European legislators got a jolt this month in their long-running effort to update auto-emissions standards when a German member of the European Parliament suddenly proposed exempting a whole class of vehicles.
"This was a huge loophole, and everyone was asking: Where does this idea come from?" recalled Bas Eickhout, a member of the Dutch Green party who sits on the committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. It did not take long to discover the origin of the contentious proposal: Volkswagen Group. What had seemed a proposal by a legislator was in reality the work of the German carmaker.
This was just one particularly brazen example of how European automobile manufacturers have for years sought to thwart or water down regulation of their industry. And it helped explain one of the biggest mysteries left by the announcement this month that Volkswagen had installed software in 11 million diesel vehicles to ensure that they provided false information about emissions: Why had Europe, which has far more diesel cars than the United States, failed to uncover and halt this ruse?
"The answer is very simple: The car industry has been too powerful," said Karl-Heinz Florenz, a German member of the European Parliament who sits on the environment committee. It has been well known for nearly two decades that emissions tests can be easily manipulated and that they often produce results that wildly underestimate the real level of pollution produced by normal driving.
But European automakers have lobbied hard here to stall the introduction of a more rigorous testing regime that would involve normal driving conditions. They even hired a law firm to quibble over the meaning of "normal," a maneuver that, along with other interventions, has drastically slowed progress toward a system that would prevent abuses like those by Volkswagen.
As long ago as 1998, a Swedish researcher published a detailed study of how manufacturers could deploy technology for "cycle-breaking," the falsification of results obtained during test cycles used by regulators to assess pollution levels.
"The emission test allows manufacturers to design cars to pass the test rather than have low pollution levels on the road," wrote the researcher, Per Kageson, an environmentalist.
And a transportation expert who runs Nature Associates, a private consultancy in Stockholm.
Even scientists working for the European Commission, the European bloc's executive branch, have for years been warning about the gap between test results and reality. A 2013 study by the Commission's Joint Research Center included a review of "defeat devices," the technologies used to skew test results.
The study described how such devices could "deactivate emissions control systems with the purpose of either enhancing the effectiveness of these systems during emissions testing or reducing the effectiveness of these systems under normal vehicle operation and use." The Joint Research Center recommended a shift toward on-road testing, instead of just in a laboratory, to make the analysis "more effective in limiting the application of defeat strategies."
Matthias Groote, a German member of the European Parliament and former chairman of its environment committee, said he and others had for years been pushing the European Commission for tests that better reflected true emissions. The response, he said, was nothing but "blah, blah, blah" about how complicated that would be.
Governments in many of the bloc's 28 member countries, he added, also showed little enthusiasm, particularly those with big auto industries, like Germany, France and Italy. "Let us be honest, the car industry is a major industry in Germany and has a lot of influence," said Groote, whose constituency includes two Volkswagen factories.
Europe and the United States gauge the level of a vehicle's pollutants in laboratory tests that are easily cheated on and generally show far lower levels of emissions than so-called Real Drive Emissions tests.
The cheating can include simply removing mirrors, spare tires and seats to reduce the load and taping up doors to reduce drag. It can also extend to the method used in Volkswagen's diesel cars: the introduction of sophisticated software that activates emissions controls, which reduce power, only when a vehicle is being tested in the laboratory. Kageson, the Swedish researcher, said the discrepancy between reality and laboratory test results was already so well known in the 1990s that he had expected quick steps in Europe to "make it much more difficult for manufacturers to beat the tests." But nothing was done, at least not in Europe."There was great unwillingness among politicians and in the European Commission and, of course, resistance from manufacturers, who were very content with the existing system," Kageson said.
The Volkswagen Group, critics of the company say, has made particularly strong efforts in Brussels to shape legislation in its favor but, as a result of the scandal over its cheating on emissions, has lost even its friends in the European Parliament.
Albert Dess, the German member of the European Parliament whose staff members recently circulated the Volkswagen-drafted proposal to exempt certain vehicles from strict emissions standards, dropped the proposal as soon as the scandal broke. He did not respond to requests for comment. Volkswagen also declined to comment.
Jos Dings, the director of Transport & Environment, a research group in Brussels, said the current problem at Volkswagen was a direct consequence of the auto industry's attitude that environmental standards must be resisted every step of the way, first by gutting legislation and, if that fails, by avoiding enforcement.
"They have piled so much pressure on regulators not to do anything that this approach is now coming home to roost," Dings said. "This inflicts far more damage on the industry than compliance ever would."
Scrambling to counter accusations that it had ignored the cheating on emissions tests that its own scientists have long warned about, the European Commission last week acknowledged that it was aware of "defeat devices," which have been banned in Europe since 2007, but insisted that responsibility for enforcing the rules lay with each of the bloc's member states, not with the leadership in Brussels.
In the United States in 1998, the Environmental Protection Agency imposed large fines on truck engine manufacturers for installing software designed to outfox emissions tests. But the European Union has no equivalent of the EPA, only a jumble of 28 national regulators.
"We are not an enforcement arm that looks into electronic devices," a commission official said, speaking to journalists here on Friday on the condition of anonymity.
