A deal too far?

Ever since Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the US in July 2005 and he and President George W Bush sprang the surprise of the Indo-US nuclear agreement (the famous July 18 statement), relations between the two countries appear to have been revolving around just this one aspect. Progress, or the lack of it, has become the single test of the relationship. There are excellent reasons why the agreement, if it goes through, will be an important one. These reasons have been aired fully and don't need repetition. But it is also necessary to ask if too much is not being invested by both countries in just this one issue. In other words, would the heavens fall if the deal did not eventually materialise?

Much depends on how the government""especially the Prime Minister""views the issue. Although Dr Singh may well like to make this deal a part of his legacy, he is canny enough to realise that he cannot agree to bind India by US laws if such a thing goes against the national interest. One immediate example of this is the issue of reprocessing spent fuel. India is clear that it will not give up the right to reprocess. But US law is equally clear that spent fuel must be returned so that some of it does not get used in bombs. The other contentious issue is the stockpiling of fuel by India, to feed its civilian power plants for their entire life-cycle (to prevent a repetition of what happened in the case of Tarapur), but this too is a bone of contention""the US wants to use continued fuel supply as a lever to ensure "good behaviour", not realising that no one will invest in power plants that have the sword of Damocles hanging over them.

These are substantive differences, and the gap between the Indian and US positions is not easily bridged. At the political level, especially after the statement made by the Prime Minister to Parliament last August (which pretty much set things in stone as far as India is concerned), there seems to have been some diminution of interest. Mr Bush has other, much larger issues to fret about, and Dr Singh has to make sure that he is not seen as having agreed to something that hobbles India forever. Meanwhile, those charged with the negotiations have been soldiering on and, on occasion (such as at the present moment), waiting for firm political direction. Both sides seem happy for now to push at the string in the hope that it will move at some point.

Is this a good thing or bad? As stated earlier, ever since the July 18 statement there has been a tendency in India to view Indo-US relations through just one slit. This has been distorting the perspective. But as many analysts have pointed out, there are several other aspects that are at least as important, if not more. Chief amongst these is the broader economic and social engagement, which should not become a prisoner of the energy subset within it. The short point is that the time has come to get a move on these other issues and cease to be in the thrall of the "sexy" strategic/nuclear tango. If it works, everyone can raise a toast; if not, there are other issues on which to build the bilateral relationship.