THE NEW COLD WAR: PUTIN'S THREAT TO RUSSIA AND THE WEST
Edward Lucas
Bloomsbury
Oxford University Press
282 pages; Rs 399
Russia is at the forefront of geostrategic power shifts again. After witnessing impressive economic growth over the past 15 years, the Russian rouble has seen a dramatic fall, fuelling fears of a deep recession. This decline can be attributed to falling global oil prices and the European Union/United States sanctions in the wake of Russian aggression in Ukraine. The falling oil price has hit oil and gas export economies, like Russia, Iran and Venezuela, far worse than it has affected the nascent shale gas economy in the United States. On another front, Russia has also adopted a revised military doctrine that labels the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) build-up in East Europe as a "violation of international law".
At such a precarious juncture, The New Cold War gives an insight about the ideology, domestic political situation and foreign policy of Vladimir Putin's Russia. The author, Edward Lucas, is a senior editor at The Economist who has covered Central and Eastern Europe for more than 25 years. The book, originally written in 2008, has been republished in 2014 with an updated preface that covers the Crimean crisis. What adds value to the new edition is that although the author's predictions in 2008 have largely been upheld, the prospects of rapprochement with Russia remain just as bleak as the author had portrayed six years ago.
In the first two chapters, Mr Lucas traces the rise and rise of Mr Putin through the Yeltsin years. He begins by dividing the post-World War II Russia into three eras: the Soviet Russia, where political loyalty was at a premium; the Gorbachev/Yeltsin era, where talent and adaptability were rewarded; and the Putin era, which punishes only dissent. The communist ideology of Soviet Russia has very few buyers in Russia today, but it remains a powerful symbol of Russian domination. The Yeltsin era is seen as a painful period of transformation when the Kremlin sought to normalise relations with the West and transitioned to a free economy. The delay in realising the benefits of this churn combined with the subsequent oil price rise made it easier for Mr Putin, the successor, to stake claim to a stable, growing economy. This growth was a big deal for Russia, which faced a crippling financial crisis in 1998. Consequently, the Putin era emerged as a bullish and revisionist state that, in Mr Putin's own words, sees the collapse of the Soviet Union as a humiliating geopolitical setback the reversal of which was only a matter of time.
Domestically, the author equates Mr Putin's rise with the growing control of the KGB (or the FSB, to give it its new name) over all organs of the Russian state and economy. Mr Lucas mentions detailed instances that befit a Hollywood action thriller: murder in London with radioactive polonium, whistle-blowers going missing, orchestrated bomb blasts and so on. The author consistently reminds readers that dissent in any form is unacceptable to the Kremlin. An indicator of this phenomenon is the shrinking space for independent media houses. However, many Russians are extremely proud of their new found prosperity in the Putin era. This, combined with the growth of the projected personality cult of Mr Putin makes him the most popular figure in the country.
It is believed that unlike Soviet Russia, the New Russia has no ideology. The author disagrees. He refers to the governing ideology under Mr Putin's rule as "New Tsarism". This ideology has three main pillars. One, the growth of ethnic Russian nationalism, which finds its inspiration from the strength of the Soviet Union as a geopolitical giant. Second, religion and orthodoxy are very important to this ideology. Mr Lucas details the symbiotic relationship of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the KGB. The ROC's fear of Roman Catholicism nicely fits into the "belligerent West" conception of the KGB. Third, autocracy-sovereignty characterised by terms such as "derzhavnost" (meaning a strong centralised state) and "vlastnaya vertikal" (indicating Kremlin's omnipresent control) forms another important pillar of this ideology. As the Westphalian world view is assumed by default, The New Cold War fails to consider that this New Tsarism ideology might be a new civilisational world view altogether, akin to the Chinese or the Islamic worldview. Ideologues like Alexander Dugin have, in their writings, referred to the Russian conception of the world as the Eurasian world view.
The author sees Russian actions in Eastern Europe as a direct corollary to the New Tsarist ideology. It is here that the new cold war will be fought, he says. These countries, because of their Soviet Union history, have a large number of ethnic Russians. Here, the modern Russian state is at odds with the concept of the Russian nation. Russia's military doctrine explicitly warns against discrimination against its citizens in these countries. In 2001, this idea of a nation was further expanded to include all "compatriots" - meaning any Russian speaker in the former Soviet republics. Such a stance is bound to lead to conflicts. Estonia and Georgia are the hotspots of this conflict because it is here that "Russia's geopolitical ambitions, economical muscle and historical amnesia overlap". The sections on Ukraine, Belarus and the Central Asian "-stans" are a compelling read. The author believes that the best hope for a moth-eaten Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova is to make their remaining parts successful - economically, socially and politically.
Russia's growing strength in the neighbourhood is partly attributed to its status as the provider of natural gas and oil to energy-starved European nation-states of all hues. By acquiring private companies, the Russian state finds it easy to wield energy as a political weapon rather than a means of doing business. The details in the book on "pipeline geopolitics" should serve as a reminder of the threats to India if it is dependent on pipelines passing through hostile countries.
For ending this new cold war, Mr Lucas suggests that rules of finance, business and energy be rewritten so that countries can pose a joint opposition to Russia. The author is in favour of removing Russia from groups like the G8. Since the enemy is irreconcilable, he suggests an increase in Nato deterrence in Poland and the Baltic states. What needs to be noted, however, is that the foundation of Mr Putin's success over the last decade has been that only a few individuals and nations have lost but many others have gained. How this will change in the face of a looming deep recession might well determine the fate of Mr Putin's Russia.
