 "We're not going to let ISIL create some caliphate: Obama")
President Obama's hair is definitely greyer these days, and no doubt trying to manage foreign policy in a world of increasing disorder accounts for at least half of those gray hairs. But having had a chance to spend an hour touring the horizon with him in the White House Map Room late Friday afternoon, it's clear that the president has a take on the world, born of many lessons over the last six years, and he has feisty answers for all his foreign policy critics.
Obama made clear that he is only going to involve America more deeply in places like West Asia to the extent that the different communities there agree to an inclusive politics of no victor/no vanquished. The United States is not going to be the air force of Iraqi Shiites or any other faction. Despite Western sanctions, he cautioned, President Vladimir Putin of Russia "could invade" Ukraine at any time, and, if he does, "trying to find our way back to a cooperative functioning relationship with Russia during the remainder of my term will be much more difficult." Intervening in Libya to prevent a massacre was the right thing to do, Obama argued, but doing it without sufficient follow-up on the ground to manage Libya's transition to more democratic politics is probably his biggest foreign policy regret.
I began by asking whether if former Secretary of State Dean Acheson was "present at the creation" of the post-World War II order, as he once wrote, did Obama feel present at the "disintegration?"
"First of all, I think you can't generalise across the globe because there are a bunch of places where good news keeps coming." Look at Asia, he said, countries like Indonesia, and many countries in Latin America, like Chile. "But I do believe," he added, "that what we're seeing in the Middle East and parts of North Africa is an order that dates back to World War I starting to buckle."
But wouldn't things be better had we armed the secular Syrian rebels early or kept US troops in Iraq? The fact is, said the president, in Iraq a residual US troop presence would never have been needed had the Shiite majority there not "squandered an opportunity" to share power with Sunnis and Kurds. "Had the Shia majority seized the opportunity to reach out to the Sunnis and the Kurds in a more effective way, (and not) passed legislation like de-Baathification," no outside troops would have been necessary. Absent their will to do that, our troops sooner or later would have been caught in the crossfire, he argued.
With "respect to Syria", said the president, the notion that arming the rebels would have made a difference has "always been a fantasy. This idea that we could provide some light arms or even more sophisticated arms to what was essentially an opposition made up of former doctors, farmers, pharmacists and so forth, and that they were going to be able to battle not only a well-armed state but also a well-armed state backed by Russia, backed by Iran, a battle-hardened Hezbollah, that was never in the cards."
Even now, the president said, the administration has difficulty finding, training and arming a sufficient cadre of secular Syrian rebels: "There's not as much capacity as you would hope."
The "broader point we need to stay focused on," he added, "is what we have is a disaffected Sunni minority in the case of Iraq, a majority in the case of Syria, stretching from essentially Baghdad to Damascus. ... Unless we can give them a formula that speaks to the aspirations of that population, we are inevitably going to have problems. ... Unfortunately, there was a period of time where the Shia majority in Iraq didn't fully understand that. They're starting to understand it now. Unfortunately, we still have ISIL (the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), which has, I think, very little appeal to ordinary Sunnis." But "they're filling a vacuum, and the question for us has to be not simply how we counteract them militarily but how are we going to speak to a Sunni majority in that area ... that, right now, is detached from the global economy."
The only states doing well, like Tunisia, I've argued, have done so because their factions adopted the principle of no victor, no vanquished. Once they did, they didn't need outside help.
"We cannot do for them what they are unwilling to do for themselves," said the president of the factions in Iraq. "Our military is so capable, that if we put everything we have into it, we can keep a lid on a problem for a time. But for a society to function long term, the people themselves have to make decisions about how they are going to live together, how they are going to accommodate each other's interests, how they are going to compromise. When it comes to things like corruption, the people and their leaders have to hold themselves accountable for changing those cultures.... We can help them and partner with them every step of the way. But we can't do it for them."
So, I asked, explain your decision to use military force to protect the refugees from ISIL (which is also known as ISIS) and Kurdistan, which is an island of real decency in Iraq?
"When you have a unique circumstance in which genocide is threatened, and a country is willing to have us in there, you have a strong international consensus that these people need to be protected and we have a capacity to do so, then we have an obligation to do so," said the president. But given the island of decency the Kurds have built, we also have to ask, he added, not just "how do we push back on ISIL, but also how do we preserve the space for the best impulses inside of Iraq, that very much is on my mind, that has been on my mind throughout.
"I do think the Kurds used that time that was given by our troop sacrifices in Iraq," Obama added. "They used that time well, and the Kurdish region is functional the way we would like to see. It is tolerant of other sects and other religions in a way that we would like to see elsewhere. So we do think it's important to make sure that that space is protected, but, more broadly, what I've indicated is that I don't want to be in the business of being the Iraqi air force. I don't want to get in the business for that matter of being the Kurdish air force, in the absence of a commitment of the people on the ground to get their act together and do what's necessary politically to start protecting themselves and to push back against ISIL."
