China’s extreme north-west province, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), propelled into the global spotlight this week with rioting and violence between the Uighurs (Turkic- Muslims) and Han Chinese ethnic groups. President Hu Jintao rushed home from the ongoing G-8 Summit in Italy, drawing attention to the gravity of the situation. Mobs took to the streets of Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi and rioting turned into a free-for-all carnage. Uighurs had gathered to protest state inaction in addressing the killings of their brethren by Han Chinese in Guangdong, triggering the face-off. While the situation is seemingly under control, the verdict is damaging. In a year when the Communist Party is planning a grand 60-year bash, this is quite embarrassing and not quite the “harmonious society” that it hard-sells.
The crisis has old roots—it is neither new nor unprecedented. Xinjiang has been simmering in discontent with a long history of sporadic incidents such as in 1990 and 1997, but these were not widely reported in the local or international press. The recent events have brought to the fore Xinjiang’s distinct identity as a non-Han and non-Chinese speaking province at odds with China’s body politic since “liberation” by the Communists in 1949 and draws attention to the failure of China’s convoluted integrationist policies.
East Turkestan to the native inhabitants, but Xinjiang to the Chinese, which literally means “new dominion” or “new territory”, it is one of the five autonomous regions of China. For Beijing, in theory and practice, Xinjiang is on the periphery as the uncomfortably distant province. Its capital Urumqi lies almost 4,000 km away from Beijing and sits in a different time zone. This aside, there is little or no commonality (such as ethnic or cultural ties) between the overwhelming Han-Chinese nation and Xinjiang’s disparate and diverse 20 million current demographic consisting of minorities such as Uighurs, Kazaks, Hui, Daurs etc. The Uighurs constitute the dominant ethnic group at 47 per cent, which has dramatically fallen from an estimated 80 per cent in 1941. In a reversal of sorts, the Hans comprised a meagre 6 per cent of the population in 1949, but clambered to 40 per cent in 2000. However, official figures predict a fall to 25 per cent of the population in 2030 due to falling birth rates.
The changed demographics, colloquially referred to as “mixing sand”, or chan shazi, have been at the heart of discontent with a cross-section of Uighurs believing that they are systematically being reduced to second-class citizens in their own land. While the Han Chinese have flocked to Xinjiang, Uighurs have been forced to move out to different provinces to break rank and prevent easy mobilisation. It is common knowledge that Xinjiang has been infamous as a storage facility for demobilised troops and dumping ground for displaced citizens (such as the “environmental refugees” from the Three Gorges Dam project).
Many sinologists opine that the problem in Xinjiang has been festering not due to its religious profile but because of the nature of integrationist policies carried out in the region. The aggressive sinification campaign spearheaded by a paramilitary unit—the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (or the PCC, a party-government-army unit)—since the 1950’s has been controversial. While official sources have credited it with large-scale agricultural works, critics allege that it implemented a top-down sinification campaign.
In recent years, Xinjiang has emerged as a key region, facilitating oil and gas trade. Not only does Xinjiang boasts about the Lop Nor Nuclear Testing ground, but also China’s biggest Petroleum reserves such as the Tahe Oilfield and Dushanzi Refinery. In a way, the keel of China’s quest for energy security rests in Xinjiang. Among several ambitious projects, the 3,000-km-long Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline (KCP), deemed to be operational in 2011, runs from the Caspian Sea to Xinjiang and is a critical on-shore import channel, which will deliver 20 million tonnes of Caspian crude oil annually. A section of this pipeline, the Atasu-Alashankou line, is operational since 2005, pumping crude oil from Kazakhstan.
Xinjiang’s distinct Central Asian identity stems from its geographical location on the map. It stands at the crossroads of six different cultural and geographic regions with porous borders—Russia, Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), Mongolia, the Indian sub-continent (India, Pakistan and Afghanistan), Tibet and China. Xinjiang’s ethnic groups (such as Uighurs and Kazaks) are visibly scattered in the neighbouring republics. Uighurs of Xinjiang have cross-border kin relations with the Uighurs of neighboring countries (an estimated 185,000 Uighurs are in Kazakhstan and 80,000 in Kyrgyzstan).
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Like the majority in the region, the Uighurs are practising Muslims—which has inadvertently (in a post 9/11 phobia world) worked to China’s advantage—leading prominent sinologists to opine of a “scape-goat terrorism” stand. In fact, had religion, Islam in particular, been the issue, the problem would have manifested in the majority Muslim minority group called the Hui’s.
Life seems to be returning to normal in Urumqi with the arrival of the army. However, this episode will have longer term implications for China. The attempt to keep a lid on Han chauvinism and navigate increasing alienation of Uighurs will be an uphill task.
(Anurag Viswanath is a Visiting Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi. The views expressed are personal.)