The complete endorsement of the proposed Bilateral Security Agreement between Afghanistan and the United States by the Afghan Loya Jirga, the Grand Assembly of tribal leaders and elders, reflects the worry of all Afghans across the board about their fragile peace after the NATO forces leave next year.
Their urgency lies in the direction to President Hamid Karzai to sign it before the year end.
All the posturing by Karzai before the Loya Jirga has clearly brought out his shrewdness with which he played his cards. Understanding fully the Afghan psyche, he could not have agreed to the U.S. conditions.
Had he done so, he would have been branded by his critics to have caved in to the Americans' 'unfair' demands like the right to enter Afghan homes for searches and immunity to U.S. soldiers for the crimes they might commit during their stay in Afghanistan.
Now that he is nearing his 10th year as president, with this final act, he has silenced his critics who had been calling him as a U.S. puppet and a weak administrator. Even the charges of shielding the corrupt have been forgotten.
No Afghan leader can survive by seeming to be an agent of any foreign power. Afghan history is full of instances of violent punishment to such 'collaborators'.
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Afghans often cite the three Anglo-Afghan Wars in which the British had to suffer humiliation. King Shah Sujah, who acquired the throne with support from the British and Maharaja Ranjit Singh following the tripartite treaty, was dethroned and brutally killed.
Now, it becomes clear that there was some method to his madness.
Throughout his tenure he had been the bitterest critic of U.S. forces entering and searching Afghan homes and a large number of casualties of civilians in U.S.-led NATO operations.
All this has earned him the support of the average Afghans.
Even while inaugurating the Loya Jirga of about three thousand delegates in Kabul, Karzai said, "My trust with America is not good. I don't trust them and they don't trust me."
Karzai told his audience what a tough bargain he had negotiated.
He said: "During the past ten years, I have fought with them, and they have made propaganda against me."
In a recent interview with the BBC, Karzai said: "On the security front, the entire NATO exercise was one that caused Afghanistan a lot of suffering, a lot of loss of life and no gains because the country is not secure."
Americans even floated stories about his mental health. Peter Galbraith, a former top U.N. envoy, suggested in 2010 that he (Karzai) had "a certain fondness for some of Afghanistan's most profitable exports." But Karzai stood firm and had the last laugh.
Karzai's erratic tendencies are better explained by his particular situation. He is stuck between the demands of the United States-in his eyes, an unreliable and clumsy partner that has made a hash of the expensive and violent military surge-and the growing resentment of his own people toward the presence of foreign military forces.
Karzai is fully aware that Afghanistan badly needs American and international aid and military presence to survive, but his high-profile brinksmanship with the U.S. over the B.S.A. and other issues, has allowed him to clamp down Afghan anger while extracting greater concessions from his Western patrons.
By cultivating the impression that he is willing to sacrifice anything and everything, Karzai's "madman" approach to negotiations put the Americans under pressure who cannot afford to dump a deal at this crucial juncture.
Finally, Karzai had been successful to get the Americans to agree that the U.S. forces shall not enter Afghan homes for the purposes of military operations, except under extraordinary circumstances involving urgent risk to life and limb of U.S. nationals. He bravely negotiated the American threats of 'Zero Option' as happened in Iraq, refusal to immunity leading to complete withdrawal.
After months of high-level diplomatic haggling, the B.S.A. text contains all the key elements that the U.S. demanded: immunity from Afghan law, rights to military bases, and permission to continue counter-terrorism operations.
The Afghan demands have been addressed though with non-binding or rhetorical gestures, including vague guarantees that the U.S. would undertake "consultations" in the event of any external aggression against the country and Obama's letter assuring that U.S. forces would only enter Afghan homes in "extraordinary circumstances."
Karzai's master stroke at the Loya Jirga rattled the Americans when he said that even after the consent of the Loya Jirga and ratification by the Parliament, the BSA should be signed.
The Loya Jirga has directed him to sign the BSA by year end, and added that should not have any reservations on concerns related to it.
Not only has he earned respect for his diplomatic skills, Karzai has cemented his relevance even after he lays down the Afghan presidency in April 2014.
The views expressed in the above article are that of Mr. Gurinder Randhawa, former AIR Correspondent in Kabul.