Last month, I had highlighted some emerging problems in respect of political governance, administration of justice and delivery of public services. In this concluding piece on the above topic, I propose to suggest some administrative and institutional reforms to enable India to regain the lost ground.
The list of reforms that are required to preserve the best of our democratic heritage is long. There may also be different views, particularly in respect of reform of politics, on what is necessary and what is feasible. This is partly because, in a highly diverse country like India, what benefits one group of interests may not benefit some other group. For example, curbing the power of small parties to switch sides may be in the interest of large parties in a coalition, but this may not be so for the numerous small parties in the same coalition.
Notwithstanding these realities of power, some administrative and institutional reforms are essential and unavoidable to make the political system work in the interest of the country and its people. Let me mention a few of them which are now urgent, and deserve to be adopted as early as possible.
Two most urgent priorities for the forthcoming Budget session of Parliament are: (a) to establish a system of accountability in the delivery of public services during 2010-11, and (b) to reduce the “demand” and “supply” of corruption in the administrative system. If ministers concerned can be held accountable for delivering what they and their ministries have promised to deliver during the year (and not over five years or in 2020), the “demand” for corruption to get things done would also automatically decrease.
In order to achieve the objective of ministerial accountability, it is of utmost importance to make delivery of each service the responsibility of one ministry, and one minister — be it food, nutrition, employment guarantee, shelter or literacy. Let the ministry take into account all the possible obstacles in achieving the ambitious Five-Year Plan targets, and announce an annual target which it considers feasible and for which it can be held accountable. Each such ministry must be given autonomy and authority to do whatever is necessary to reach the targets for the year. Policy may be decided in consultation with other ministries, but execution must be the responsibility of a single ministry or department.
Another priority is to eliminate “discretionary” powers of ministers in delivery of public services, and empower the civil service to do whatever is necessary to administer the approved scheme through transparent procedures, which are accessible to the public. Ministers should be responsible for monitoring progress in achieving announced targets, and take remedial action where necessary.
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We have some highly distinguished public institutions such as the Election Commission, the Space Commission, the Central Information Commission and the Union Public Service Commission, which have rendered excellent services to the country. Appointments to these institutions are made by the government. However, once appointed, members have full authority to carry out the tasks assigned to them without any interference or approval by the ministries concerned.
We need similar institutions in all other areas of vital public interest and delivery of public services. Why should a minister decide who will be allotted telecom spectrum, or mining rights for iron ore or copper, or merger of public sector enterprises? Let the minister and cabinet collectively decide on policy for allocations, but which entity should get what and how much should be left to an autonomous agency.
The second area where immediate action is required is that of lowering the bar on tolerance of corruption. In recent years, a feeling of helplessness among the public, and the resulting acceptance of administrative and political corruption have become common. A lid has to be put on the tolerance levels of corruption. Persons who have already been “charge-sheeted” for corruption and high crimes should not be permitted to take the oath of office as members of legislative bodies or function as ministers until they have been cleared by courts. A legal procedure may be introduced for special hearings to decide pending cases against MPs and MLAs, particularly those who are proposed to be appointed as ministers.
Except in selected areas, such as security and defence, it is desirable to cut through the elaborate red-tape and rely on “self-certification”. Such simplification, which automatically reduces the demand and supply of corruption, has already been introduced in some areas with perceptible success (for example, foreign exchange regulations). In areas where government approval is still considered necessary, it is desirable to empower the civil service to take administrative decisions as per announced policies. There is simply no reason why India can not have a rule-based system of administration, which is not dependent on ministerial discretion from case to case.
The above reforms are the minimum that is necessary to prevent further erosion in the authority of the state. For those who are not yet convinced about the urgent need for a change, let me end with a quote from the editorial of this newspaper on April 24, 2008:
“The politics of a soft state, the sociology of a hierarchical society, the economics of a poor country, the laxness of a system of public administration that gives zero priority to accountability ... the predatory and exploitative nature of the state that has yet to shed its colonial provenance, the historical experience of a people who have experienced good governance only episodically — each contributes to the dysfunctionality of the Indian state, which worsens with each passing year...”
These are the words of this esteemed newspaper, not mine ! Let us hope that the decade of 2010 will be different.