Fearing MERS

Learn from errors of the National Disaster Management Authority

The state's inept handling of floods in Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, and the earlier rain-induced catastrophe in Uttarakhand, clearly indicates that few lessons have been learnt from the innumerable disasters in the past. Earthquakes can be neither predicted nor prevented. But cloudbursts, cyclones, floods and droughts can be foreseen in many cases - and in some cases, their damage can be moderated. Regrettably, India has failed to build the necessary mechanisms for this purpose, though the frequency and intensity of such calamities are steadily increasing, due to climate change and other factors. Meanwhile, the list of potential emergencies has lengthened: nuclear radiation from power plants; poisonous emissions from chemicals and pesticides factories; and medical exigencies caused by the inflow of exotic diseases, such as swine flu and bird flu, or those that may be perpetrated through bioterrorism. After all, most Indian laboratories that handle hazardous viruses and pathogens are lax about biosecurity.

The latest threat in this category is from Middle East respiratory syndrome, or MERS, a new affliction caused by a virus similar to, but deadlier than, the dreaded severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) virus. The present disaster management system is incapable of preventing the entry of such infections, of checking their spread within the country, or of ensuring their post-epidemic management. There is no biosecurity policy worth its name. Recently, the Agricultural Biosecurity Bill, 2013, was brought before Parliament, but its scope is limited only to safeguarding crops and livestock. There is, however, no such sharply focused statute to protect human health.

True, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs a few weeks ago cleared the health ministry's proposal to set up a network of laboratories to manage epidemics and outbreaks, to take pressure off the National Centre for Disease Control in Delhi and the National Institute of Virology in Pune, the only two such laboratories at present. In addition, 150 laboratories in 80 medical colleges across the country are supposed to be upgraded to deal with disease control and research. The two proposals together will cost almost Rs 1,100 crore, and may well serve to at least reduce the time between an outbreak and its discovery, as well as help synthesise a vaccine if possible. But without a specific nodal agency with the capacity to co-ordinate, will the proposal work? And if one is set up, how will it avoid the failures of the National Disaster Management Authority, which was set up in 2005 after the 2004 tsunami and that the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) has called "ineffective in most of its core areas"? It has even failed to formulate a well-conceived national disaster management plan. Meanwhile, all states have been mandated under the National Disaster Management Act, 2005, to constitute disaster relief forces for rapid post-event operations, but only seven states have done so till now. India needs an efficient mechanism for not only post-calamity operations but also anticipating any contingency and taking advance action to mitigate the damage.