Arrests being percieved as precursor of major government offensive.
The police has nabbed Chhatradhar Mahato, the public face of the Naxalites in Lalgarh, but failed to trap Koteswar Rao alias Kishenji. The same group of police masquerading as a team of TV journalists tried to entice Kishenji into a face to face meeting with them for an 'interview'.
Kishenji later told some of his known acquaintances in the media that yesterday morning he also received a phone call from the same 'TV journalist' requesting for an interview, but he declined that offer. In fact, had it been Kishenji in their net in stead of Chhtradhar Mahato, the police could have claimed a major success in their anti-Naxalite operation in West Bengal.
As indications coming from the police sources, the Central force is planning a major operation jointly with the state police in these two states in late October.
This time the army and air force will play a more active role in providing them logistic and intelligence support. Already 35,000 central forces have been deployed in these two states and another 20,000 would be added to strengthen their position. The air force helicopters are likely to be used in flying them to operation zones. Already during Lalgarh operation the joint force has made use of RISAT-2 satellite. This satellite of ISRO is capable of capturing and sending in very detailed still pictures of movement and hideouts of the Naxalites in the jungles of these states.
Pictures will be analysed by trained army personnel and passed on to the joint force's commanders. The National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) will provide them with inputs coming from communication intercept. The objective of the operation would be to destroy the main military base and its important links of the Naxalites which they had shifted from Andhra Pradesh to Chhattisgarh in recent time.
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In this context, the failure to apprehend Koteswar Rao is a major blunder for the police as he is the number one in the military wing of the CPI (Maoist). Like Kobad Gandhi, Koteswar Rao is also a member of the politburo. But Gandhi was in charge of publicity among the society's urban elites and publication wing.
Over the years the Naxalites in the Indian subcontinent has started coordinating their movements in the region.
For that they have formed a forum called Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations in South Asia (CCOMPSA), where Kishenji represents Indian Naxalites. Last time they held a meeting of this forum at some place near Rangpur in Bangladesh in 2006-7.
But then CPN (Maoist) led by Prachanda joined the government and it created a major rift in the forum. After CPN (Maoist) came out of the government in Nepal, the forum is trying to regroup itself. That his party put Kishenji in charge of coordinating with the fraternal organisations indicate the kind of confidence he enjoys within the party.
At the same time, following the Chinese communist party's model, the control over the military commission in the party is viewed as the most crucial to keeping power. Kishenji's dual responsibility shows that he is a very senior leader in the party hierarchy and should be considered as the 'prized catch' by the joint police force.
Compared to Gandhi and Kishenji, Chhatradhar is a less important catch. But his elder brother Shashadhar has joined the CPIM (Maoist) party and left his home much earlier.
According to Mamata Banerjee, he was expelled from the party after his suspected link with the extremists came to the surface. Chhatradhar became prominent after the tribal people started their agitation against the state administration and formed the Peoples' Committee Against Police Atrocity in Lalgarh.
It is true that Kishenji and Chhatradhar Mahato often aired their views and reactions through media.
While Chhatradhar often met the media, Kishenji was circumspect in meeting them. He used to choose his own time and place while calling the media persons for a press meet.
According to senior police officers, by tracking his mobile it was not difficult to locate his whereabouts, but that data is merely area specific, indicative of the region of at least few square kilometres.
Without any support and active cooperation from the local people it was not easy to conduct operation there and catch him in his den.
There is a growing consensus among the policy makers that the ideal response to the threat of the Naxalites, should be security centric, the development work should follow once the areas are freed of them.
The government is about to launch a massive coordinated operation against the Naxalites in Chhattishgarh and Jharkhand. Since the Naxalites are active in Lalgarh and areas bordering Jharkhand, the police operation in neighbouring state might force the Naxalites to intensify their hit and run activities in Bengal.