It was supposed to be a new world order where the emerging powers would be making their presence felt even as the old and tired West would be relieving itself of the responsibility to maintain global order. But if the debate on Libya is anything to go by, the new world order looks much like the old one, where the established powers are still trying to shoulder most of the responsibility of maintaining global order while the emerging powers are trying to shirk theirs rather than emerging as global stakeholders.
China, India, Russia and Brazil — the rise of whom is supposedly underpinning the shifting global balance of power — all abstained on the resolution that authorised a no-fly zone over Libya and “all necessary measures” for protecting civilians there from Col Muammar Gaddafi’s forces. China’s permanent representative to the UN, Li Baodong, argued that his country supports “the UN Security Council’s adoption of appropriate and necessary action to stabilise as soon as possible the situation in Libya and to halt acts of violence against civilians,” but “China has serious difficulty with parts of the resolution.” Vitaly Churkin, the Russian envoy to the UN, warned that “outside forces” could destabilise the Middle East and North African region and described the resolution as “unfortunate and regrettable.”
India cautioned that “the resolution that the council has adopted authorises far-reaching measures under Chapter VII of the UN charter with relatively little credible information on the situation on the ground in Libya.” What was worse, India argued, was that there was no clarity in the resolution about who would enforce it and how, “who and with what assets will participate and how these measures will be exactly carried out.” Responding to reports that Libya should be divided, India in its remarks insisted that the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Libya should be preserved.
These reservations echoed the standard policies of these states at least since the 1990s, if not before. China, Russia and India, much like other major powers in the international system, favour a multipolar world order where US unipolarity remains constrained by the other “poles” in the system. They zealously guard their national sovereignty and have been wary of US attempts to interfere in what they see as domestic affairs of other states, be it Serbia, Kosovo or Iraq. They took strong exception to the US air strikes on Iraq in 1998, the US-led air campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999, and more recently the US campaign against Saddam Hussein; with Moscow, Beijing and New Delhi arguing that these violated the sovereignty of both countries and undermined the authority of the United Nations system.
They tend to share an interest in resisting interventionist foreign policy doctrines emanating from the West, particularly the US, and display conservative attitudes on the prerogatives of sovereignty. As such they have repeatedly expressed concern about the US’ use of military power around the world, and both were publicly opposed to the war in Iraq. This was merely a continuation of the desire of both states to oppose the US hyperpuissance ever since the end of the Cold War.
But that was then. Now the West is apparently in retreat, facing an onslaught from emerging powers. The case of Libya should have been relatively easy for these emerging powers to navigate. The western response came as the Libyan leader threatened to launch the final attack to push out rebels from Benghazi, the second largest city of the country. “We are coming tonight,” Gaddafi is reported to have told the rebel forces. “There won’t be any mercy.” Fearing a coming blood-bath, the Arab League had called for a no-fly zone to be established in Libya and the resolution, co-authored by Britain and France, was tabled by Lebanon in the Security Council.
Members of the Arab League are participating in the military operation. The US till the last minute remained reluctant to participate, and the western countries have no real appetite for introducing land armies in Libya. The Security Council resolution explicitly excludes “a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory,” ruling out deployment of ground troops.
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The debate on Libya once again underlines that despite all the hyperbole about the decline of the West and the rise of the rest, the “rest” is not yet ready for the prime time. The emerging powers are yet to articulate a world vision that provides an alternative to the western-designed global order. Opposing every move the West makes is easy and criticising from the sidelines is even easier.
India, despite being the largest democracy in the world, has largely watched the events unfold in the Middle East in silence. In many ways, this reticence is understandable. The region has been witnessing a highly unpredictable situation and the government was taking its time to think through the implications. Moreover, for New Delhi to comment on events unfolding in the region would have been hypocritical, given how seriously India takes the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. India remains worried about the safety of its nationals who have decided to stay back in Libya despite the crisis. It is also discomfited by the “precedent setting” parts of the Security Council resolution. And it is likely that coming days and months in Libya may well vindicate the position of the nay-sayers like India.
But India comes out the worst in the Libyan case. China and Russia’s abstention actually meant a yes, as their veto would have killed any UN action. The fact that they abstained meant that they are willing to go with the West on Libya, albeit to a limit. But where does India stand? No one knows.
This is a time of great tumult in the Middle East, which is also testing the resolve of the international community to tackle difficult issues in the region. All major global powers are struggling with tough choices as they try to strike a balance between their values and strategic interests in crafting a response to the unfolding crisis in Libya. But so long as India is not ready to answer some really tough questions about its global priorities, for all the talk of its rise, it will remain largely peripheral in shaping global discourse and events.
The author is with the department of defence studies, King’s College London