Sharply questioned last week in the European Parliament, Joanna Szychowska, a senior Commission official, said that "we have been aware of this discrepancy" between test results and reality and that work was underway to introduce Real Drive Emissions testing - in other words, a system that would for the first time give an accurate measure of a vehicle's pollution levels.
This work was supposed to have started in 2007 but was taken up only in 2011 by the Technical Committee on Motor Vehicles, which is made up of experts from member states and the European Commission. The committee formed a "Real Drive working group" to come up with a new testing regime.
Among the parties taking part in the discussions has been the European Automobile Manufacturers' Association, the industry's main lobbying group in Brussels. The association says it is "fully supporting" efforts "to ensure a more robust control on emissions."
But environmentalists, who are also taking part, say industry lobbyists have done everything possible to slow and weaken any new testing system. "What carmakers claim and what they do are quite different," said François Cuenot, a policy expert for Environment & Transport who has attended many of the working group meetings.
Van Bael & Bellis, a Belgian law firmed hired by the auto industry, compiled a detailed review of legislation relating to emissions and concluded that regulations for vehicles "in normal use" applied not to normal driving conditions but only to the results of laboratory testing.
The review also asserted that the European Commission had only "limited" powers to impose a new Real Drive testing system.
"My only conclusion is that they want to delay the whole thing," Cuenot said, referring to the Volkswagen Group and other automakers in the Brussels lobbying association. "They are always coming up with proposals to slow everything down."
In June, a month after the working group produced a preliminary agreement on the technical parameters for real world tests, the manufacturers' association suddenly demanded the inclusion of an entirely new concept - a "transfer function" that would smooth out extreme variations, adjusting pollution readings downward.
The association has also pushed for great leeway in meeting mandatory emission levels once real driving tests begin - and presumably show that actual pollution levels are far higher than those detected in the laboratory. Wrangling over this so-called conformity factor has gone on for years.
Fed up with the slow pace, the European Parliament voted last week to require what it called "real-life" testing by 2017.
The manufacturers' association, while pleading for more time, denies stalling and, in a statement about the Volkswagen scandal, insisted that it wanted a new testing system "finalized urgently." The association added that it "recognizes the gravity of the situation" created by Volkswagen's troubles.
"There is no evidence that this is an industrywide issue," the association said.
But Eickhout, the Dutch politician, said that although all car companies might not have gone as far as Volkswagen to game the system, the industry had been united against the swift introduction of tougher testing.
"I am only surprised that Volkswagen invested its innovation budget in cheating, not in making its engine better," he said. "This shows that they thought they were untouchable."
"This was a huge loophole, and everyone was asking: Where does this idea come from?" recalled Bas Eickhout, a member of the Dutch Green party who sits on the committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. It did not take long to discover the origin of the contentious proposal: Volkswagen Group. What had seemed a proposal by a legislator was in reality the work of the German carmaker.
This was just one particularly brazen example of how European automobile manufacturers have for years sought to thwart or water down regulation of their industry. And it helped explain one of the biggest mysteries left by the announcement this month that Volkswagen had installed software in 11 million diesel vehicles to ensure that they provided false information about emissions: Why had Europe, which has far more diesel cars than the United States, failed to uncover and halt this ruse?
"The answer is very simple: The car industry has been too powerful," said Karl-Heinz Florenz, a German member of the European Parliament who sits on the environment committee. It has been well known for nearly two decades that emissions tests can be easily manipulated and that they often produce results that wildly underestimate the real level of pollution produced by normal driving.
But European automakers have lobbied hard here to stall the introduction of a more rigorous testing regime that would involve normal driving conditions. They even hired a law firm to quibble over the meaning of "normal," a maneuver that, along with other interventions, has drastically slowed progress toward a system that would prevent abuses like those by Volkswagen.
As long ago as 1998, a Swedish researcher published a detailed study of how manufacturers could deploy technology for "cycle-breaking," the falsification of results obtained during test cycles used by regulators to assess pollution levels.
"The emission test allows manufacturers to design cars to pass the test rather than have low pollution levels on the road," wrote the researcher, Per Kageson, an environmentalist.
And a transportation expert who runs Nature Associates, a private consultancy in Stockholm.
Even scientists working for the European Commission, the European bloc's executive branch, have for years been warning about the gap between test results and reality. A 2013 study by the Commission's Joint Research Center included a review of "defeat devices," the technologies used to skew test results.
The study described how such devices could "deactivate emissions control systems with the purpose of either enhancing the effectiveness of these systems during emissions testing or reducing the effectiveness of these systems under normal vehicle operation and use." The Joint Research Center recommended a shift toward on-road testing, instead of just in a laboratory, to make the analysis "more effective in limiting the application of defeat strategies."
Matthias Groote, a German member of the European Parliament and former chairman of its environment committee, said he and others had for years been pushing the European Commission for tests that better reflected true emissions. The response, he said, was nothing but "blah, blah, blah" about how complicated that would be.