The reviewer is a geopolitical analyst with the Takshashila Institution, an independent policy think tank
Edward Lucas
Bloomsbury
Oxford University Press
282 pages; Rs 399
Russia is at the forefront of geostrategic power shifts again. After witnessing impressive economic growth over the past 15 years, the Russian rouble has seen a dramatic fall, fuelling fears of a deep recession. This decline can be attributed to falling global oil prices and the European Union/United States sanctions in the wake of Russian aggression in Ukraine. The falling oil price has hit oil and gas export economies, like Russia, Iran and Venezuela, far worse than it has affected the nascent shale gas economy in the United States. On another front, Russia has also adopted a revised military doctrine that labels the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) build-up in East Europe as a "violation of international law".
At such a precarious juncture, The New Cold War gives an insight about the ideology, domestic political situation and foreign policy of Vladimir Putin's Russia. The author, Edward Lucas, is a senior editor at The Economist who has covered Central and Eastern Europe for more than 25 years. The book, originally written in 2008, has been republished in 2014 with an updated preface that covers the Crimean crisis. What adds value to the new edition is that although the author's predictions in 2008 have largely been upheld, the prospects of rapprochement with Russia remain just as bleak as the author had portrayed six years ago.
In the first two chapters, Mr Lucas traces the rise and rise of Mr Putin through the Yeltsin years. He begins by dividing the post-World War II Russia into three eras: the Soviet Russia, where political loyalty was at a premium; the Gorbachev/Yeltsin era, where talent and adaptability were rewarded; and the Putin era, which punishes only dissent. The communist ideology of Soviet Russia has very few buyers in Russia today, but it remains a powerful symbol of Russian domination. The Yeltsin era is seen as a painful period of transformation when the Kremlin sought to normalise relations with the West and transitioned to a free economy. The delay in realising the benefits of this churn combined with the subsequent oil price rise made it easier for Mr Putin, the successor, to stake claim to a stable, growing economy. This growth was a big deal for Russia, which faced a crippling financial crisis in 1998. Consequently, the Putin era emerged as a bullish and revisionist state that, in Mr Putin's own words, sees the collapse of the Soviet Union as a humiliating geopolitical setback the reversal of which was only a matter of time.
Domestically, the author equates Mr Putin's rise with the growing control of the KGB (or the FSB, to give it its new name) over all organs of the Russian state and economy. Mr Lucas mentions detailed instances that befit a Hollywood action thriller: murder in London with radioactive polonium, whistle-blowers going missing, orchestrated bomb blasts and so on. The author consistently reminds readers that dissent in any form is unacceptable to the Kremlin. An indicator of this phenomenon is the shrinking space for independent media houses. However, many Russians are extremely proud of their new found prosperity in the Putin era. This, combined with the growth of the projected personality cult of Mr Putin makes him the most popular figure in the country.
It is believed that unlike Soviet Russia, the New Russia has no ideology. The author disagrees. He refers to the governing ideology under Mr Putin's rule as "New Tsarism". This ideology has three main pillars. One, the growth of ethnic Russian nationalism, which finds its inspiration from the strength of the Soviet Union as a geopolitical giant. Second, religion and orthodoxy are very important to this ideology. Mr Lucas details the symbiotic relationship of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the KGB. The ROC's fear of Roman Catholicism nicely fits into the "belligerent West" conception of the KGB. Third, autocracy-sovereignty characterised by terms such as "derzhavnost" (meaning a strong centralised state) and "vlastnaya vertikal" (indicating Kremlin's omnipresent control) forms another important pillar of this ideology. As the Westphalian world view is assumed by default, The New Cold War fails to consider that this New Tsarism ideology might be a new civilisational world view altogether, akin to the Chinese or the Islamic worldview. Ideologues like Alexander Dugin have, in their writings, referred to the Russian conception of the world as the Eurasian world view.
The author sees Russian actions in Eastern Europe as a direct corollary to the New Tsarist ideology. It is here that the new cold war will be fought, he says. These countries, because of their Soviet Union history, have a large number of ethnic Russians. Here, the modern Russian state is at odds with the concept of the Russian nation. Russia's military doctrine explicitly warns against discrimination against its citizens in these countries. In 2001, this idea of a nation was further expanded to include all "compatriots" - meaning any Russian speaker in the former Soviet republics. Such a stance is bound to lead to conflicts. Estonia and Georgia are the hotspots of this conflict because it is here that "Russia's geopolitical ambitions, economical muscle and historical amnesia overlap". The sections on Ukraine, Belarus and the Central Asian "-stans" are a compelling read. The author believes that the best hope for a moth-eaten Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova is to make their remaining parts successful - economically, socially and politically.
Russia's growing strength in the neighbourhood is partly attributed to its status as the provider of natural gas and oil to energy-starved European nation-states of all hues. By acquiring private companies, the Russian state finds it easy to wield energy as a political weapon rather than a means of doing business. The details in the book on "pipeline geopolitics" should serve as a reminder of the threats to India if it is dependent on pipelines passing through hostile countries.
For ending this new cold war, Mr Lucas suggests that rules of finance, business and energy be rewritten so that countries can pose a joint opposition to Russia. The author is in favour of removing Russia from groups like the G8. Since the enemy is irreconcilable, he suggests an increase in Nato deterrence in Poland and the Baltic states. What needs to be noted, however, is that the foundation of Mr Putin's success over the last decade has been that only a few individuals and nations have lost but many others have gained. How this will change in the face of a looming deep recession might well determine the fate of Mr Putin's Russia.
The reviewer is a geopolitical analyst with the Takshashila Institution, an independent policy think tank