Borderline issues

Indo-Bangla bonhomie masks critical gaps

The conspicuous display of goodwill between Narendra Modi and Sheikh Hasina during the Indian prime minister’s first foreign visit since the outbreak of Covid-19 to celebrate the golden jubilee of Bangladesh’s independence reflects the notable progress in Indo-Bangladesh relations. The bonhomie was evident in the signing of five agreements — in areas ranging from sports and disaster management — to establishing border haats and laying the foundation stones for various projects and a war memorial for the Indian soldiers who died in Bangladesh’s war of liberation.

India’s soft power was underlined by its donation of 108 ambulances and the “gift” of 3.2 million doses of Covid-19 vaccines. Even the contentious Teesta water-sharing agreement was reportedly mentioned in emollient terms with Sheikh Hasina merely voicing expectations of an early settlement. The unspoken implication in this is the outcome of the West Bengal Assembly election, where Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee is in a tough fight with the Bharatiya Janata Party. It was Ms Banerjee who had caused Manmohan Singh’s government deep embarrassment by withdrawing at the last minute from a draft water-sharing agreement in 2011. There has been little progress on it since. But the Teesta water system is vital for Bangladesh because its floodplain accounts for the direct and indirect livelihood of a large percentage of its population so any delay in an agreement — hanging fire since 1972 — would certainly have an impact on relations. This is all the more so when Dhaka is reportedly exploring an agreement with China to dredge and embank large portions of the 100-km stretch of the river in Bangladesh.

In the main, however, Mr Modi has been able to build on the strong diplomatic ties that were established when Sheikh Hasina returned to power in 2009. Mindful of the role India has played in Bangladesh’s independence and the refuge New Delhi provided her after her father, Bangladesh’s first President Mujib-ur-Rahman and most of her family were assassinated in 1975, Sheikh Hasina has successfully moved to address India’s concerns over cross-border terrorism and north-eastern insurgency movements. Though the Teesta water dispute simmered when Mr Modi came to power in 2014, the two leaders managed to put aside their differences and sign a land boundary demarcation agreement on overlapping border enclaves in 2015. This marked a new phase of Indo-Bangladesh diplomacy, which also saw a proposal to discuss a more universal water-sharing agreement — on the lines of the Indo-Pakistan water-sharing treaties — involving all the rivers that flow through the two countries.

But for all the temple-visiting and celebrations, there are undercurrents of unease between the two neighbours that extend beyond the Teesta’s turbulent waters. This concerns the contentious Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), passed by Parliament in 2019, and the prospect of extending the National Register of Citizens (NRC) beyond Assam to the rest of India. Tied up in both are the polarising notions of “intruders” from Bangladesh — an oblique reference to Bengali workers from border districts — who could face repatriation and the implication that Bangladesh persecuted its minorities. Sheikh Hasina was careful to articulate that the CAA and NRC were India’s “internal matters” but she is perturbed enough to question their rationale in interviews in the UAE as recently as January this year. The pandemic has postponed the CAA-NRC reckoning but it would be a pity if a Hindutva agenda were allowed to vitiate good relations with India’s closest and, so far friendliest, South Asian neighbour.