There is a new dispensation in position in Kabul. Hamid Karzai has stepped down, Ashraf Ghani is the president of Afghanistan and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah is the country's CEO. This was an arrangement worked out with considerable assistance and cajoling by US Secretary of State, John Kerry.
Ultimately good sense prevailed, a long drawn out recrimination was avoided and a peaceful democratic, even though flawed, take over took place. The widespread allegations of fraud in the elections had been swept aside or papered over and Afghanistan was on its way to becoming another forgotten war of the Americans. The times ahead will not be easy to negotiate and all sides would need to work in the larger interest.
The west has measured the cost of war in terms largely of American and NATO lives lost and the money spent. From the day "Operation Enduring Freedom" began on October 7, 2001 till now the total estimated expenditure has been US $ 800 billion and about 2300 Americans killed. Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader is still alive and so is Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the Al Qaeda number two, and living somewhere in Pakistan. Compare this to Afghan casualties of over 9000 killed and injured this year. But then this was not America's war anymore and it had not been Afghanistan's war at any time. It had become a war no one wanted to own.
The Bilateral Security Agreement and Status of Forces Agreement have been signed and the transition is on its way. By the end of the year, the 40000 ISAF troops will be reduced to 12500 which would include 9500 American soldiers. There will be further reductions till the end of 2016 by when there will be just enough US soldiers for guard duties at the US Embassy. The Afghans may not be fond of foreigners but they do see this withdrawal as abandonment at a time when they needed security and peace after three and half decades of brutal warfare that was not of their making.
The Taliban remain active and are feared to be gaining ground in the outlying areas of the country. Groups like the Haqqani Network and the Quetta Shura operate from sanctuaries in Pakistan. They claim the night and the Afghan security forces do not have night fighting capabilities nor do they have the mobility to strike across the country against insurgent activity.
The Taliban do not have the capacity yet to hold the ground all the time but are doing better than the government forces in the information war. The famous claim of the Taliban that the Americans have the watches and they have the time may be close to realization unless the rest of those interested in a stable Afghanistan act in cohesion and soon.
Afghanistan has a few problems that are immediate and important. First, it is touching the bottom of the barrel for revenues to run the government. By September end it needed a bail out of half a billion dollars to pay its bills including salaries for its Afghan National Security Forces. The Afghan Government has an annual budget of about US $ 7.6 billion of which 65 % is met by foreign assistance; but there is a fiscal deficit of 25 % because of a shortfall in tax and customs' tariff collection. The international coalition had agreed in September 2014 to spend US $ 5.1 billion annually till 2017 on the Afghan security forces. Nevertheless, the Afghans are hopeful that they would do better next year with a more realistic budget and more accurate estimate of revenue collections.
This leaves the Afghan government facing five other major problems. Law and order and the abilities of the security forces to tackle the insurgency, the state of the economy, the fear of ethnic tensions and violence and the role of Pakistan which has remained negative throughout and finally, international disinterest in Afghanistan which would dampen enthusiasm to help.
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Law and order will be a major concern in Afghanistan, particularly when the Afghan police do not enjoy a good reputation for either competence or integrity. Thus the ANSF will have to remain involved and consume resources at a time when precious resources would be needed for economic development. Statistically the ANSF would be hampered as it would lose the support of ISAF. A substantial portion of the 162,000 strong ISAF would depart by year end and the 228,000 Afghan force, ill equipped, and ill protected against IEDs which have accounted for 60% of its fatalities will be left to face the Taliban. The ANSF has inadequate air support or mobility to strike at distances or at night. This has to be rectified urgently and also the country's intelligence capabilities sharpened to make them modern with surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities that would enhance counter insurgency efforts.
India would have to step up and play a more active role in helping Afghanistan in strengthening its security effort. India needs to capitalise on its popular goodwill both for its own sake and for the Afghans. This would mean stepping out of the limited role of concentrating on providing humanitarian and economic infrastructure assistance and helping Afghanistan meet its internal and external security threats. It has been reluctant to contribute assistance that would enhance the country's security substantially. So far India has limited itself to training 1000-1500 Afghan troops in India with 200 ANSF officers trained at the NDA. This should be increased to a higher figure that the Afghans might want and we can give.
Material assistance should not be just for logistics but also for weapons of all kinds. It is in India's interest to have an Afghan Army that can resist, repulse and overcome attacks.
We have a strategic partnership with Afghanistan. We need to put some pragmatic meaning and depth to this agreement. Earlier in the year India Afghanistan and Russia had signed a tripartite agreement where India would pay for Russian military hardware including artillery and mortars supplied to Afghanistan, revival of a factory in Kabul, and some refitting of military equipment. Not much more is known about this arrangement. India will continue to seek closer ties with Iran for access to Afghanistan and Central Asia as well as with Russia for cooperation in assisting Afghanistan.
After so many years of turmoil and warfare it is not surprising that Afghanistan now has a completely broken economy. The main activity in agriculture became opium cultivation that gave the farmer enough money but the profits in billions went outside the country. Afghanistan has remained in double jeopardy; it was blamed for not doing enough to eradicate opium cultivation but precious little was done by the rest of the world to curtail demand which along with the profits were mostly in the west. Afghanistan would continue to need generous assistance from the rest of the world not just as a humanitarian assistance but also to prevent a drift towards terrorism by seeking to join organizations like Al Qaeda and ISIS.
Despite the various negative features that the world highlights from to time and pointing to the possibility of ethnic troubles in Afghanistan, several Afghans and some other observers insist that Afghan nationalism and identity has always been strong. They may have their internal differences from time to time but there is a strong Afghan national identity which is much stronger than in Pakistan where regional identities remain stronger. Afghans insist that there is a strong sense of the region and ethnicity in their country in normal times and an equally strong sense of Afghanistan in adverse times. There will be many difficulties ahead for them but they are not about to end up as warring factions in a divided country.
Pakistan is hardly likely to view Indian involvement with any degree of equanimity and would Endeavour to scuttle all plans without much attention to subtlety. Pakistan has sponsored terrorism in Afghanistan through the Taliban and various other factions based on Pakistani soil for nearly four decades (even before the Soviet invasion of 1979). Pakistan has sought strategic depth in Afghanistan, almost as a birthright and it presumably sees the departure of an exhausted American force both as a victory for its own battle of attrition against the Americans and a vindication of its policies of seeking strategic depth against India. It sees this possibility as imminent.
The result of the US-led Afghan Jihad of the 1980s was seen by the the Mujahedeen as a victory of their faith. The region, and indeed the world, has never been the same and conflict followed conflict. But the highest cost has been paid by the regions where these battles were or are still being fought. As the Americans leave Afghanistan, this too will be a seen as victory for the Taliban and their creed. This will happen at a time when the Al Qaeda and the ISIS are threatening to make the region as their playground for jihad. Pakistan and Afghanistan have paid a high enough price for all that has happened and it is necessary to rethink about the high cost of unending conflict where victories against states are being handed over to non-state actors. Another danger is that states usually slip into a denial mode even as they slip into intolerant religiosity. This might be happening in Pakistan.
The other danger is that according to the prevalent narrative both India and Pakistan will continue to see each other's moves as challenges to their own interests. It may be that the time has now come that that the two see these moves as opportunities for each other.
Cooperation and even competition in the mutual development of all three countries should be preferred to confrontation and conflict.
Do we collectively have the will to break this logjam?
The views expressed in the above article are that of Mr. Vikram Sood, former Secretary R and AW, Government of India, and currently an adviser to the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation.