Definition in one law not applicable to other

EXPERT EYE

It has been quite a practice in legal parlance to interpret certain terms or expressions by relying on definitions of these words occurring in some other statutes. The Supreme Court has now settled the principle that a statute has to be interpreted in the context in which the words are used in that particular statute.

The context in which these words have been used in some other Acts may be quite different and so may not have any relevance for purpose of interpreting this statute.

In its latest judgement on this issue in the Kohinoor Elastics Pvt Ltd vs Commissioner of Central Excise case, 2005(188)ELT 3(SC), the Supreme Court had to deal with the meaning of the word "brand name" and "trade name" in a central excise notification.

The tribunal had interpreted these expressions with reference to the same word used in the Merchandise and Trade Marks Act. The Supreme Court pointed out that the context in which those terms had been used in the Trade Marks Act was not relevant for the purpose of interpreting them in a notification in the Central Excise Act. The context being different, it is not permissible to bring in the meaning in another Act for interpretation of certain terms in the Central Excise Act.

While this is the latest pronouncement by the Supreme Court, there have been some well known decisions on this issue in the past. One of the most renowned judgements was in the PC Cheriyan vs Barfi Devi case, AIR 1980 SC 86, wherein the Supreme Court had ruled that the definition of manufacture in the Central Excise Act or the Factories Act should not be applicable in other Acts such as the Transfer of Property Act.

The apex court said in some Acts such as the Central Excise Act, manufacturing had been given an extended meaning to include repairs in some cases. But in the case of the Transfer of Property Act no such meaning was applicable.

In the MSCO Pvt Ltd vs Union of India case, 1985 (19) ELT 15 (SC), the Supreme Court said the meaning given to the expression "industry" in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, could not be depended upon while construing other statutes such as Central Excise Act. It should be confined to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

In the Central Excise Act, the Customs Act, and other fiscal laws, the concepts are guided by the understanding in the market parlance, if there is not a statutory definition. Concept of food, therefore, is what people understand as food in the market.

In the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the concept is much more wide. It refers to whatever items people eat or drink, that is, say, whatever is consumed through the mouth.

The idea is not to consume adulterated items. The purpose is health- oriented. So the definition of food is not applicable as such for central excise purposes as laid down in the Commissioner of Central Excise vs Parley Exports case, 1988 (38) ELT 741 (SC).

However, if the context was the same, definitions could be lifted from one Act and used for interpretation in another, held the Bombay High Court in the Leukoplast vs State of Goa case, 1988 (36) ELT 369A (Bom). The expressions "drugs" and "cosmetics" used in the Drugs and Cosmetics Act is the same as the concept in the market parlance and therefore, while interpreting these words for central excise purposes, we can accept the meaning as in the Drugs and Cosmetics Act.

Thus a definition given to a word or expression in a particular Act cannot be used for interpretation of a similar word occurring in a different Act. But this is not an absolute principle of law.

In a given case, the definition given in a particular statute not being repugnant may be used to construe and interpret the same expression occurring in another statute.

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