 "Xi's vision of security elevates party and stifles dissent")
China's new national security law, released in draft form this month, has little to say about such traditional security matters as military power, counterespionage or defending the nation's borders. Instead, to the surprise and alarm of many people here, it reads more like a Communist Party ideology paper and a call to arms aimed at defending the party's grip on power. The law, together with two other recently published draft laws, constitutes the most expansive articulation yet of President Xi Jinping's vision of national security, and the widest interpretation of threats to the Communist Party and the state since the Mao era.
Analysts say the laws are aimed at giving the security forces and courts greater leeway in muzzling Chinese civil society and corralling the influence of Western institutions and ideas, which Xi views as a threat.
Deploying the kind of retro-nationalist language that has become standard fare under Xi, the national security law says security must be maintained in all aspects of society, from culture to education to technology, "to realise the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation".
"This draft focuses on politics, ideology and culture," said Zhang Xuezhong, a civil rights lawyer and former law professor at East China University of Political Science and Law in Shanghai.
The two other draft laws - also related to what might be described as ideological security - are a so-called counterterrorism law and one aimed at controlling the activities of foreign nongovernmental organisations and their Chinese partners.
More than at any other time since the Communists seized power in 1949, some scholars say, the law is being used in the service of ideology and maintaining party survival.
The draft laws, Zhang said, "really look like an expression of the conservative political thinking of some party leaders, and the legislative organs are merely trying to realise their thoughts."
Perhaps the most interesting question is why Xi thinks he needs such laws. Existing laws already enshrine Communist Party power and criminalise any act deemed to encourage "subversion of state power". But the new laws provide a firmer legal framework for controlling civil society and Western organisations, scholars say.
The most ambitious of the three, the national security law, solidifies Xi's authority over national security by placing a central organ - likely to be the National Security Commission that Xi founded - in charge of all security matters. An April 23 article in People's Daily, the official party newspaper, said the new draft of the security law reflected "General Secretary Xi Jinping's spirit."
Another reason Xi wants these laws is more abstract, scholars say. Party ideology no longer plays a central role in the lives of ordinary Chinese the way it did in the Mao era, so the party needs to promote and institutionalise the ideology by whatever means it can, including by writing it into law. That is especially true under Xi, who since the day he took office in 2012 has promoted old-school party ideology in a way not seen since the aftermath of the June 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protests around Tiananmen Square in Beijing.
"The ideology is far thinner and holds the attention of the populace far less powerfully than before," said Stanley B Lubman, a scholar of Chinese law at the University of California, Berkeley. "As a result, the Chinese Communist Party needs more institutional support than before, and may need even more. This helps to explain the attention that law has recently been receiving since Xi came to power."
The national security law explicitly mentions the need to teach China's 1.3 billion people about the security and ideological needs of the state and the party. One clause commands institutions to "strengthen guidance on news, propaganda and public opinion about national security".
"National security education will be included in the national education system and the public-servant training system to strengthen awareness among the entire populace," the law says. "April 15 of each year will be set aside as national security education day."
Legal analysts say the law is expected to be passed no later than March, when the National People's Congress is to meet in Beijing. It could be passed sooner by the legislature's standing committee, which also has the power to approve laws.
"I think the frame of the national security law fits the current needs of the nation, since national security as a concept has expanded to more areas," said Tong Zhiwei, a professor at the East China University of Political Science and Law. "But I don't agree with some of the wordings in the draft - for example, the phrases 'ideological security' and 'cultural security'."
Ideology and culture are not threats to national security, Tong added.
Zhang, the lawyer, said the law was "destined to be abused". With its sanction, he said, "law enforcement officials who want to suppress freedom of speech or set limits on importing foreign publications will be more confident in doing so."
The two other draft laws have even more concrete provisions for controlling civil society and Western institutions; both could be passed as early as this summer. The foreign NGO law proposes that such organisations be registered and regulated by the Public Security Ministry, a step that William Nee, a China researcher with Amnesty International, equates to treating them "as potential criminals".
The law would apply to all nonprofit groups, including schools and artistic organisations. Even those groups with no China operations but who want to hold an event here would have to register with the police.
©2015 The New York Times New Service
Analysts say the laws are aimed at giving the security forces and courts greater leeway in muzzling Chinese civil society and corralling the influence of Western institutions and ideas, which Xi views as a threat.
Deploying the kind of retro-nationalist language that has become standard fare under Xi, the national security law says security must be maintained in all aspects of society, from culture to education to technology, "to realise the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation".
"This draft focuses on politics, ideology and culture," said Zhang Xuezhong, a civil rights lawyer and former law professor at East China University of Political Science and Law in Shanghai.
The two other draft laws - also related to what might be described as ideological security - are a so-called counterterrorism law and one aimed at controlling the activities of foreign nongovernmental organisations and their Chinese partners.
More than at any other time since the Communists seized power in 1949, some scholars say, the law is being used in the service of ideology and maintaining party survival.
The draft laws, Zhang said, "really look like an expression of the conservative political thinking of some party leaders, and the legislative organs are merely trying to realise their thoughts."
Perhaps the most interesting question is why Xi thinks he needs such laws. Existing laws already enshrine Communist Party power and criminalise any act deemed to encourage "subversion of state power". But the new laws provide a firmer legal framework for controlling civil society and Western organisations, scholars say.
The most ambitious of the three, the national security law, solidifies Xi's authority over national security by placing a central organ - likely to be the National Security Commission that Xi founded - in charge of all security matters. An April 23 article in People's Daily, the official party newspaper, said the new draft of the security law reflected "General Secretary Xi Jinping's spirit."
Another reason Xi wants these laws is more abstract, scholars say. Party ideology no longer plays a central role in the lives of ordinary Chinese the way it did in the Mao era, so the party needs to promote and institutionalise the ideology by whatever means it can, including by writing it into law. That is especially true under Xi, who since the day he took office in 2012 has promoted old-school party ideology in a way not seen since the aftermath of the June 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protests around Tiananmen Square in Beijing.
"The ideology is far thinner and holds the attention of the populace far less powerfully than before," said Stanley B Lubman, a scholar of Chinese law at the University of California, Berkeley. "As a result, the Chinese Communist Party needs more institutional support than before, and may need even more. This helps to explain the attention that law has recently been receiving since Xi came to power."
The national security law explicitly mentions the need to teach China's 1.3 billion people about the security and ideological needs of the state and the party. One clause commands institutions to "strengthen guidance on news, propaganda and public opinion about national security".
"National security education will be included in the national education system and the public-servant training system to strengthen awareness among the entire populace," the law says. "April 15 of each year will be set aside as national security education day."
Legal analysts say the law is expected to be passed no later than March, when the National People's Congress is to meet in Beijing. It could be passed sooner by the legislature's standing committee, which also has the power to approve laws.
"I think the frame of the national security law fits the current needs of the nation, since national security as a concept has expanded to more areas," said Tong Zhiwei, a professor at the East China University of Political Science and Law. "But I don't agree with some of the wordings in the draft - for example, the phrases 'ideological security' and 'cultural security'."
Ideology and culture are not threats to national security, Tong added.
Zhang, the lawyer, said the law was "destined to be abused". With its sanction, he said, "law enforcement officials who want to suppress freedom of speech or set limits on importing foreign publications will be more confident in doing so."
The two other draft laws have even more concrete provisions for controlling civil society and Western institutions; both could be passed as early as this summer. The foreign NGO law proposes that such organisations be registered and regulated by the Public Security Ministry, a step that William Nee, a China researcher with Amnesty International, equates to treating them "as potential criminals".
The law would apply to all nonprofit groups, including schools and artistic organisations. Even those groups with no China operations but who want to hold an event here would have to register with the police.
©2015 The New York Times New Service