From Egypt to Jordan, from Yemen to Nepal, people are angry with rulers and politicians and are finding new ways to register their protest. In Egypt and Yemen they are on the streets. In Nepal, they are slapping politicians. Shoes have also been used.
Devi Prasad Regmi, a disgruntled supporter of the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), could not have known, when his right hand came into contact with a left cheek in January 2011 in Itahari, that the smack he was delivering was to the future Prime Minister of Nepal, Jhalanath Khanal. All he knew was a sense of deep frustration at the political leadership of Nepal, for having been unable to elect a prime minister after seven months and 16 attempts. Khanal (who later forgave his assailant) said: “Gnats and flies make no effect at all” (sic).
Khanal was elected prime minister after Maoist supremo Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda” opted out of the contest, and the Maoists voted en bloc for the CPN-UML. Khanal got 368 votes, of which 238 came from the Maoists. So clearly, the tail is going to wag the dog.
A previous meeting in Kathmandu attended by the Nepali Congress (NC) and CPN-UML, where Prachanda proposed his candidature as PM, paved the way for Khanal’s election. Both groups said they would be ready to support Prachanda if he abided by three conditions: announce the exact number of Maoist combatants in camps and on the streets; spell out the modus operandus of integration of combatants into the Nepal Army; and take irreversible steps to segregate Maoists from official state militias.
That Prachanda opted to reject these conditions and told his party Khanal should be supported is significant. His party colleague, Babu Ram Bhattarai, appended a note of dissent on behalf of his followers — so a section of the Maoists has deep reservations about the move.
What does that say about Khanal’s future? And what implications does his appointment have for India?
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First, rather than becoming prime minister, Prachanda decided that the Maoists can still reclaim power from the streets through mass mobilisation and protest campaigns which include a calibrated use of violence and intimidation. This premise is yet to be tested, and now, since they are supporting the government, will get even less chance to be tested. On the other hand, there is even less compulsion on the Maoists to transform themselves into a democratic party upholding the rule of law. The pressure to implement past agreements – renewed at least 14 times – to return property seized during the war and dismantle the paramilitary Young Communist League is now absent.
What does that say about the peace process? It gets even more gridlocked. Earlier, the Maoists used to say that India was the regressive force in Nepal, because New Delhi wanted its proxy in Kathmandu. Now, because a Maoist-supported government is in place, this argument is no longer valid. If anything, there is a Maoist proxy in place in the prime minister’s palace, known as Baluwatar. The portfolios and names of his ministers have not been announced yet. But it can safely be conjectured that a large number of Maoists will now become ministers.
Democratic parties like the Nepali Congress are now in the opposition. So are a majority of the parties representing the plains (Terai), known as Madhes. Madhesis are seen as being influenced by India. How will the government handle Madhesi politics? A splinter group of Madhesis is likely to join the government. Will this make ethnic politics in Nepal more cohesive or less? In terms of ground-level politics, violence on the open India-Nepal border cannot be ruled out.
A standoff between the Nepal Army and the government of the day cannot be ruled out either. After all, Nepal’s current crisis was triggered by Prachanda’s sacking of Chief of Army Staff, General Rukmangad Katowal, who was seen as the main hurdle to the integration of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with Nepal Army and the consolidation of their power base. General Katowal was dismissed without Cabinet approval. This unilateral decision led to the collapse of the Maoist-led government. Now a regime is in place that represents the very same forces.
The only variable is the prime minister. Jhalanath Khanal has long argued that there can be no political solution in Nepal without the Maoists. In this he does not have the full-throated support of his own party. But now that he is prime minister, will he be able to take some hard decisions? Will he be his own man? Will Indian business still be singled out for “violation” of Nepal’s laws? Will the UML-led government in Kathmandu keep its pledge of correcting the trade deficit between India and Nepal by buying petrol and other items from other countries? Will demands to rewrite treaties between the two countries be revived?
India’s experience is that governments in which the tail wags the dog are rarely stable. Moreover, they get very little done by way of tough decisions. So Nepal may have a prime minister and government in place but is likely to be headed for another spell of suspended animation.