Instead, Mr Mathur must be visionary. He should take to the prime minister just five simple measures that would create or catalyse dramatic improvements across the wider defence arena. It would be pointless recommending a larger defence budget; anyone can improve defence by throwing vast sums of money at it. Mr Mathur should focus on getting more bang for the buck. Given the almost criminal inefficiency of our defence processes, this can be achieved without fuss.
India's fundamental defence problem is the Army's bloated manpower, the cost of which leaves little for modern equipment. The Army chief says defending the mountainous border needs large numbers. True, but China, with far longer unsettled borders, slashed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) by a million in 1985; another 500,000 in 1997, and 200,000 more in 2003, to a size not much larger than India's. In contrast, our army is expanding, adding 80,000 soldiers this decade, when half the army's current budget already goes on salaries. Adding bayonets is useless when that leaves no money for equipment like artillery. The defence secretary must recommend time-bound manpower reduction targets, rightsizing over this decade, from 1.2 million today to a 900,000-strong army.
These smaller numbers can successfully defend our far-flung borders, provided they can move quickly between sectors. Currently, every sector must be heavily manned in case of a full-scale attack. A poor border road network precludes the quick reinforcement of a threatened sector. A time-bound road-building plan would allow many sectors to be lightly held, saving manpower costs that could buy heavier and more accurate firepower. To meet road-building targets, an expanded Border Roads Organisation (BRO) must be placed under the defence ministry (it is currently under the ministry of road transport and highways). The defence minister must chair the apex Border Roads Development Board, which was once chaired by Jawaharlal Nehru himself. Border states must be incentivised, through border area development funds, to play their role in land acquisition.
The third suggestion, which would be enabled by a better-connected border, is to radically outsource the Army's administrative functions. Today, based on the dated assumption that wars are fought mainly in uninhabited areas, the Army's administrative functions are discharged by expensive combat soldiers. Military salaries and lifetime pensions are paid to legions of "combatant tradesmen" who wash, sweep, cook and cut hair. In an equipment-heavy armoured division, every sixth combatant is a mechanic, performing a role that civilians can discharge more cheaply and better. Other soldiers supply rations, clothing, spare parts and fuel, jobs that most armies have privatised almost entirely. Today, even a waiter in an officers' mess is a full-time soldier, entitled to pay and pension for life.
Privatising these functions would improve the military's "tooth-to-tail ratio", cut salary and pension bills, and create economic opportunities for local populations in border areas who would be hired by private service contractors. It would also "civilianise" defence, creating a new genre of combat service contractors.
Fourthly, Mr Mathur should place national interest over political and IAS apprehensions and recommend the appointment of a chief of defence staff. The CDS, a five-star rank officer, appointed for a three-year tenure, is badly needed to co-ordinate and oversee manpower and equipment planning of all three services. Today, with nobody to mandate joint-service aims, priorities or roles, the Army, Navy and Air Force jostle for money and turf, wasting scarce funds in duplicating capabilities. Furthermore, without an overall commander to prioritise between competing service demands, the tri-service 15-year equipment plan is a worthless wish list that, in pandering to all three services, goes far beyond the actual availability of funds. Finally, a CDS would provide the military with unified command in war, and the ministry with single-point advice in peace.
Finally, to create a viable defence industry the defence ministry must consciously assume a "market maker" role. For almost a decade, A K Antony has shied away from any role in developing indigenous companies into serious defence players. Instead, he reduced defence procurement and production policy to a decision matrix, devoid of judgement and discretion. The MoD must overtly and unabashedly favour indigenous production, while remaining impartial between the public and private sectors. To maintain even-handedness, the MoD must unburden itself of the nine defence public sector undertakings, transferring them to the ministry of heavy industries. To promote high technology, the MoD should identify innovative Indian companies and focus on their development. Controls must be loosened on defence exports to help these companies become global players, benefiting from economies of scale. At least 100 to 150 "Make" category projects must be kicked off, providing these companies the framework to grow. Technology entrepreneurs should be additionally seeded through the DARPA model, in which the Pentagon's Defence Advance Research Projects Agency funds small projects that are directed towards futuristic war. The DARPA's successes include creating the Internet, but Indian technologists have no one to turn to.
None of these proposals is difficult for the new government, given its mandate and vision for change. The lack of a full-time minister for the defence ministry, however, would throw any transformation into doubt.