INDIA-CHINA BOUNDARY ISSUES: QUEST FOR SETTLEMENT
Ranjit Singh Kalha
Indian Council of World Affairs & Pentagon Press;
310 pages; Rs 995
Ranjit Kalha is a distinguished expert on Sino-Indian relations. He knows China well. Speaks Chinese fluently. His book, in my judgement, will have a long shelf life. I hope someone will bring it to the notice of Prime Minister Narendra Modi before he visits China in mid-May.
On May 16, 1959, at the height of the Tibetan uprising, the Chinese Ambassador arrived at South Block and handed over a note, purported to be personally authored by Mao Zedong, which, though rambling in content, had a very important message for the Indian leadership. The note said, "China can only concentrate its attention eastwards of China, but not South westwards … . It seems you too cannot have two fronts … . Here lies the meeting point of our two sides." Sadly, as Mr Kalha points out, Jawaharlal Nehru brusquely rejected the offer. The stage was, thus, set for confrontation. On August 25, 1959, for the first time the Himalayas reverberated with gunfire as Chinese and Indian soldiers clashed. From that point on, it was downhill, leading to the bitter conflict of 1962.
In the past, the Himalayas have dominated the Asian policies of the British in India, the Russians and the Chinese. Britain was always concerned about the safety and security of its jewels in the crown. Its perception after a detailed geographical survey was that the Himalayas presented the perfect barrier, as no large army could possibly mount an offensive and, therefore, the British largely left the north and the north-eastern frontiers of India unguarded. At the time of independence, there were only five police posts within 150 km of the border. Of these, three were in the North-East Frontier Agency, two in Himachal Pradesh and none in the western sector. Also, it was never British policy to recognise Tibetan independence or to encourage the Tibetans in that direction, content as they were with a vague concept of Chinese suzerainty. This was the Indian inheritance at the time of independence.
It goes without saying that the great powers took immense interest in the on-going boundary negotiations between India and China. Mr Kalha's book based on meticulous research of recently declassified documents highlights the contours of US, Soviet Russian and British policy. Even the Chinese have declassified some important documents. Of particular interest is the Chinese version of what Nehru said about incorrect Chinese boundary maps is in stark contrast to what we have understood. I was liaison officer attached to prime minister Chou En Lai during his April 1960 visit. It was a disaster. We blew it. Chou got the better of Nehru.
It is to the credit of Indira Gandhi that she was the first Indian leader who understood that the boundary issue was not a simple question of drawing lines on a map; it was much more and, therefore, it required a sophisticated approach. As Mr Kalha has correctly surmised, the Chinese, soon after Indira Gandhi's return to power in 1980, probably came to the conclusion that a solution to the boundary issue was not imminent and, therefore, started to put impossible conditions. The Chinese assertion in November 1985 that India must give concessions in the eastern sector was designed to hobble the negotiations. It is a recognition of Rajiv Gandhi's acumen that he saw through the Chinese tactics and decided to visit China, 35 years after his grandfather did, to try and unlock the Sino-Indian boundary logjam. Had he not lost the 1989 election the story might well have been different. It is seldom acknowledged that since Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Beijing in December 1988, the Indian border has remained tranquil with minor exceptions.
Mr Kalha has done well to illustrate how not to take Chinese statements at face value. Just as the Chinese concept of a "package deal" has undergone significant changes, so have their "interpretations" of understandings arrived at. Mr Kalha gives the example of Article VII of the "Political Parameters and Guiding Principles Agreement" signed on April 11, 2005. Under Article VII, it was agreed that: "In reaching a border settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled population in border areas."
It was surmised by Indian negotiators that China had, thus, abandoned its earlier position of seeking "concessions" in the eastern sector. Not so, for the Chinese foreign minister told the then Indian foreign minister in 2008 that "mere presence of populated areas [Arunachal Pradesh] would not affect Chinese claims on the boundary". What had changed? India and the United States had concluded the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal in 2007; much to the chagrin of the Chinese, which also highlights the fact that boundary negotiations are never really divorced from power politics of the day.
I fully agree with his realistic conclusion given in the last two sentences of the book. "Despite India agreeing to settle the boundary issue in a 'package way' there are few signs that China is willing to settle the boundary issue unless India completely subscribes to China's world view and agrees to remain within the 'red lines' that China set for it. As that is unlikely to happen, the stalemate, therefore is likely to continue." This perhaps suits both countries, but neither will or can say so in public.
