A wobbly first year for the CDS

Deep and candid introspection is warranted for the Chief of Defence Staff to have a tangible impact on military reforms

The Narendra Modi government took a major policy decision in creating the post of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) on January 1. This political resolve to address a long-delayed issue pertaining to India’s higher defence management was welcomed as a commendable initiative. Approval was accorded for creating “the post of Chief of Defence Staff in the rank of a four-star General with salary and perquisites equivalent to a Service Chief” and it was understood that the CDS  would be the first among equals.

Prime Minister Modi  made the announcement  fairly early in his second term from the Red Fort during his August 15 address to the nation in 2019, and the first incumbent, General Bipin Rawat, assumed charge as the CDS in January,  immediately after demitting office as the Chief of Army Staff. 

Heralded as a “landmark” decision, the mandate envisioned for the CDS was substantive and included: “Promoting jointness in procurement, training and staffing for the Services through joint planning and integration of their requirements ; facilitation of restructuring of Military Commands for optimal utilisation of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, including through establishment of joint/theatre commands; and promoting use of indigenous equipment by the Services.”

A year later, the tangible impact and outcome on India’s national security and the manner in which  overall military capability has been nurtured by the first CDS  is mixed. While the need for such a position is unexceptionable and tri-service synergy a desirable goal,  some of the reports  that can be gleaned from the public domain are not encouraging.

It is instructive that on the day before  General Rawat assumed office, there was some puzzlement among the veterans, for the CDS-designate had unveiled a new badge that ostensibly signified the new post but it had no precedent and seemed incongruous with the  “first among equals” principle. A former service chief noted on social media (Dec 31, 2019) of the new badge: “Is this authentic?? Unique if it is, because CDS is not a rank. It is an appointment tenable by an officer of the rank of Gen/Adm/ACM. A new flag is in order but new rank badge??”

In itself this may seem inconsequential, though the question does arise as to what a four-star naval or air force officer would sport as badge and shoulder epaulettes if appointed CDS, but the symbolism is significant. The post of the CDS is an exalted one in the military hierarchy and to be accorded the highest respect institutionally.  Consequently, the first incumbent must proceed with due deliberation and prudence — for his every  word, deed and  action will set a precedent for his successors.

Given the relative indifference and the lack of awareness  about  military convention  in the political and bureaucratic dispensation, it would not have been appropriate for any individual outside the fauj to point out this badge anomaly. A degree of restraint and self-regulation would have been prudent.

Reviewing the major punctuations of India’s national security over the last year — the truly big-ticket  setback is the Chinese intrusion across the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh in early 2020 and the loss of lives in the  Galwan  incident in June. India’s higher defence management was found to be inadequate again — as it was in 1962, 1999 and 2008.  While the CDS has no operational responsibility, the gaps in the system that allowed the People's Liberation Army intrusion to happen is a matter that ought to be examined objectively and remedial measures initiated in an effective manner.  There is little in the public domain to suggest that such a review is on the agenda and this does not augur well in the long run.

Illustration: Binay Sinha

In recent months, the CDS has indicated that in keeping with the mandate given by the government, the existing single-service  military commands (a total of 17) would be restructured rapidly but the actual progress has been wobbly. In August, it was suggested that a new air defence command would be unveiled soon — on October 8 — to coincide with Air Force Day but the “news” was neither refuted nor confirmed officially and the matter allowed to fizzle out.  Reference was also  made to a new maritime theatre command with headquarters in Karwar but the fine print does not seem to have been as rigorously thought through in a comprehensive manner.

India’s existing military capability has a credibility that has been nurtured by professionals over the decades in a very distinctive ecosystem. The need to transmute single-service silos towards greater tri-service synergy is a desirable objective and technological changes make this imperative.  Any major restructuring would call for a comprehensive blueprint, which needs detailed debate and synthesis of divergent views. This does not appear to be the case and seemingly bold innovation that prioritises “low-hanging” fruit might not be the optimum path. Hasty re-structuring of military commands during a Covid-blighted period when the national coffers are under stress could inadvertently lead to the equivalent of India’s military being devalued in its composite efficacy index.

Another  policy proposal mooted by the CDS that could be highly corrosive is the “Tour of Duty” that seeks to introduce short tenures for new recruits  to save on pay and pension. While seeking to reduce the revenue budget is a desirable goal at the national level, it is not clear why the onus should be on the military alone.  The internal note on the subject refers to a “resurgence of nationalism and patriotism” in the country and the rising unemployment and hence proposes a three-year “internship” for those who “do not want to make defence services their permanent vocation.”

When unveiled in the media, the reaction from senior army officers  was anguished bewilderment. A retired three-star officer bemoaned: “The scheme appears to be part of politics built around ultra-nationalism and glorification of military service without actually addressing the concerns of the military.”

Perhaps the most disquieting development was the decision of the CDS to attend a religious event in Gorakhpur along with the chief minister of Uttar Pradesh on December 4 — traditionally observed as Navy Day and skip the solemn wreath laying ceremony where all the three service chiefs participate.

It would have been befitting in the spirit of “jointness” if the CDS had been part of this ceremony as the country’s senior-most military officer. This was not so, thereby diluting the maroon in the badge worn by the CDS.  Deep and candid introspection is warranted.

The writer is Director, Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi