It is important, therefore, to consider what Indo-Japanese collaboration has to offer, what the constraints acting on it are, and why it is important that New Delhi follow up on the open hand that Tokyo has extended. In effect, India and Japan have to create a "special relationship" of the sort that a very few countries have. One leg of this relationship, obviously, is economic. Continuing strong anti-Japanese feelings in the People's Republic of China, egged on by its authoritarian leaders, have finally forced Japanese companies to look elsewhere for factories and markets - especially to India's middle-class consumers that they have largely lost to the Koreans in the past decade. For India, the benefits have also come in terms of infrastructure financing. The few infrastructure successes and hopes of the United Progressive Alliance's recent years are owed to Japanese financing - overseas development assistance of $36 billion has so far flowed to India. The Delhi Metro was the first, conspicuous success, along with a bridge to the suburb of Noida. The Bangalore and Chennai projects, several ring roads and expressways are also being financed. And the big-idea industrial-zone hopes - the Delhi-Mumbai and Chennai-Bengaluru Industrial Corridors - are also dependent on Japanese assistance.
But there is also the question of national security. Increasing assertiveness in the region by China has combined with the unwillingness of the United States to meet its previous commitments of support to its allies in the region to create instability in the Asian balance. An important leg to any rebalancing must be a firm alliance between New Delhi and Tokyo. A significant step was taken earlier this year when Mr Abe's government began the process of approving the sale of its amphibious US-aircraft to the Indian military. This would essentially skirt the strict no-arms-exports requirements in Japan's laws; the US-2 can be used for search-and-rescue missions. But it can also be modified to carry armaments - making India one of the first destinations for possibly offensive weapons platforms from Japan. Closer co-operation between the two countries' navies must also be arranged for, and high-level strategic dialogue should also become a regular event. China's loudly-expressed concerns should not give India a moment's pause in this endeavour.
As Asia adjusts to China's rise, as Japan rediscovers its momentum, as the US looks inward, and as India dithers on its strategic orientation, the imperial visit is an important harbinger of the direction India can, must and will go. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh expanded the government's "Look East" policy to include Japan and Australia. He and his successor must build on that to create a special relationship with Tokyo - and quickly.