"The national unity government which hints at moving in the direction of a parliamentary system of governance presents new challenges and opportunities to India"
Afghanistan now has a government of national unity which, though cumbersome, represents a power sharing arrangement representing a way out of a situation which could have polarized the country along ethnic lines. This arrangement represents a political pact between the Pashtoons and the other ethnic and religious minorities, an arrangement which, to work, depends on the principal personalities - the Pashtoon President Dr Ashraf Ghani and the CEO, Dr Abdullah, who represents Tajik interests - sinking their differences and working in tandem.
As a consequence, the country now has a President, two Vice President's, a CEO and two deputy CEO's, a cabinet to be presided over by the President and a Council of Ministers to be coordinated by the CEO. An unwieldy proposition anywhere but even more cumbersome for a country facing turmoil but, still, an arrangement which could spur reconciliation moves.
The contradictions between the two leaders are many as one of them spent his time, during the jehad and the Taliban period, working for the World Bank while the other was with those who resisted the Soviets and then the Taliban. One lived in the West with his family while the other took to the hills sending his family to New Delhi. However, on the plus side, one represents most of the majority Pashtoons and the other has the support of most of the northern groups.
It is, quintessentially, a government of national unity and, notwithstanding the claims of either, the most workable since a President solely dependent on one would have further aggravated the north-south divide to the benefit of those backing the Taliban. More importantly, it hints at moving in the direction of a parliamentary system of governance, a more equitable form in a country deeply divided along sectarian and ethnic lines and in consonance with that prevalent in the SAARC region.
The two did try to address the ethnic divide by the choice of running mates. Abdullah chose by taking Mohammad Khan, a Pashtoon from Gulbuddin Hikmatyar's Hizbe Islami as his running mate. Mohammad Khan is a former HeI intelligence chief, which implies a high degree of acceptability to the ISI. An outright Abdullah victory could have led to greater Pakistani interference and the possibility of Hikmatyar's return to Afghanistan. Hikmatyar, a northern Pashtoon, enjoys support in the south and has political machinery but lacks a territorial base. The only place where he could have attempted to build a base would be Kunduz, his hometown, and this would have physically divided the Tajiks in the north and caused tensions with those in bordering provinces like the Hazaras and the Ismaeli's. Hikmatyar's presence in Kunduz would have also been a source of concern to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
Ashraf Ghani, 65, though a Pashtoon from the Ahmedzai sub-tribe, is a Kucci - pastoral Pashtoons who do not control territory. He is known to be short tempered and prickly. To stitch up northern support he took Uzbek strongman Abdul Rashid Dostam as his vice Presidential running-mate. Dostam's health is a source of concern as is his mood swings. His ruthless past had even led Ghani, in the past, to accuse him of human rights violations.
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With the US slated to withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2016, other problems loom, of concern not just to those in Afghanistan but also to India. With the middle-east in turmoil, the Al Qaeda looking to revive its fortunes and the ISIS already finding support, the US withdrawal would have been an invitation to trans-national terror groups like Al-Qaeda and the ISIS and India-focused groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba to set up shop in Afghanistan.
The primary task for New Delhi, which has accepted the new arrangement, is to rebuild the clout it enjoyed during the Karzai regime. While Abdullah is an old friend of India, Ashraf Ghani is a new face. He is known to be close the West, has built ties with the Saudi's and China but his attitude towards India is uncertain.
It would be essential to press the suit that India is the largest regional donor with investments in infrastructure, capacity building, health, education and economic reconstruction. Most essentially, it is the country most favourably viewed by Afghans and would be a counter to Pakistan but this may not sit easy with Ghani who has spoken of an ambitious ten year plan to develop closer ties with Pakistan. It would not be in his interests to seek Indian military assistance in the manner the previous regime did. In fact, recent media reports suggest that the Afghans plan to withdraw their request for military aid.
Unfortunately, the Indian government will have to carry the onus of neglect of Afghan military requests, an engagement which could have further cemented our relations. We have not argued our case well. Indian hesitation has been seen as reneging on the commitments made in the Strategic Partnership Agreement; that we are risk averse and prone to factoring in Pakistani sensitivities in our Afghan policy. The new Modi government, which may have been more willing, may now, find the new Afghan government less than willing.
India would do well to continue with its developmental assistance while lobbying (and be seen to be doing so) the West to continue their developmental engagement for this could signal that the West is not abandoning Afghanistan completely. This engagement will be crucial to continue the international community's efforts to support Afghans create a local economy.
There is also a need to reach out to Afghanistan's northern and western neighbours to reconstitute an alliance as existed in the 90's. While none of these countries are models of excellence, each has a stake in Afghanistan's stability and a lot to lose if the Taliban return to power.
The only major point of difference between them and Delhi's position on Afghanistan has been the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan. Now that the withdrawal of foreign forces is a settled matter, it is time to strengthen an alliance that supports the anti-Taliban movement in Afghanistan.
India also needs to work closely with Russia and engage with the Chinese. Russia has concerns over the narcotics trade. China, faced with Uighur separatism, sees stability in Afghanistan as essential to its security. It no longer sees relations with Afghanistan as an extension of ties to Pakistan. China has made clear that while it supports a settlement to bring the Taliban into the political system, it opposes a Taliban government. The Chinese have also been making other quiet moves. It is involved with the Istanbul Process (Heart of Asia) aimed at providing a regional platform to support Afghanistan's stability and has started discussion on a regional forum for Afghan reconciliation.
The most important outcome of the unity government is that it could spur reconciliation. President Ghani has already sent out a message stating that war was not a solution and the only way forward was for an Afghan-led process. To jumpstart the process, Ghani may chose to recognize the Taliban's political office in Doha as well as reach out to both the Pakistan-based leadership and the Afghanistan-based commanders.
This outreach to the Taliban will lead to an engagement of Pakistan, already a stated aim of the new President. While it is said Pakistan no longer wants a Taliban-controlled government in Afghanistan, Pakistan wants to use its 'influence' with the Taliban as leverage over bilateral issues like India's presence in Afghanistan, the recognition of the Durand Line and the apparent use of Afghan territory as a sanctuary by some Pakistani Taliban.
India, which may not enjoy the same clout in Kabul, will need to be nimble footed to stay in front. Its biggest asset is the Afghan people and it must do more to retain that constituency.
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