Governments in many of the bloc's 28 member countries, he added, also showed little enthusiasm, particularly those with big auto industries, like Germany, France and Italy. "Let us be honest, the car industry is a major industry in Germany and has a lot of influence," said Groote, whose constituency includes two Volkswagen factories.
Europe and the United States gauge the level of a vehicle's pollutants in laboratory tests that are easily cheated on and generally show far lower levels of emissions than so-called Real Drive Emissions tests.
The cheating can include simply removing mirrors, spare tires and seats to reduce the load and taping up doors to reduce drag. It can also extend to the method used in Volkswagen's diesel cars: the introduction of sophisticated software that activates emissions controls, which reduce power, only when a vehicle is being tested in the laboratory. Kageson, the Swedish researcher, said the discrepancy between reality and laboratory test results was already so well known in the 1990s that he had expected quick steps in Europe to "make it much more difficult for manufacturers to beat the tests." But nothing was done, at least not in Europe."There was great unwillingness among politicians and in the European Commission and, of course, resistance from manufacturers, who were very content with the existing system," Kageson said.
The Volkswagen Group, critics of the company say, has made particularly strong efforts in Brussels to shape legislation in its favor but, as a result of the scandal over its cheating on emissions, has lost even its friends in the European Parliament.
Albert Dess, the German member of the European Parliament whose staff members recently circulated the Volkswagen-drafted proposal to exempt certain vehicles from strict emissions standards, dropped the proposal as soon as the scandal broke. He did not respond to requests for comment. Volkswagen also declined to comment.
Jos Dings, the director of Transport & Environment, a research group in Brussels, said the current problem at Volkswagen was a direct consequence of the auto industry's attitude that environmental standards must be resisted every step of the way, first by gutting legislation and, if that fails, by avoiding enforcement.
"They have piled so much pressure on regulators not to do anything that this approach is now coming home to roost," Dings said. "This inflicts far more damage on the industry than compliance ever would."
Scrambling to counter accusations that it had ignored the cheating on emissions tests that its own scientists have long warned about, the European Commission last week acknowledged that it was aware of "defeat devices," which have been banned in Europe since 2007, but insisted that responsibility for enforcing the rules lay with each of the bloc's member states, not with the leadership in Brussels.
In the United States in 1998, the Environmental Protection Agency imposed large fines on truck engine manufacturers for installing software designed to outfox emissions tests. But the European Union has no equivalent of the EPA, only a jumble of 28 national regulators.
"We are not an enforcement arm that looks into electronic devices," a commission official said, speaking to journalists here on Friday on the condition of anonymity.
Sharply questioned last week in the European Parliament, Joanna Szychowska, a senior Commission official, said that "we have been aware of this discrepancy" between test results and reality and that work was underway to introduce Real Drive Emissions testing - in other words, a system that would for the first time give an accurate measure of a vehicle's pollution levels.
This work was supposed to have started in 2007 but was taken up only in 2011 by the Technical Committee on Motor Vehicles, which is made up of experts from member states and the European Commission. The committee formed a "Real Drive working group" to come up with a new testing regime.
Among the parties taking part in the discussions has been the European Automobile Manufacturers' Association, the industry's main lobbying group in Brussels. The association says it is "fully supporting" efforts "to ensure a more robust control on emissions."
But environmentalists, who are also taking part, say industry lobbyists have done everything possible to slow and weaken any new testing system. "What carmakers claim and what they do are quite different," said François Cuenot, a policy expert for Environment & Transport who has attended many of the working group meetings.
Van Bael & Bellis, a Belgian law firmed hired by the auto industry, compiled a detailed review of legislation relating to emissions and concluded that regulations for vehicles "in normal use" applied not to normal driving conditions but only to the results of laboratory testing.
The review also asserted that the European Commission had only "limited" powers to impose a new Real Drive testing system.
"My only conclusion is that they want to delay the whole thing," Cuenot said, referring to the Volkswagen Group and other automakers in the Brussels lobbying association. "They are always coming up with proposals to slow everything down."
In June, a month after the working group produced a preliminary agreement on the technical parameters for real world tests, the manufacturers' association suddenly demanded the inclusion of an entirely new concept - a "transfer function" that would smooth out extreme variations, adjusting pollution readings downward.
The association has also pushed for great leeway in meeting mandatory emission levels once real driving tests begin - and presumably show that actual pollution levels are far higher than those detected in the laboratory. Wrangling over this so-called conformity factor has gone on for years.
Fed up with the slow pace, the European Parliament voted last week to require what it called "real-life" testing by 2017.
The manufacturers' association, while pleading for more time, denies stalling and, in a statement about the Volkswagen scandal, insisted that it wanted a new testing system "finalized urgently." The association added that it "recognizes the gravity of the situation" created by Volkswagen's troubles.
"There is no evidence that this is an industrywide issue," the association said.
But Eickhout, the Dutch politician, said that although all car companies might not have gone as far as Volkswagen to game the system, the industry had been united against the swift introduction of tougher testing.
"I am only surprised that Volkswagen invested its innovation budget in cheating, not in making its engine better," he said. "This shows that they thought they were untouchable."
©2015 The New York Times News Service