It is towards Ireland that all eyes in Brussels, the headquarters of the European Union, are currently trained. On October 2 the Irish will hold a referendum for the second time to decide whether or not to approve the Lisbon Treaty. The island-nation will thus decide the fate of a much beleaguered set of proposed changes to the 27-member EU’s rule book that has its opponents frothing at the mouth even as its supporters tout its transformational potential.
But after years of thus-far unsuccessful attempts to try and push through the reforms set out in the treaty, even if the Irish were to vote ‘yes,’ Lisbon has emerged less as a symbol of a dynamic, united Europe the world must take notice of, than a tortured process, symbolic mostly of the lack of political will and support for a stronger, more empowered Europe.
The Lisbon treaty began life with another name: the European constitution. But the constitution proved a non-starter with French and Dutch voters rejecting it in referendums held in 2005.
Smarting from this set-back the EU’s leaders retreated to regroup. But convinced that a rose by any other name would smell as sweet, they were back in 2007 with an alternative to the European constitution: the Lisbon Treaty.
The constitution had attempted to replace all earlier EU treaties and start afresh. It was also heavy on symbolism with its backers heralding it as the basis for a new European identity.
The Lisbon Treaty on the other hand kept the core provisions of the constitution while dressing it up in less flashy clothes. All references to the symbols of the EU — the flag, the anthem and the motto- were dropped. Moreover, rather than a fresh-start the Treaty was put forth as merely an amendment to earlier European treaties.
As a result most EU leaders were able to argue that there was no need to hold referendums for Lisbon and that legislative approval would suffice. The Treaty was projected as a series of complicated, dull, technocratic rules that the European public should not waste their time paying too much attention to and instead leave to the experts.
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Sneaking in the constitution in its new robes seemed to be the perfect solution until Ireland became the unlikely David to the EU’s Goliath. An Irish Supreme Court ruling in 1987 stated that any major amendment to an EU treaty needed an amendment to the Irish constitution. And any amendment to the Irish constitution needed to be passed by a referendum.
In 2008, Brussels was shocked when it’s painstakingly put together Lisbon Treaty was defeated by the Irish in a vote that many believed reflected issues that had nothing to do with the Treaty itself. The referendum its critics said was largely a vote on domestic issues reflecting dissatisfaction with the government of Brian Cowen.
Now, in a few days’ time the Irish will vote for again on the Treaty, following assurances from Brussels that the new rules will in no way impinge on domestic Irish matters like taxation, abortion, euthanasia, and so on.
While this time around polls show a slim lead for the “Yes” camp, the conclusion is far from foregone. Moreover, even were the Irish to approve it, the Treaty would still need to be ratified by Poland and signed by the Czech president.
The question that arises is that if Lisbon is eventually able to cross the remaining hurdles and make it gasping to the finish line, what difference will it make to Europe and to the world?
To begin with, the European Parliament, the only European institution which is directly elected by citizens, will have increased powers and will co-decide with the Council of Ministers on most legislative matters. Moreover, within the Council of Ministers decisions will no longer have to be taken unanimously, with majority voting becoming the norm. As a result any single member state will no longer be able to block the whole legislative process.
Making Europe more of a force on the geo-strategic stage is another major intention behind the Treaty. At the moment countries like India tend to give Brussels short-shrift because Europe does not speak with one voice on foreign policy issues.
Lisbon hopes to change this through various means. First, by the creation of a President of the European Council with a two-and-a-half year term. Next, by a new post of the High Representative of Foreign Affairs that will combine the jobs of the existing foreign affairs supremo, Javier Solana, and the external affairs commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner. Lastly, a dedicated External Action Service, in essence a diplomatic corps, will be at the disposal of this High Representative.
“The idea is to provide an answer to Kissinger’s famous question: ‘Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?’” explained Shada Islam of the European Policy Centre. But Islam was quick to add that even after Lisbon a united European foreign policy would remain elusive making a single phone number to call, less than useful.
“The Lisbon Treaty is silent on how to harmonise the conflicting foreign policy cultures and structures across Europe,” she said. Indeed, the Treaty may create a more unified organisation but it will not be able to generate more unified views behind it.
But Charles Grant, Director for the Centre of European Reform, remained cautiously optimistic. “Having a dedicated external action service will mean the EU can benefit from greater expertise in foreign affairs. The changes laid out in Lisbon will lead to a greater tendency to common foreign policy analysis,” he argued.
He added that a tangential benefit of the Lisbon Treaty going through would be to free up the political energy the process of getting it approved has soaked up. “Lisbon has been a big distraction from the key challenges facing Europe like illegal immigration, the rise of China, climate change and the Middle East process.”
“What we have learned through the Lisbon process,” Islam concluded, ‘is that 27 countries cannot be on the same wavelength.”
In the final analysis, it’s likely that whatever its ultimate fate, Lisbon will prove both its critics and its supporters wrong. It will not go down in History as the embodiment of a power-hungry Brussels gobbling up the sovereignty of national governments. Nor will it be remembered as the starting point for a stronger, more democratic Europe. Its legacy will instead be that of the Treaty that demonstrated the impracticability of treaty politics in a 27-member state Europe.