 "Capitol defenders blame bad intelligence for deadly breach")
Faulty intelligence was to blame for the outmanned Capitol defenders' failure to anticipate the violent mob that invaded the iconic building and halted certification of the presidential election on January 6, the officials who were in charge of security declared in their first public testimony on the insurrection.
The officials, including the former chief of the Capitol Police, on Tuesday pointed their fingers at various federal agencies and each other for their failure to defend the building as supporters of then-President Donald Trump overwhelmed security barriers, broke windows and doors and sent lawmakers fleeing from the House and Senate chambers.
Five people died as a result of the riot, including a Capitol Police officer and a woman who was shot as she tried to enter the House chamber with lawmakers still inside.
Former Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund, who resigned under pressure after the attack, and the other officials said they had expected the protests to be similar to two pro-Trump events in late 2020 that were far less violent.
He said he hadn't seen an FBI field office report that warned of potential violence citing online posts about a war. And he and a House official disputed each other's versions of decisions that January day and in advance about calling for the National Guard.
Sund described a scene as the mob arrived at the perimeter that was like nothing he had seen in his 30 years of policing and argued that the insurrection was not the result of poor planning by Capitol Police but of failures across the board.
More From This Section
Trump had rallied the invaders to protest his election loss at the Capitol, and the House later impeached him on a charge of incitement of insurrection. But he noted that he had asked the crowd to protest "peacefully," and the Senate acquitted him.
Sund insisted the invasion was not his or his agency's fault.
No single civilian law enforcement agency and certainly not the USCP is trained and equipped to repel, without significant military or other law enforcement assistance, an insurrection of thousands of armed, violent, and coordinated individuals focused on breaching a building at all costs, he testified.
The joint hearing, part of an investigation by two Senate committees, was the first time the officials testified publicly about the events of January 6. In addition to Sund, former Senate Sergeant-at-Arms Michael Stenger, former House Sergeant-at-Arms Paul Irving and Robert Contee, the acting chief of police for the Metropolitan Police Department, testified.
Like Sund, Irving and Stenger resigned under pressure after the deadly attack. They were Sund's supervisors and in charge of security for the House and Senate.
We must have the facts, and the answers are in this room," Senate Rules Committee Chairwoman Amy Klobuchar said at the beginning of the hearing. The Rules panel is conducting the joint probe with the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.
Much remains unknown about what happened before and during the assault. How much did law enforcement agencies know about plans for violence that day, many of which were public? How did the agencies share that information with each other? And how could the Capitol Police have been so ill-prepared for a violent insurrection that was organised online?
Sund told the lawmakers that he learned only after the attack that his officers had received a report from the FBI's field office in Norfolk, Virginia, that forecast, in detail, the chances that extremists could bring war to Washington the following day.
The head of the FBI's office in Washington has said that once he received the January 5 warning, the information was quickly shared with other law enforcement agencies through a joint terrorism task force.
Sund said Tuesday that an officer on the task force had received that memo and forwarded it to a sergeant working on intelligence for the Capitol Police but that the information was not sent on to other supervisors.
How could you not get that vital intelligence? asked Senate Homeland Chairman Gary Peters, who said the failure of the report to reach the chief was clearly a major problem.
That information would have been helpful, Sund acknowledged.
Sund said he did see an intelligence report created within his own department warning that Congress could be targeted on January 6. But he said that report assessed the probability of civil disobedience or arrests, based on the information they had, as remote to improbable for the groups expected to demonstrate.
Contee, the acting city police chief, also suggested that no one had flagged the FBI information from Norfolk, Virginia, which he said came in the form of an email. He said he would have expected that kind of intelligence would warrant a phone call or something".
Two officials disagreed on when the National Guard was called and on requests for the guard beforehand. Sund said he spoke to both Stenger and Irving about requesting the National Guard in the days before the riot, and that Irving said he was concerned about the optics of having them present.
Irving denied that, saying Sund's account was categorically false. Safety, not optics, determined the security posture, he said, and the top question was whether intelligence supported the decision.
Pentagon officials have said it took time to put the troops in position, and there was not enough contingency planning in advance. They said they offered the assistance beforehand but were turned down.