A 'bottom-up' approach to defence management is a bold experiment

While the ministry of defence has been pitching a joint operations command for better synergy among the country's armed services, it has not revealed why the recommendations of the GoMs were rejected

It has been seventeen years since the group of ministers (GoM), tasked to review the national security system in its entirety, submitted its report. In keeping with our indifferent approach to national security, whilst some peripheral recommendations have been implemented, two vital issues of higher defence management, namely civil-military interface and jointness in operational planning, remain unaddressed.

That out of the blue, one aspect of this complex subject, namely the issue of theatre commands, should become the subject of a raging media debate, comes as a surprise. This refers to the setting up joint command centres, where assets of all three armed forces would come under the operational command of a three-star officer from any of the services.

It now appears that the subject has been under consideration within the Ministry of Defence since last year and for very valid reasons, the IAF is not on board having put its views in a position paper, saying it is the only integrated service.

It is intriguing that this internal debate should suddenly burst into public domain triggered by the publishing of a paper by the defence think thank, Centre For Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS) whose executive council consists of senior serving officers and whose advisory board is headed by none other than the defence minister. The paper is authored by a serving Rear Admiral of the navy and the views reflected in the paper are claimed to be those of the author. Nevertheless, the fact that CENJOWS has chosen to publish it, may – to this writer’s mind – not be insignificant.

This view is strengthened by the reported statement of the RM to the effect that the issue of jointness was very dear to the prime minister’s heart and in her words: “We want a bottom-up approach, create the base and then add layers to it”.

GoM recommendations rejected

Whilst it is heartening to learn that jointness is of concern to the PM, the defence minister has not shared with us why the ‘top-down’ approach, recommended by the GoM (based on the study by the Arun Singh Task Force on Management of Defence), is being summarily rejected. What is indeed worrisome is the defence minister’s prescription to address it through a ‘bottom-up’ approach.

To put the issue in the correct perspective, the GoM recommendations whilst proposing a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) had stated:

“The functioning of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) has, to date, revealed serious weaknesses in its ability to provide single point military advice to the government, and resolve substantive inter-service doctrinal, planning, policy and operational issues adequately. This institution needs to be appropriately revamped to discharge its responsibilities efficiently and effectively, including the facilitation of “jointness” and synergy among the defence services.”

In its recommendations, the GOM stated: “The COSC has not been effective in fulfilling its mandate. It needs to be strengthened by the addition of a CDS and a Vice-Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS).”

One can only guess that failing to obtain consensus on the vital recommendations of the GoM concerning a CDS, the MOD appears to have chosen the path of least resistance by starting from the bottom, where the only obstacle appears to be IAF.

It is in this scenario that the paper in question titled “The IAF and Theaterisation – Misplaced Apprehensions” appears to serve a purpose. The author, whilst making a case for replacing individual service operational commands with theatre commands, is unduly critical of the IAF for harming itself by opposing the concept, thereby weakening trust between it and the army and navy. That it is unusual for a senior serving officer to be criticising a sister service in an open forum is an understatement. That such a paper should be published by a well-respected think tank when it makes subjective and unsubstantiated comments and claims, without the backing of any reference material, is doubly surprising.

Contradictions and biases

To put this in perspective, some contradictions and biases in the paper merit mention. To quote, the author believes that “the problem does not lie in integration amongst the three services. Our Higher Defence Organisation (HDO) is in good shape with excellent relations between senior commanders”. This observation is in conflict with the earlier quoted views of the GoM.

The author blames IAF’s culture of “do it alone” for the Navy taking over the maritime reconnaissance role from the IAF and the Army taking over helicopters for air observation post (OP) duties from the IAF. On the contrary, in its position paper against the concept of theatre commands, the IAF has argued that it is the only service that is integrated, bottom-up, with each of the other two armed forces (navy and army).

This is factually correct and from personal in-service experience, one can say that when performing roles of air OP and maritime reconnaissance, the IAF fully recognised its support function and deferred to the operational needs of the concerned service. It is in this spirit that the IAF has for decades positioned an advanced HQ (under a two-star rank) with its sister-service command HQs to facilitate integrated planning and smooth air operations at their doorstep. Far from smacking of “do it alone”, this remains a model of jointness to this day.

The irony is that it was the natural desire of the services to have their own air arms rather than any operational or command and control weaknesses that drove them to press for transfer of these assets. Whilst the desire to own their air assets at one time may have been understandable, whether it is cost effective today for the nation to maintain three separate air arms – each with its own logistics, support and training functions – when costs are rising steeply and defence budgets under stress, is a moot point.

Modern warfare a whole new ball game

Indeed one can argue that dynamics of modern warfare encompassing space, cyber, electronic, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), cruise and surface missiles along with a host of technological advancements, is a whole new ball game. In this scenario, there is every merit in having another look at the traditional roles and missions of each of the services by using modern scientific and engineering tools of joint warfare analysis for arriving at new roles and missions. Integral to this thinking is for the armed forces to keep subjectivity and individual service emotions at bay. This is a tall order.

And finally, shorn of any supporting evidence, the author believes that it is the IAF’s fear of losing the maximum number of Commander’s posts that is at the heart of its reluctance towards the entire concept of theatre commands. It is a pity that a subject as serious as the one under discussion should be reduced to the level of innuendo. Worse, that it find place in the publication of a reputed think tank.

In 2000, in a paper IAF 2020 presented to the Arun Singh Task Force on Management of Defence, emphasising on the need to look at integrated and affordable defence planning this writer had said, “Criteria of affordability must now guide the very basis of national security planning. A top to bottom integrated approach rather than a distributive ‘do with what you get’ approach.”

From the defence minister’s statement, one understands that the MOD has given up on the GoM recommendations of integration of service HQ with MOD and creating a Chief of Defence Staff to promote jointness. Instead, it wishes to experiment from ‘bottom-up’, namely at the very sharp end of our fighting capability. Whilst politically, this may appear to indicate progress, only the very bold will choose to experiment at the very sharp end of the national security chain.

We need to pause and think.

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Brijesh D. Jayal is a former air marshal of the Indian Air Force.