The twin anti-terror laws passed recently are not enough, Ved Marwah, honorary professor, Centre for Policy Research, tells AASHA KHOSA
How effective do you think are the anti-terror laws that have been cleared by Parliament in the wake of the Mumbai blasts?
The twin legislation cleared by Parliament recently are a move in the right direction but not enough to fight as serious a problem as terrorism. The National Investigating Agency, (NIA) for example, is meant to investigate acts of terrorism on the same old pattern of a state police official registering a case for investigation. Later, he would have to inform the NIA within 15 days. This is a lot of time for vital evidence and clues to get destroyed and lost. The recent case of Arushi murder is an eye-opener. In this case, vital clues that could have led the police to her killers were lost within the first two days. Even the CBI (Central Bureau of Investigation), which took over the investigation, felt helpless for want of evidence.
Actually, what we need is an anti-terror agency like the USA’s Home Security, which was set up after 9/11. Such an agency would anticipate terrorists’ plans and thwart them in time. It should be able to look at the threat to India’s security in a holistic manner. For example, when terrorists targeted Marriot Hotel in Islamabad, someone in India should have analysed the incident and taken charge of the situation to prevent similar strikes here. Only an anti-terrorism agency would be able to do it.
The amendment to the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act is going to be India’s basic anti-terrorism law. Do you feel this is enough?
This law is better than not having anything at all. But the problem with this law is that it does not make the confession of the accused an admissible evidence in a court of law. In POTA, a confession before an officer of the rank of SP (Superintendent of Police) or above was useful in getting the terrorist punished. Now, if you cannot trust an officer of the level of SP, there is something terribly wrong with our system. Another flaw in the new Act is that the bail provisions make prosecution’s case difficult.
Through these two laws, it is clear that the Centre is still not ready to be held accountable for terrorist incidents. Through these laws, Mr Chidambaram wants to wield authority and power but is not ready to take responsibility and be held accountable.
You were an advisor to the Jammu and Kashmir governor when militancy was at its peak there and later served as governor in Manipur. Also, having been a police officer, can you tell us the difficulties the investigators face in such cases?
I am amazed at why policy-makers in the country have not taken their lessons from handling insurgencies in Kashmir and north-eastern states. It would be interesting for them to see how criminal jurisprudence works at the grassroots level and how difficult it is to get evidence against terrorists. Now, in both the states, the terrorists were highly motivated people and it was not easy to make them talk. Policemen need a lot of time and patience to elicit the truth. Also, in such cases, witnesses, including the victims themselves, are too terrified to come before the court.
We often hear policemen complain that they have to fight terrorism with their hands tied. How true it would be?
Did we not fight terrorism in Punjab and even in the north-eastern states successfully? But those days terrorism was not looked from the prism of politics. Everyone cutting across political parties supported action against terrorists. But now it’s a pity that the fight against terrorism has been so politicised that young officers investigating cases are always cautious to sound-politically correct than conduct the investigation properly. There is so much political interference and sometimes even pressure to show results, which is sad.
However, while on the one hand, the terrorists are challenging the basic concept of India, our government is still working out its counter-approach in the context of the centre-state relations.
More From This Section
The NSG, a force which you headed in its initial years, is being touted as a special anti-terrorist force today. Is it right to invest so much into NSG while on the ground it’s other para-military forces and police which are fighting the terrorists?
The NSG was raised as an experimental force in 1986 and I headed it in 1988. The government was supposed to review its performance as an anti-hijacking and hostage-rescue force, which was never done. Pushing the NSG in the forefront of combating terrorism is not the right approach. I feel that while the NSG should be made a leaner force for use in special situations, its expansion is not desirable. The NSG should strengthen its core commando group — the Special Action Group, comprising army personnel, and disband the Special Ranger Groups, comprising men from para-military forces.
Creating four more NSG hubs would not help as in any case the commandos would not be familiar with the location where they would be airlifted for an operation.
The NSG is not the answer for the situation we are facing. The right approach would be that all states create their own commando force. We already have a successful model of the Grey Hound in Andhra Pradesh. These commandos from the state police have fought the Naxals and this model needs to be replicated all over the country. The NSG, in turn, could train these commandos at Manesar, which has the best training facilities.
What should be the must-do for the government for fighting terrorism?
First of all, the government needs to implement police reforms immediately. Instead of raising more forces, the police should be strengthened. The police force needs to be de-politicised so that the investigations are carried out without pulls and pressures. We need an anti-terrorism agency that can collect, coordinate and analyse all information and also take responsibility and be accountable for any terrorist strike. This organisation should take all agencies, including airports, sea ports, Customs, excise, etc, on board to take a holistic view of the threat to the country.