India's risk and uncertainty in engaging with China are obviously linked to the inevitability of China being a bad neighbour. Numerous and increasingly intensifying incursions are occurring across the Indian border, the most recent during the President's visit. The blatant objective, declared by their army, was to build strategic border roads. It was followed by the President's statement upon return exhorting the army to prepare for a regional war. It is unlikely that the reference was only to the South China Sea. It could comprise the Ides of March for India if it commits the folly of letting such mongering pass.
The risk is also associated with China's long-standing approach in sharing responsibility in global growth before the global economic crisis and, after, with its resistance to fair burden sharing. Table 1 reveals some stark contrasts that have emerged over three decades from the 1980s. Between 1981-2013, India's GDP increased from $19.7 thousand crore to $188 thousand crore, and China's from $19.4 thousand crore (lower than India's) to $924 thousand crore (about five times India's). Japan's GDP grew from $120 thousand crore (more than six times India or China) to $490 thousand crore (half of China and two and a half times India's).
China's phenomenal growth compared to Japan and even more so in relation to India is not strictly admirable in terms of human rights or international trade. The decades-long absence of labour rights is finally resulting in selective manifestation of labour unrest, albeit quickly crushed every time. The absence of political rights was recently manifest in emotional student protests in Hong Kong. And the global crisis finally impelled trading partners to protest China's international market manipulation through artificially low exchange rates with the objective of pushing exports significantly above expected growth in terms of quality or technology. Consequently, it initiated a currency appreciation, albeit reluctant and slow.
Japan has been demonstrably more cooperative in international relations. The secularly high trade surplus with the United States of the 1980s was broken by its acceptance of reducing the quantum of automobile exports, a quantitative policy verboten in the context of international trade. It protested mildly that the Japanese did not appear to prefer American cars when the United States further asked why the Japanese were not importing more of them. Throughout, Japan has revealed more willingness to go along with the international community in both trade and diplomacy. Indeed, Japan's prolonged economic recession, with periods of depression, is likely to have had its origin in that period of inarguable obeisance to the United States, robbing it of a way of life established from the mid 1800s by industrial houses such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo in cooperation with Government. The squatters' park in front of the Tokyo Museum and the deserted department stores are presently its stark and constant reminders.
Indo-Japan and Indo-China trade patterns are pointers. Figure 1 shows that, though India exports to Japan a bit less than it imports from it, in the case of China, India's imports are three and a half times its exports. Figure 2 shows India's imports and exports from and to Japan have remained similar in the last five years at about two per cent of India's global imports and exports respectively. However, in the case of China, it represents 11 per cent of India's global imports but only five per cent of India's global exports. Does India wish to become even more dependent on, and acquire a higher deficit with, China, a country that projects its naked power at every available opportunity? There is no need for India to be impolite but the clear policy should be an assiduous adherence to enhancing border security, strategic transport access through roads and airpower, and a continuing demonstration of fearlessness on the seas. And, paired with a clear turn exclusively towards Japan.
Unfortunately, India loses direly in its inability to control corruption including in Defence if wide ranging reports are given credibility while China can take quick action, including using capital punishment, to contain it. India need not replicate medieval remedies but it must control corruption for, otherwise, all arguments made above would stand on quicksand. At the moment, hopes are high that Mr Modi will improve things, perhaps even radicalise the issue. If not, it is expectable that the disaffected majority would find solutions sharper than Naxalism.