This raises apprehension that the new policy may fare no better than its predecessor, DPP-2006, which held up as its most important change a new "Make" procedure, through which urgently needed arms or equipment could be developed and manufactured by Indian manufacturers, including private companies. In the lifetime of DPP-2006, however, not one piece of equipment was successfully developed under the "Make" procedure. The defence ministry must take the blame for that utter failure. Any programme under the "Make" category needs to fulfil a military requirement spelt out under the tri-service Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan, or LTIPP. This 15-year roadmap was originally supposed to detail all modernisation for 2002-2017. Based upon this, the ministry was to plan procurement and funding for the 10th, 11th and 12th Defence Plans for that 15-year period. None of this happened. An audit report (No 4 of 2007) reveals that in 2006, with four years of the 10th Defence Plan gone and no LTIPP in sight, the ministry decided to revise the period covered by the LTIPP; it would now be for 2007-2022. But the revised LTIPP has still not seen the light of day. Instead, the ministry told the Lok Sabha's standing committee on defence that the LTIPP would be finalised in 2009. So the 10th Defence Plan was implemented without the longer-term framework of the LTIPP. The first two years of the 11th Defence Plan have also gone by without an LTIPP. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the 11th Defence Plan, covering the period 2007-2012, has not been approved either. So for the last seven years, tens of thousands of crores have been allocated for defence on a year-by-year basis, without any medium-term or long-term articulation of how this money should be spent.
The lip service being paid to the indigenisation of defence production also stands exposed by the ministry's failure to nominate suitable private companies as "Raksha Utpadan Ratnas", or RuRs. These RuRs are supposed to get government funding for developing important military equipment. But the nomination of RuRs remains stalled by pressure on the defence minister from the trade unions of state-owned defence enterprises, which apprehend that they will be put out of business by a more efficient private sector. None of this is surprising, considering how little mind space politicians and the public have for the hard calculations of national security. Framing DPP-2008 was relatively easy; the ministry's more difficult challenge remains to make it yield results.