Those who live by the sword (or gun) perish by it. But not always. President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan may be about to join the lucky few. If he is impeached, as looks increasingly likely, he will have broken a tradition in Pakistan of the ruler going out at the point of a gun, usually alive but sometimes dead. Between Liaquat Ali Khan, who was assassinated in 1951, and now, hardly any ruler of Pakistan has left on schedule, by due constitutional process. Both Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan were military rulers who were forced to leave, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was overthrown, Zia-ul Haq was killed, and neither Nawaz Sharif nor Benazir Bhutto completed a term as prime minister. The first was exiled after being ousted in 1999, and the second was killed in December 2007. Nawaz Sharif has now come back and has been joined by Asif Ali Zardari, both of whom have personal scores to settle with Mr Musharraf.
The result is that unless he decides to pre-empt the impeachment proceedings, either through a petition before the Supreme Court or by more dire and direct methods, the Pakistani president could well be on his way out — though there are those who argue that the ruling combine may not be able to cobble together the required two-thirds majority. One of Mr Musharraf’s main supporters has said that stability has to be the president’s first consideration. “This impeachment is a democratic, political battle. He has a right to defend himself, he has a right to fight back. And we feel that he has a lot of support within parliament.” Another supporter, Tariq Azim, a minister in a previous government, says “We are going to oppose it. It is a half-baked effort and a sure recipe for disaster.”
Mr Musharraf could go to the Supreme Court, but the army seems disinclined to come out on his behalf. The chief of the army’s general staff, General Ashfaq Kiyani, has kept his counsel, waiting and watching. In any case, the people don’t much care for the army and may well come out on the streets — as they did against Mr Musharraf. There is, of course, the third possibility, that he goes quietly, though that would be out of character. There is also the Washington angle to consider. The US has been positively disposed to the Pakistani president, but is also increasingly disillusioned with his stance of “constructive ambiguity” when it comes to the jihadis. In any case, America can hardly intervene with due constitutional process.
For Pakistan, such uncertainty is normal. But for the rest of the world, and especially for its immediate neighbours, the country is a matter of wonderment. When, if ever, will it settle down, they can be forgiven for wondering. A country that breeds terrorists and protects them, that has the US as a close pal but also distrusts it, that has nuclear weapons but thinks nothing of proliferating them, that has the army as its main institution of governance, that has a huge chip on its shoulder vis-a-vis its neighbour and is willing to export terrorism to the east and to the west, must get its act together. But will it? That question is far more important than the fate of a general who came to power through a coup and then made the inevitable mistakes.