Four stages of war

The war in Ukraine is currently in its third, and profoundly different, phase. In the first phase of the war, the armed forces of the Russian Federation and its proxies from the self-declared “People’s Republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk moved swiftly towards major population centres in southern, eastern, and northern Ukraine. Russian paratroopers — the feared Vozdushno-Desantnye Voyska, in their sky-blue berets and striped shirts — were dropped well ahead of frontlines; the invasion moved along multiple axes towards the cities of Kyiv, Mariupol, Kherson, Mikolayiv, Zaporishia, and Kharkiv. But, as is now well understood, the timing of the invasion was poor, causing heavy vehicles to get bogged down in late winter mud in the north and northwest; intelligence was mistaken, in that resistance at both the national level and in Russian-speaking areas of Ukraine was heavier than expected; and the Ukrainian armed forces, after being initially stunned by the scale of the onslaught, reacted with better than expected speed and professionalism.

As a consequence, at the end of the first phase, the Russians had taken Kherson in the south and besieged Mariupol in the southeast — but had not even managed to encircle Kyiv and Kherson, the two largest cities (the latter being majority Russian-speaking). The south saw the most effective advances partly because of the usefulness of  Crimea as a base; partly because of lapses in Ukrainian defence preparedness prior to the invasion; and partly because the roads are better and the country more open and better suited to tank armies. Columns of armour that might otherwise get bunched up on a single approach road, as happened northwest of Kyiv, were able to advance more effectively in the south.

The second phase of the war, thus, consisted of Russian attempts to defend some of these gains and then their strategic withdrawal from the north in order to focus on the east and south. These areas — with populations that are in large parts descendants of Russian-speaking settlers during the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union — are the core of President Vlaidimir Putin’s irredentist claims. There are also clear strategic benefits to controlling southern and eastern Ukraine. First, eastern Ukraine is the most heavily industrialised part of the country; second, control of Black Sea ports like Mariupol might allow the slow strangulation of the Ukrainian economy; and third, a “land bridge” between Donetsk in the southeast and the Crimean peninsula greatly increases the security of both Russian-controlled territories.

While the Russian retreat from around Kyiv can be spun as reflective of a Moscow that never desired western Ukraine, the retreat from Kharkiv — chased by Ukrainian forces that threaten to interdict ground lines of communication to Russian forces fighting further east — is much more difficult to spin. These retreats were completed by the third week of May, and the focus of fighting shifted to the far northeast of Ukraine, where the Russian forces were seeking to converge on the city of Severodonetsk, the largest remaining town in Luhansk province in Ukrainian hands. By all accounts, after a three-week battle of manoeuvre and encirclement, Russian forces are mere days from complete control of Severodonetsk. Whether this capture will also result in a proper encirclement of large numbers of Ukrainian soldiers and their surrender is yet to be seen.

At the end of the third stage of this war, the Russians will likely control a straightened and relatively defensible line in eastern Ukraine, and will have vastly expanded the size of the “People’s Republics”. The question is: What next? Is that enough for Moscow to declare victory?

Only one man knows the answer to that question, and President Vladimir Putin isn’t telling.

However, there are some straws in the wind to which it is worth paying attention. First, the focus on enclosing the Severodonetsk salient has meant the general abandonment of areas north of Kharkiv and a larger encirclement attempt that was being launched from the northern city of Izium, which is still in Russian hands. More worryingly for Moscow, gains in the south may not be set in stone. Recent Ukrainian counter-attacks have focused on recovering the city of Kherson, just north of Crimea. While the city is Russian-speaking and the home of many pre-war Russia-friendly politicians, there have also been multiple reports of partisan activity and political dissension in the area, indicating that incorporating the area into either one of the People’s Republics or Russia proper will not be straightforward.

Thus while the war may turn into another “frozen conflict” in the east, with strong defensible lines facing off against each other, the chances are that it will continue in the south. In this fourth stage of the war, Moscow will have to defend the Kherson line, but that’s not all. Its war aims undoubtedly included the large port of Odessa; strangling Ukraine’s economy is impossible while Odessa remains Ukrainian. In spite of naval losses, it continues to have control over the Black Sea. Hopes that conflict will largely dial down in the next few weeks, when Russian gains in the east culminate, might thus be misplaced.