The reason, the president added, "that we did not just start taking a bunch of airstrikes all across Iraq as soon as ISIL came in was because that would have taken the pressure off of (Prime Minister Nuri Kamal) al-Maliki." That only would have encouraged, he said, Maliki and other Shiites to think: " 'We don't actually have to make compromises. We don't have to make any decisions. We don't have to go through the difficult process of figuring out what we've done wrong in the past. All we have to do is let the Americans bail us out again. And we can go about business as usual.'"
The president said that what he is telling every faction in Iraq is: "We will be your partners, but we are not going to do it for you. We're not sending a bunch of US troops back on the ground to keep a lid on things. You're going to have to show us that you are willing and ready to try and maintain a unified Iraqi government that is based on compromise. That you are willing to continue to build a nonsectarian, functional security force that is answerable to a civilian government. ... We do have a strategic interest in pushing back ISIL. We're not going to let them create some caliphate through Syria and Iraq, but we can only do that if we know that we've got partners on the ground who are capable of filling the void. So if we're going to reach out to Sunni tribes, if we're going to reach out to local governors and leaders, they've got to have some sense that they're fighting for something." Otherwise, Obama said, "We can run (ISIL) off for a certain period of time, but as soon as our planes are gone, they're coming right back in."
Clearly, a lot of the president's attitudes on Iraq grow out the turmoil unleashed in Libya by Nato's decision to topple Col Muammar el-Qaddafi, but not organise any sufficient international follow-on assistance on the ground to help them build institutions. Whether it is getting back into Iraq or newly into Syria, the question that Obama keeps coming back to is: Do I have the partners - local and/or international - to make any improvements we engineer self- sustaining?
"I'll give you an example of a lesson I had to learn that still has ramifications to this day," said Obama. "And that is our participation in the coalition that overthrew Qaddafi in Libya. I absolutely believed that it was the right thing to do. ... Had we not intervened, it's likely that Libya would be Syria. ... And so there would be more death, more disruption, more destruction. But what is also true is that I think we [and] our European partners underestimated the need to come in full force if you're going to do this.
Then it's the day after Qaddafi is gone, when everybody is feeling good and everybody is holding up posters saying, 'Thank you, America.' At that moment, there has to be a much more aggressive effort to rebuild societies that didn't have any civic traditions. ... So that's a lesson that I now apply every time I ask the question, 'Should we intervene, militarily? Do we have an answer (for) the day after?'"
Obama made clear that he is only going to involve America more deeply in places like West Asia to the extent that the different communities there agree to an inclusive politics of no victor/no vanquished. The United States is not going to be the air force of Iraqi Shiites or any other faction. Despite Western sanctions, he cautioned, President Vladimir Putin of Russia "could invade" Ukraine at any time, and, if he does, "trying to find our way back to a cooperative functioning relationship with Russia during the remainder of my term will be much more difficult." Intervening in Libya to prevent a massacre was the right thing to do, Obama argued, but doing it without sufficient follow-up on the ground to manage Libya's transition to more democratic politics is probably his biggest foreign policy regret.
I began by asking whether if former Secretary of State Dean Acheson was "present at the creation" of the post-World War II order, as he once wrote, did Obama feel present at the "disintegration?"
"First of all, I think you can't generalise across the globe because there are a bunch of places where good news keeps coming." Look at Asia, he said, countries like Indonesia, and many countries in Latin America, like Chile. "But I do believe," he added, "that what we're seeing in the Middle East and parts of North Africa is an order that dates back to World War I starting to buckle."
But wouldn't things be better had we armed the secular Syrian rebels early or kept US troops in Iraq? The fact is, said the president, in Iraq a residual US troop presence would never have been needed had the Shiite majority there not "squandered an opportunity" to share power with Sunnis and Kurds. "Had the Shia majority seized the opportunity to reach out to the Sunnis and the Kurds in a more effective way, (and not) passed legislation like de-Baathification," no outside troops would have been necessary. Absent their will to do that, our troops sooner or later would have been caught in the crossfire, he argued.
With "respect to Syria", said the president, the notion that arming the rebels would have made a difference has "always been a fantasy. This idea that we could provide some light arms or even more sophisticated arms to what was essentially an opposition made up of former doctors, farmers, pharmacists and so forth, and that they were going to be able to battle not only a well-armed state but also a well-armed state backed by Russia, backed by Iran, a battle-hardened Hezbollah, that was never in the cards."
Even now, the president said, the administration has difficulty finding, training and arming a sufficient cadre of secular Syrian rebels: "There's not as much capacity as you would hope."
