When Indian External Affairs Minister S M Krishna underscored the folly of making a distinction “between good Taliban and bad Taliban” at the Afghanistan Conference in London earlier this year, he was completely out of sync with the larger mood at the conference. As a result, Indian diplomacy faced a major setback when Indian concerns were summarily ignored. The West had made up its mind that it was not a question of if, but when and how to exit from Afghanistan, which was rapidly becoming a quagmire for the leaders in Washington and London.
The diplomatic debacle at the London conference and the continued targeting of Indian interests in Afghanistan forced a major rethink of Delhi’s Af-Pak policy. No wonder Krishna was a different man at the Afghanistan conference in Kabul earlier this week. He dropped his “no differentiating between good and bad Taliban” mantra but continued to maintain that hard-line elements cannot be accepted as credible Afghan interlocutors. This change in the tone of the Indian external affairs minister reflects the bind that India finds itself in Afghanistan.
There should be no doubt that this is Pakistan’s moment. Pakistan has been successful in ensuring that it is at the centre of negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government, so that Pakistan’s core interest of containing Indian influence is not jeopardised. The Taliban remains Pakistan’s greatest source of leverage in Afghanistan and they have used that leverage effectively. Pakistan’s security establishment is relishing the double game it is playing in Afghanistan.
Pakistani support for the Taliban in Afghanistan continues to be sanctioned at the highest levels of Pakistan’s government, with the ISI even represented on the Quetta Shura — the Taliban’s war council — so as to retain influence over the Taliban’s leadership. The ISI does not merely provide financial, military and logistical support to the insurgency. It retains strong strategic and operational control over the Taliban campaign in Afghanistan. The Pakistani military continues to look upon the Taliban as a strategic asset and is manipulating the Taliban’s political hierarchy so as to have greater leverage over future peace talks.
Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are hedging their bets against a possible US withdrawal. The July 2011 deadline for the commencement of American troop withdrawal was intended to force Karzai to address urgent problems like corruption and ineffective governance. But it may have had the opposite effect, convincing Karzai that in a year from now, he will be on his own. Though the US is at pains to underline that July 2011 “will be the beginning of a conditions-based process” and that the deadline will be debated in the military’s formal review of progress later this year in December, there are few who are willing to bet at the moment that the Obama Administration has the stomach to stay for much longer in Afghanistan. Karzai in particular seems convinced that the Americans will not be able to stay the course. He has lost faith in Nato’s ability to defeat the insurgency and has turned to Pakistan to help broker a deal to end the conflict.
Not surprisingly, Karzai is trying to craft a more autonomous foreign policy. He lost no time in dismissing two high-profile cabinet ministers — the interior minister and intelligence chief — who were most closely allied with the US. These were the men Washington had insisted Karzai include in his cabinet after his re-election last year and they were resisting Karzai’s attempts to negotiate with the Taliban and closer ties with Islamabad. Karzai now views Pakistan as an important player in ending the war through negotiations with the Taliban or on the battlefield. The decision to send officers for training in Pakistan is of great symbolic value and is the result of talks between the Afghan government and Pakistan’s security agencies that began in May. Pakistan has asked Karzai to develop a strategic framework that can facilitate negotiations with the Taliban.
India can do little but watch these developments unfold with wariness. India’s ‘soft power’ strategy has not brought it any strategic gains. Rather, India stands side-lined by the West despite being the only country that has been relatively successful in winning the “hearts and minds” of the Afghans. From the very beginning the prime objective of India’s Afghanistan policy has been to pre-empt the return of Pakistan’s embedment in Afghanistan’s strategic and political firmament. And ironically it is India’s success in Afghanistan that drove Pakistan’s security establishment into a panic mode as a perception gained ground that India was ‘taking over Afghanistan.’
The Obama Administration’s desire for a rapid withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan has given the necessary opening to Pakistan to regain its lost influence in Kabul. In order to keep Islamabad in good humuor, Washington has insisted on India limiting its role in Afghanistan. The conclusion of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade and Transit Agreement (APTTA) is a major shot in the arm for Pakistan as it explicitly affirms that India will not be allowed to export goods to Afghanistan through the Wagah border.
Though India insists that it won’t retreat from Afghanistan, there are signs that it is indeed scaling down its presence. It is not taking on new projects and various Indian schemes have been put on hold. India’s strategic space in its neighbourhood seems to have shrunk over the last few years. By failing to craft its own narrative on Af-Pak ever since US troops went into Afghanistan in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, New Delhi has allowed the West, and increasingly Pakistan, to dictate the contours of Indian policy towards the region. More damagingly, by failing to assert its profile in Afghanistan, India has failed to win the confidence of those constituencies in Afghanistan who considered India a natural ally. India now needs a rapid readjustment of its Kabul policy; otherwise, great turbulence lies ahead in India’s vicinity.