Manoranjan Mohanty, honorary fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi, and fellow at Orfalea Center for Global & International Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara, talks to Aditi Phadnis about the challenges facing Chinese President Xi Jinping and his agenda for the party congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC).
The 19th party congress of the CPC is scheduled to start from October 18. What should we be looking for and why is it so important?
The 19th party congress of the CPC has assumed enormous significance for China and the Xi Jinping leadership, having implications for the evolving global scenario. Of the two centenaries that are talked about in China today, one is in 2021 when the CPC will be 100 years old, the other in 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.
The year 2020 has been earmarked to achieve the doubling of the 2010 gross domestic product (GDP) and the per capita income and build a “well-off society in all respects”. Xi, all set to be elected for a second five-year term, has to achieve this. The doubling is not in doubt, but all Chinese being well-off in all respects is. Relatively low growth rate of GDP at slightly below seven per cent has been accepted as the “new normal” that was good enough to maintain the growth momentum. But serious problems of unemployment and distress migration from the countryside persist along with environmental degradation and rising inequalities. Xi and his new team, which will be in place in October, had to grapple with that.
In the global plane, Xi has many initiatives such as One Belt One Road (OBOR), the new security doctrine, the notion of humanity with a common destiny, great power relations in the 21st century. All this has economic and security implications for Asia and the world as a whole. Xi’s political report will put his domestic and foreign policy initiatives into one integrated framework. This will be watched with great interest throughout the world.
It appears the stand-off on Doklam has been resolved, with India withdrawing its soldiers. The stand-off has been linked with the need for Xi to “save face” in the days leading up to the party congress. Do you subscribe to this view?
The withdrawal of Indian forces from Doklam, along with stopping of road construction activities by the Chinese on August 28, might have been timed for facilitating a bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS meeting in Xiamen on September 5. Much speculative commentary appeared in the media, linking the Doklam stand-off to the People’s Liberation Army (PLC)-CPC rivalry in China, the Xi regime trying to demonstrate China’s authority in the border regions, Xi affirming his standing as the supreme leader in China and so on. Xi has indeed reshuffled the PLA as his predecessors did to put new leaders under his command. This process has gone on for over a year. Recently, he replaced the PLA chief of staff General Fang Fenghui with Li Zuocheng. Similarly, he was named the “core” of the party leadership at the sixth plenum of the Central Committee in October 2016.
As for the Doklam situation, leaders of the two countries deployed active diplomacy to defreeze the tense stand-off, establish normalcy and carry on their relations at multiple levels. Not doing that would have been costly for both sides. That the two sides allowed such a situation to arise in the first place exposed the level of inaction and inefficiency in the China-India border management at present. It was reported that the summit meeting in Xiamen initiated a process to put in place a more efficient system to avert such contingencies in the future.
Xi will be meeting several internal challenges head on, including corruption, on which he is said to have read the riot act to the party cadre. But taking a strong stance could also jeopardise his standing in the party. What are the signals we should watch out for?
Clean and pro-people governance has been Xi’s platform throughout his first term. His book, The Governance of China, has broken all records in the global circulation of books. His anti-corruption campaign may have many angles, including purging political rivals and putting corporate heads on a cautious stand and even pushing some business houses out of the country. But it has created an atmosphere of accountability in public service in China.
Xi is going to pick his team of perhaps five new members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, with himself and Premier Li Keqiang both continuing for another five-year term. The trend of giving his ideas on governance and global initiatives a fresh theoretical status is clearly discernible. The People’s Daily recently ran a people’s forum on its pages, where some writers refer to Xi Jinping Thought. The term, “Thought”(sixiang), was used only for Mao Zedong, whereas it was Deng Xiaoping Theory, Important Thought of Three Represents of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s Scientific Outlook on Development. Xi’s Four Comprehensives (in relation to reforms, rule of law, strict governance in the party and a well-off society) and the international policy formulations may constitute what could emerge as the contours of Xi Jinping Thought at the 19th party congress.
There is a rumour that he may restore Mao’s title as chairperson of the CPC for himself, rather than continuing in the position of general secretary. Deng’s political strategy to build institutions of collective leadership with clear tenures and procedures for succession seems to have been weakened. Xi has set up a number of special committees with himself as the head, thus centralising considerable power in his own hands. These might seem to be gestures of a leader still trying to be sure about his popularity among the people, authority over the state, party and army, and, above all, his place in history. It is also possible that he may take innovative steps such as having a woman and a non-Han in the top leadership and several other measures to implement his five-pronged development strategy — innovation, openness, green, coordinated, inclusive — and invite all-round applause.
The OBOR summit that India stayed away from has committed the unequivocal support of several countries to the programme, though they might have been wavering earlier. However, problems, especially in its financing, continue. Will the party congress discuss this?
Yes, the party congress will put OBOR on a pedestal as Xi’s big global initiative in a win-win framework. The Chinese have committed close to a trillion dollars for five years. Funding won’t be a problem; actual negotiations on each project and their economic and security implications for the region would be the problem. India has launched the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor together with Japan. This need not be conceptualised as a rival to OBOR. In fact, various multilateral initiatives can negotiate interactions and convergence strategies. That might lend flexibility to the zero-sum position that India has put itself in vis-a-vis OBOR while enabling it to affirm its political and security interests in various cases such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
Current and retired Chinese leaders spent time together at a retreat to hammer out the way the meeting will be structured, what issues will be raised, etc. Will we see new international and economic trajectories for China in the future?
This is an old practice to convene informal meeting at the seaside resort of Beidaihe before the party congress, where old and prospective central committee members or equivalent cadres meet to discuss personnel changes and policy formulations. This was in the form of a “working conference” in the time of Mao. Deng made it a regular practice. This unique institution seeks to build consensus.