Ten years after the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre came down in New York, the world is taking stock. In the ensuing “war on terror”, though the Al Qaeda has been defeated, it hasn’t been destroyed. The terrorist organisation’s key calculation, that a furious United States homing in on targets in West Asia would provoke a general Arab uprising, has been belied. Osama bin Laden and many of his key aides are dead, and no Arab nation wants to have anything to do with the organisation. If anything, the “Arab Spring” is a negation of Al Qaeda-style terrorism and a vote for representative democracy (different from bin Laden’s dream of a unifying caliphate). No one can rule out fresh outrages by motivated groups in isolated cells, but in a decade when there have been Al Qaeda-inspired attacks in Britain, Spain, Indonesia and elsewhere, there have been none in the US, or none that have been successful. This could be a matter of luck (the New York car bomber was simply incompetent), but that is part of any war. Though the endgame is still being played out in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the US could possibly claim a victory of sorts.
But it has been a costly victory. Estimates vary on what the “war” has cost the US; the lowest is by the Congressional Budget Office — it puts the figure at $1.3 trillion (about nine per cent of US GDP). Other estimates go as high as $3 trillion, and even $6 trillion. The cost in terms of lives (not just American ones, but even Iraqi and Afghan) has also been steep. Inevitable questions arise on the mistakes that have been made, the war that need not have been fought (in Iraq), and even the choice of “ally”, Pakistan, a country whose strategic interests fundamentally differ from those of the US, and which may emerge as the world’s Headache No. 1. Critics will also quote historian Paul Kennedy on imperial over-reach: empires collapse when they seek military objectives that their economies cannot sustain. But then, the US might well have afforded the war were it not for other mistakes (the Bush-era tax cuts and the financial sector running amok) that have blighted the country’s economy. Meanwhile, conspiracy theorists have argued that an undeclared US objective has been to gain control of oil — hence the permanent posting of US troops in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War in 1990-91, the unprovoked attack on Iraq, and now on Libya. But oil production has fallen in both Iraq and Libya, and oil prices have reached record levels — a clear negative for the US, which imports oil.
Finally, the fact is that religious extremism and terrorism remain threats to democratic countries around the world. The US may have prevented a second 9/11-type attack, but it remains as vulnerable as India or Indonesia to the anger of religious extremists and the diabolical agenda of non-state actors from across the borders. In the long run, the real answer to such ideology-inspired terrorism has to be the strong assertion of the ideology of freedom, pluralism, secularism and tolerance. An eye for an eye, Gandhiji said, makes the whole world blind! However, no government can afford to neglect immediate administrative responses. Some feel the US has gone too far with “homeland security”, using modern technology to invade citizens’ privacy. In India, many believe the Indian security authorities have not done enough on this front — a view that will gain currency in the aftermath of the latest terror attack in New Delhi.
Clearly, India has to “walk on two legs”: pursuing a longer-term agenda of a politics and economics of inclusion and an immediate agenda of creating a more effective and intelligent internal security machinery. The US was able to pursue external enemies to seek retribution for 9/11; India cannot afford such adventurism. It needs a more nuanced, though firm, strategy to deal with the threat at home and from across the border.