Helping Afghanistan

Delhi Declaration inadvertently highlights geopolitical weaknesses

The Delhi Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan, chaired by India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, and attended by the security chiefs of Russia, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, may have been a sincere effort to address the humanitarian and security problems implicit in the return of the Taliban. But the impact of the Delhi Declaration has been rendered moot in the absence of representatives from the most influential players in the region, China and its “client state” and Taliban’s chief sponsor, Pakistan, and Afghanistan itself, plus Russia’s equivocal approach.

This is more so when Pakistan hosted a “Troika-plus” meet — involving special representatives from China, Russia and Afghanistan — just a day later, and that is likely to yield more consequential decisions. In terms of geopolitical signalling, the Delhi Declaration pressed all the right buttons. It broadly called for a more inclusive government in Afghanistan, that its territory should not be used for terrorist acts, for cooperation against radicalisation, extremism and drug trafficking, and for ensuring the fundamental rights of women, children and minority communities. Assurances of humanitarian aid and the reiteration of the United Nations’ centrality and continued presence in Afghanistan were the other key elements of the Declaration.

Though the Declaration covered the broad rubric of common interests among the signatories, the reality is that concerted action is likely to be a chimera. That is principally because the focus of each player’s central concern vis-à-vis Afghanistan differs. For India, it is the return of cross-border terrorism from jihadis now freed up from fighting the US-led coalition in Kabul, evidence of which has manifested itself unexpectedly rapidly, a refugee crisis, and more heroin spilling over the Punjab borders. For Iran, it is maintaining Kabul as a major buyer of its oil and gas, a market that has shrunk under the weight of US sanctions. This, even as it balances its interests vis-à-vis the nuclear deal, which the Biden administration has sought to re-start. Like Iran, the “Stans” stand to gain as key energy suppliers to Afghanistan but they too face the prospect of a refugee crisis. Minorities such as the Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and so on account for almost 48 per cent of Afghanistan’s population. Several of them are Shia and at odds with the extreme Sunni theology of the Taliban.

All of these minorities played key roles in military opposition to the Taliban. This apart, the “Stans” have to play a balancing act with Russia, which has military bases in some of them, and China, through its Belt and Road Initiative. That Russia, whose 1979-89 invasion set off this tragic train of events, issued its own version of the Delhi Declaration with significant modifications indicates that the differences are more than a matter of nuance. The Russian version, for instance, omitted the Declaration’s mention that it would ensure that Afghanistan would never become a safe haven for global terrorism as also the call for collective cooperation on security issues in the region. Nor did it commit to the Declaration’s 2022 timeframe for another meeting. The Delhi Declaration undoubtedly underlines India’s traditional role as an exemplar of humanitarian service in Afghanistan, to which the Taliban has tentatively responded. But the reality is that the Troika-plus will determine whether India can resume this role and that will remain its Achilles’ heel.