No terrorist atrocity in India has produced as much distorted reportage as Mumbai 26/11. The ill-equipped and untrained city police got all the blame, while journalists failed to ask even basic questions. Why, for instance, did the Indian Army and the Navy commandos refuse to fight the Pakistani jihadis inside the Oberoi hotel?
Ashok Kamte, a flamboyant Mumbai Police additional commissioner, was someone who did fight, along with another exceptional IPS officer, Hemant Karkare. They died in an ambush in a dim-lit lane. Now Kamte’s wife has written a book on this tragic event based on police wireless records she obtained through the RTI Act.
Unfortunately, the thrust of the book’s argument — that the Police Control Room, headed that night by Crime Branch chief Rakesh Maria, bears responsibility for the deaths — is not supported by the facts. Moreover, the book only cursorily examines a significant revelation — that besides other Crime Branch men, Maria sent his own deputy with six armed constables to combat the Lashkar-e-Taiba gunmen.
What did this officer do? He never went to Cama Hospital, where the terrorists were initially holed up. Instead, he climbed the terrace of a nearby building, stayed put for over an hour, and then exited from the wrong side after Kamte, Karkare and the others had been shot. If he had gone to Cama, maybe they would still be alive.
Strangely, Vinita Kamte doesn’t even name this officer. But we don’t need the RTI to find out. The Crime Branch No. 2 is none other than Deven Bharti, one of the four officers the Pradhan Committee relied on to indict then police chief Hasan Gafoor as a “poor leader”, and one from the same famous foursome that “supercop” Julio Ribeiro hailed as “outstanding officers… some of the most competent in the department”.
Bharti had an extended midnight caper. While the bodies of Kamte, Karkare and four others were being taken to hospital, he ran off with his armed posse to another part of the city after apparently getting a “hot tip-off” that terrorists were holed up there. He didn’t find any.
Ribeiro is a respected authority on police matters. But this time he has left us totally wide-eyed. Take the charade around Vinita Kamte’s book. He was the guest of honour at its Mumbai launch. This meant he endorsed its contents.
More From This Section
Yet, four days later, Ribeiro criticised the author and defended Maria. His explanation for this strange behaviour? He had gone to the book launch after “quickly” reading the manuscript. He later asked Vinita Kamte to “bring all the records”. After examining them “very carefully” he found “her conclusions are not correct”.
“She is emotionally troubled right now and we must sympathise with her,” Ribeiro said. And added: “I know Maria is not a fool to make such a blunder.” Didn’t he know that when he went to the book launch?
And does he at all wonder why Maria, despite being so media savvy, has been under such sustained attack? Could it have anything to do with the hostility from some influential officers who feel threatened by the successful anti-terror investigations conducted by both Maria and Karkare under Gafoor’s leadership before 26/11?
There’s another glaring omission in the book. No mention at all of KP Raghuvanshi, the most senior IPS officer present on the spot that night. Raghuvanshi both preceded and succeeded Karkare as chief of the Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS). After his first controversial stint, he was promoted as Additional DGP in charge of railway security, directly under the command of state DGP AN Roy. Roy quickly brought him back to the ATS after Karkare’s demise.
You can see him with Karkare in TV shots from 26/11. The Lashkar ghouls, Ajmal Kasab and Ismail Khan, had just massacred 52 people, including three of his own men, at the CST train station. Yet Raghuvanshi decided not to join Karkare in pursuit of the terrorists, but went back to CST. No one has asked him why. Nor do we know what orders he got from Roy. But one of his men has helpfully explained. In a “first person” account in the Asian Age, an ATS commando recently said that Raghuvanshi had to leave Karkare and rush back to CST to attend to an emergency — the door to a motorman’s cabin wouldn’t open!
Corruption, crass careerism and political meddling have hollowed out the Mumbai Police, once a premier force in India. “Even the legendary bonding amongst IPS officers is gone,” said a policeman ruefully. “When officers meet today, the talk is more often about who made how much money in what deal.”
This is an all-India problem. But it’s acute in Mumbai as the city sits on piles of cash. The underworld, real estate developers, crooked politicians and big business all combine to warp the system.
Both Kamte and Karkare were “outsiders” in this system. When circumstance brought them together that fateful night, both knew they had to pursue the terrorists. Moreover, a fellow IPS officer was injured and under fire inside Cama. The best traditions of the service demanded they go to his aid.
In the end, the only mystery about the deaths of Kamte and Karkare is this: how could two police officers retain their faith and dedication, and be ready to face the ultimate challenge in life, while working in a professional milieu marked by so much cynicism, greed and crookery?
TO THE LAST BULLET
Vinita Kamte, with Vinita Deshmukh
Ameya Prakashan
221 pages; Rs 300