familiar trajectory of the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 1989, a reflection of the Chinese governing establishment’s sensitivity to protest that is extended to the crushing of Muslim Uighur and Turkmen tribes who express unhappiness with the dominance of the Han Chinese majority. On the Indian method of dealing with dissent the author refers to the anti-corruption rallies of Anna Hazare in 2011 and she quotes an elderly man in the protest as saying, “Our government is failing us. We must help it get better. It is our job as Indians.”
The author also traces the focused trajectory of China’s liberalisation as a mercantilist power that encourages an industrial strategy to secure natural resources overseas and create opportunities for state-owned enterprises. India, by contrast, has no comprehensive economic strategy and its economic sway beyond its borders is limited. She castigates Indian trade policy for being protectionist and the bureaucracy for being obstructionist and negative, pointing out that these problems make it difficult for India to compete with China.
These observations, which are not novel, unwittingly reflect the American position vis-à-vis India and its concern with China’s rapid rise and visibly strengthening ties with Pakistan via the One Belt One Road initiative and the tidal wave of investments.
Her overall message is that China and India are rightfully pushing the US to rethink the post-World War II global order. The US, she thinks, should welcome the two as partners “rather than obstinately refuse to acknowledge that the world is changing” and explore ways to leverage their projection of power as opportunities.