America's ally

The US intends to give Pakistan a Major Non-Nato Ally (MNNA) status. Others with this status are Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines.

On Saturday India said it was 'disappointed' with this decision. It was not made clear, however, whether the official disappointment was with Pakistan's new status or because it was not informed in advance.

The US secretary of state, Colin Powell, had come visiting just a couple of days previously to discuss the Indo-US relationship but he kept mum on this MNNA decision. Overall, too, the Indian reaction has been one of extreme irritation. How could the US give this status to a country that has just been caught selling nuclear weapons technology to Libya and North Korea?

Surely, the US has security concerns about Pakistan that it does not have with any of the others to whom it has given the same status. Is this then the cynical price paid for Pak cooperation in the hope of nabbing Osama bin Laden before voting day in the US?

The issue must cause embarrassment to the government because Mr Vajpayee had declared, during his summit meeting with President Clinton in 2000, that India is America's 'natural ally'""a claim that has never been reciprocated. The point, though, is that India has usually been shy of getting into military alliances, the sole exception (with the Soviet Union in 1971) being forced on it by American alignment with Pakistan.

And it is Pakistan that has more readily got into alliances with the US: remember SEATO and CENTO. The Cold War is of course over, but Pakistan remains a frontline state. Hence its usefulness to the US, despite its generally dodgy behaviour.

Still, it is important to retain perspective, and to bear in mind that the benefits to MNNAs are largely symbolic. MNNAs don't have mutual defence and security guarantees that members of Nato have. But they are eligible for priority delivery of excess defence articles, stockpiling of US defence goods, purchase of depleted uranium anti-tank rounds and participation in cooperative research and development programmes. They are also eligible for the Defence Export Loan Guarantee (DELG) programme, which backs up private loans for commercial defence exports. All of these will be useful to Pakistan, but will not change the military balance with India.

Should India be miffed? Perhaps, but the important question is whether the new relationship gives the US some control of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, or at least some say in how they might be used. If it does, it could mean an end to the kind of nuclear sabre-rattling that Gen. Musharraf indulged in two years ago.

Equally, the chances of Pakistani nuclear secrets getting into the wrong hands may now be less. On its part, Pakistan now has an informal guarantee against Indian attack which, given Indian superiority on the conventional side, was its raison d'etre for developing nuclear weapons. But whether this will make Pakistan a more responsible state remains to be seen. If it does not, the US will surely face some embarrassing questions.