Last week’s successful launch of the GSAT-12 communication satellite using the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) was more than a routine event. It is the first time (second if the “Chandrayaan” launch of 2008 is considered) the PSLV has been used to position a satellite in a geostationary orbit, 36,000 kms above the equator. With the GSAT-12 entering service, India now has 175 active transponders that help support rapidly increasing communication services within the country. Two more launches are planned for 2011, which is clearly a step in the right direction given the increasingly communication-centric nature of the Indian economy. The successful launch should help the Indian Space Research Organisation (Isro) come out of the shadows of last year’s controversies and failures and move forward. India’s space programme is lagging seriously behind China’s and the time has come for Isro to give up its pretence of being a purely civilian programme. Equally, it must work with other countries to accelerate its upgradation and modernisation programmes. Isro Chairman K Radhakrishnan’s recent assurance to have a “reliable” Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) by the end of 2011 will be watched with eager anticipation!
Are current expectations from Isro realistic, given its shoestring budget compared to its peers in developed economies? Isro’s budget is an embarrassment when compared to that of the National Aeronautics Space Administration, the European Space Agency and corresponding entities in China, Japan and Russia. That said, Isro’s “failure-to-budget” ratio compares very favourably with those of its peers. But that is neither here nor there especially for an agency that aspires to be a world beater! Isro has indeed done much with what it has been given, but its performance will continue to be hobbled by funding that is way below the threshold required to operate a consistently successful programme. The government must put its money where its mouth is and significantly raise Isro’s budget to a level commensurate with its ambitions. This will enable Isro to accelerate its technology development programmes, which take a lot longer to deliver owing to budget constraints. The experience with indigenisation of defence equipment offers pertinent lessons. Unrealistically low levels of funding have hindered the progress of many well-intentioned projects that were designed to achieve greater national self-reliance.
It is to Isro’s credit that it has delivered results without the benefit of an ecosystem that effectively meshes the science and technology (S&T) establishment and the domestic manufacturing industry. With the possible exception of China, the established powers in the global space industry have had the benefit of both. Inter-institutional linkages among various actors in India’s S&T space are virtually non-existent, and manufacturing capabilities, to put it mildly, are nascent. Isro has been a remarkable self-starter, right from developing some vital technology in-house, establishing institutionalised technology transfer capability, and handholding domestic manufacturing industry (increasingly small and medium industries). In doing so, it has contributed to technological deepening. A reliable GSLV-based launch programme will take Isro to the next level, with a capability to eventually launch a payload of over four tonnes. This will need not only government support but also gainful engagement with the private sector and modernisation of systems.