The reviewer was India's external affairs minister
Ranjit Singh Kalha
Indian Council of World Affairs & Pentagon Press;
310 pages; Rs 995
Ranjit Kalha is a distinguished expert on Sino-Indian relations. He knows China well. Speaks Chinese fluently. His book, in my judgement, will have a long shelf life. I hope someone will bring it to the notice of Prime Minister Narendra Modi before he visits China in mid-May.
On May 16, 1959, at the height of the Tibetan uprising, the Chinese Ambassador arrived at South Block and handed over a note, purported to be personally authored by Mao Zedong, which, though rambling in content, had a very important message for the Indian leadership. The note said, "China can only concentrate its attention eastwards of China, but not South westwards … . It seems you too cannot have two fronts … . Here lies the meeting point of our two sides." Sadly, as Mr Kalha points out, Jawaharlal Nehru brusquely rejected the offer. The stage was, thus, set for confrontation. On August 25, 1959, for the first time the Himalayas reverberated with gunfire as Chinese and Indian soldiers clashed. From that point on, it was downhill, leading to the bitter conflict of 1962.
In the past, the Himalayas have dominated the Asian policies of the British in India, the Russians and the Chinese. Britain was always concerned about the safety and security of its jewels in the crown. Its perception after a detailed geographical survey was that the Himalayas presented the perfect barrier, as no large army could possibly mount an offensive and, therefore, the British largely left the north and the north-eastern frontiers of India unguarded. At the time of independence, there were only five police posts within 150 km of the border. Of these, three were in the North-East Frontier Agency, two in Himachal Pradesh and none in the western sector. Also, it was never British policy to recognise Tibetan independence or to encourage the Tibetans in that direction, content as they were with a vague concept of Chinese suzerainty. This was the Indian inheritance at the time of independence.
It goes without saying that the great powers took immense interest in the on-going boundary negotiations between India and China. Mr Kalha's book based on meticulous research of recently declassified documents highlights the contours of US, Soviet Russian and British policy. Even the Chinese have declassified some important documents. Of particular interest is the Chinese version of what Nehru said about incorrect Chinese boundary maps is in stark contrast to what we have understood. I was liaison officer attached to prime minister Chou En Lai during his April 1960 visit. It was a disaster. We blew it. Chou got the better of Nehru.
It is to the credit of Indira Gandhi that she was the first Indian leader who understood that the boundary issue was not a simple question of drawing lines on a map; it was much more and, therefore, it required a sophisticated approach. As Mr Kalha has correctly surmised, the Chinese, soon after Indira Gandhi's return to power in 1980, probably came to the conclusion that a solution to the boundary issue was not imminent and, therefore, started to put impossible conditions. The Chinese assertion in November 1985 that India must give concessions in the eastern sector was designed to hobble the negotiations. It is a recognition of Rajiv Gandhi's acumen that he saw through the Chinese tactics and decided to visit China, 35 years after his grandfather did, to try and unlock the Sino-Indian boundary logjam. Had he not lost the 1989 election the story might well have been different. It is seldom acknowledged that since Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Beijing in December 1988, the Indian border has remained tranquil with minor exceptions.
Mr Kalha has done well to illustrate how not to take Chinese statements at face value. Just as the Chinese concept of a "package deal" has undergone significant changes, so have their "interpretations" of understandings arrived at. Mr Kalha gives the example of Article VII of the "Political Parameters and Guiding Principles Agreement" signed on April 11, 2005. Under Article VII, it was agreed that: "In reaching a border settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled population in border areas."
It was surmised by Indian negotiators that China had, thus, abandoned its earlier position of seeking "concessions" in the eastern sector. Not so, for the Chinese foreign minister told the then Indian foreign minister in 2008 that "mere presence of populated areas [Arunachal Pradesh] would not affect Chinese claims on the boundary". What had changed? India and the United States had concluded the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal in 2007; much to the chagrin of the Chinese, which also highlights the fact that boundary negotiations are never really divorced from power politics of the day.
I fully agree with his realistic conclusion given in the last two sentences of the book. "Despite India agreeing to settle the boundary issue in a 'package way' there are few signs that China is willing to settle the boundary issue unless India completely subscribes to China's world view and agrees to remain within the 'red lines' that China set for it. As that is unlikely to happen, the stalemate, therefore is likely to continue." This perhaps suits both countries, but neither will or can say so in public.
The reviewer was India's external affairs minister