The "broader point we need to stay focused on," he added, "is what we have is a disaffected Sunni minority in the case of Iraq, a majority in the case of Syria, stretching from essentially Baghdad to Damascus. ... Unless we can give them a formula that speaks to the aspirations of that population, we are inevitably going to have problems. ... Unfortunately, there was a period of time where the Shia majority in Iraq didn't fully understand that. They're starting to understand it now. Unfortunately, we still have ISIL (the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), which has, I think, very little appeal to ordinary Sunnis." But "they're filling a vacuum, and the question for us has to be not simply how we counteract them militarily but how are we going to speak to a Sunni majority in that area ... that, right now, is detached from the global economy."
The only states doing well, like Tunisia, I've argued, have done so because their factions adopted the principle of no victor, no vanquished. Once they did, they didn't need outside help.
"We cannot do for them what they are unwilling to do for themselves," said the president of the factions in Iraq. "Our military is so capable, that if we put everything we have into it, we can keep a lid on a problem for a time. But for a society to function long term, the people themselves have to make decisions about how they are going to live together, how they are going to accommodate each other's interests, how they are going to compromise. When it comes to things like corruption, the people and their leaders have to hold themselves accountable for changing those cultures.... We can help them and partner with them every step of the way. But we can't do it for them."
So, I asked, explain your decision to use military force to protect the refugees from ISIL (which is also known as ISIS) and Kurdistan, which is an island of real decency in Iraq?
"When you have a unique circumstance in which genocide is threatened, and a country is willing to have us in there, you have a strong international consensus that these people need to be protected and we have a capacity to do so, then we have an obligation to do so," said the president. But given the island of decency the Kurds have built, we also have to ask, he added, not just "how do we push back on ISIL, but also how do we preserve the space for the best impulses inside of Iraq, that very much is on my mind, that has been on my mind throughout.
"I do think the Kurds used that time that was given by our troop sacrifices in Iraq," Obama added. "They used that time well, and the Kurdish region is functional the way we would like to see. It is tolerant of other sects and other religions in a way that we would like to see elsewhere. So we do think it's important to make sure that that space is protected, but, more broadly, what I've indicated is that I don't want to be in the business of being the Iraqi air force. I don't want to get in the business for that matter of being the Kurdish air force, in the absence of a commitment of the people on the ground to get their act together and do what's necessary politically to start protecting themselves and to push back against ISIL."
The reason, the president added, "that we did not just start taking a bunch of airstrikes all across Iraq as soon as ISIL came in was because that would have taken the pressure off of (Prime Minister Nuri Kamal) al-Maliki." That only would have encouraged, he said, Maliki and other Shiites to think: " 'We don't actually have to make compromises. We don't have to make any decisions. We don't have to go through the difficult process of figuring out what we've done wrong in the past. All we have to do is let the Americans bail us out again. And we can go about business as usual.'"
The president said that what he is telling every faction in Iraq is: "We will be your partners, but we are not going to do it for you. We're not sending a bunch of US troops back on the ground to keep a lid on things. You're going to have to show us that you are willing and ready to try and maintain a unified Iraqi government that is based on compromise. That you are willing to continue to build a nonsectarian, functional security force that is answerable to a civilian government. ... We do have a strategic interest in pushing back ISIL. We're not going to let them create some caliphate through Syria and Iraq, but we can only do that if we know that we've got partners on the ground who are capable of filling the void. So if we're going to reach out to Sunni tribes, if we're going to reach out to local governors and leaders, they've got to have some sense that they're fighting for something." Otherwise, Obama said, "We can run (ISIL) off for a certain period of time, but as soon as our planes are gone, they're coming right back in."
Clearly, a lot of the president's attitudes on Iraq grow out the turmoil unleashed in Libya by Nato's decision to topple Col Muammar el-Qaddafi, but not organise any sufficient international follow-on assistance on the ground to help them build institutions. Whether it is getting back into Iraq or newly into Syria, the question that Obama keeps coming back to is: Do I have the partners - local and/or international - to make any improvements we engineer self- sustaining?
"I'll give you an example of a lesson I had to learn that still has ramifications to this day," said Obama. "And that is our participation in the coalition that overthrew Qaddafi in Libya. I absolutely believed that it was the right thing to do. ... Had we not intervened, it's likely that Libya would be Syria. ... And so there would be more death, more disruption, more destruction. But what is also true is that I think we [and] our European partners underestimated the need to come in full force if you're going to do this.
Then it's the day after Qaddafi is gone, when everybody is feeling good and everybody is holding up posters saying, 'Thank you, America.' At that moment, there has to be a much more aggressive effort to rebuild societies that didn't have any civic traditions. ... So that's a lesson that I now apply every time I ask the question, 'Should we intervene, militarily? Do we have an answer (for) the day after?'"
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