MANDATE
Will of the People
Vir Sanghvi
Westland;
137 pages; Rs 195
The book began life as a television serial on Indian politics that the author, Vir Sanghvi, was anchoring on the 9X channel. Watching the entire serial requires seven hours, but Mr Sanghvi realised that it contained enough material - plus his own three decades of writing and interviewing as a journalist - that could not necessarily be used in the TV show to produce a book on the subject.
Mr Sanghvi makes it clear that this is no profound academic tome; instead, he offers a journalist's subjective view of people and events. Also, he says he has written for the large cohort of educated Indians under 30, many of whom have no idea of the Emergency or the Punjab insurgency.
His starting point is the Nehru-Gandhi family's dubious legacy of dynastic politics, the seeds of which were sown as early as when Jawaharlal Nehru was prime minister. There are conflicting views from insiders on whether Jawaharlal Nehru wanted Indira Gandhi to take over the reins after him or not. Natwar Singh, who worked in Nehru's office, says he was not a dynast, though he believed his daughter would eventually join politics. Yet veteran journalist Kuldip Nayar has said K Kamraj, the Tamil Nadu strongman, told him that in Kamraj's discussions with Nehru on succession, Nehru had always had Indira in mind.
As it happened, Indira Gandhi occupied the hot seat much faster than anyone had anticipated - the Syndicate of senior Congressmen foisted the prime ministership on her after Lal Bahadur Shastri's early death, mainly to stall the unpopular Morarji Desai's claim and also because as a woman she was considered pliable enough to do their bidding.
Having coasted for two unimpressive years, she decided to take on the Syndicate, forming around her a coterie of left-leaning advisors, masterminding a successful presidential election that split the Congress and prompting her to call early elections in 1970. Her lurch to socialism was sheer realpolitik that, Mr Sanghvi writes, "painted the Syndicate as being in the grips of crony capitalists" and raised the novel idea of taking the "old edifices of the failing capitalistic structures" and nationalising them on behalf of the people.
Socialism helped Indira Gandhi win the 1971 elections with a thumping majority and destroy the Syndicate. But "four years after this massive triumph for Indian democracy, Indira Gandhi went on to suspend democracy itself". Mr Sanghvi provides useful perspective on who was responsible for the idea. Many thought it was Indira Gandhi's egregiously powerful son Sanjay. Although Sanjay Gandhi certainly supported the move wholeheartedly, we now know that it was her confidant Siddhartha Shankar Ray. A lawyer, he advised Indira Gandhi to declare a state of Emergency through an ordinance and without consulting the Cabinet. As Mr Sanghvi reasonably points out, the Gandhi scion had no knowledge of the Indian constitution to think up such an idea.
The decision to suspend the Emergency and call elections in 1977 was just as unexpected. Mr Sanghvi adds the interesting sidelight that Indira Gandhi rejected Sanjay's idea of setting up a French-style presidential system by changing the Constitution, so that he could become prime minister. Her son did not think in terms of elections at all. But the real reason for this change of heart was an Intelligence Bureau report that convinced her that she would win - Mr Sanghvi writes that it was commonly believed the report was doctored to keep her happy.
On the Punjab insurgency that eventually cost Indira Gandhi her life, Mr Sanghvi clearly sets out how she mishandled the threat from Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, the extremist preacher. She relied on the advice of her home minister Zail Singh who promoted Bhindranwale as a bulwark to the powerful Akali Dal and its stranglehold on the gurudwaras in Punjab. As the separatist Sikh movement grew, Indira Gandhi dithered. In 1983, for instance, she missed the chance to send security forces into the Golden Temple to apprehend the killers of A S Atwal, the police officer who was shot on the premises. When she finally decided to act in 1984, she asked the army to move in the temple despite the fact that the "Indian Army had no previous experience of fighting in built-up areas packed with civilians", while the "generals showed foolish overconfidence, bragging that the operation … would all be over in a few hours". The rest is history.
Mr Sanghvi's account falls short, however, when it comes to understanding why the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government was defeated in 2004 after one term in power despite the "India Shining campaign" and pollsters' predictions of a comfortable victory. Perhaps he was short of space, but he does not go beyond well-worn reasons in the media, sweeping generalisations such as the rural-urban divide, farmer suicides and alienated Muslims after the Gujarat riots of 2002. But then, recounting recent history when public memory is fresh is always hazardous.
Still, it is interesting to know that in 2009, Pranab Mukherjee came close to fulfilling a life-long ambition of becoming prime minister. In that year, it was widely predicted that the Bharatiya Janata Party would come to power and then prime minister Manmohan Singh was on his way out. The Congress reckoned that its best-case scenario was to maintain its numbers in Parliament with some help from the Left, which it would not get if Singh was around (the Left had opposed the Indo-US nuclear deal that Singh had concluded). So an informal agreement was reached - the Congress would put forward the name of Pranab Mukherjee as prime minister and the Left would back him. But the Congress won more seats than before, it did not need the Left and Singh was back for a second term.
Mr Mukherjee's appointment as president of India was the consolation prize for one of the Gandhi dynasty's most faithful retainers.
Will of the People
Vir Sanghvi
Westland;
137 pages; Rs 195
Also Read
For college students or those in senior school - and for many like me who want to refresh their memories - this potted account of India's recent political history is a must read. It is tailor-made for the time-challenged younger generation: lucidly written, almost like a racy novel, and its 137 pages in large print require just about two hours to read. Yet the reader is guaranteed to emerge the richer for it since the book captures a critical era of Indian politics from the 1970s to Narendra Modi's election.
The book began life as a television serial on Indian politics that the author, Vir Sanghvi, was anchoring on the 9X channel. Watching the entire serial requires seven hours, but Mr Sanghvi realised that it contained enough material - plus his own three decades of writing and interviewing as a journalist - that could not necessarily be used in the TV show to produce a book on the subject.
Mr Sanghvi makes it clear that this is no profound academic tome; instead, he offers a journalist's subjective view of people and events. Also, he says he has written for the large cohort of educated Indians under 30, many of whom have no idea of the Emergency or the Punjab insurgency.
His starting point is the Nehru-Gandhi family's dubious legacy of dynastic politics, the seeds of which were sown as early as when Jawaharlal Nehru was prime minister. There are conflicting views from insiders on whether Jawaharlal Nehru wanted Indira Gandhi to take over the reins after him or not. Natwar Singh, who worked in Nehru's office, says he was not a dynast, though he believed his daughter would eventually join politics. Yet veteran journalist Kuldip Nayar has said K Kamraj, the Tamil Nadu strongman, told him that in Kamraj's discussions with Nehru on succession, Nehru had always had Indira in mind.
As it happened, Indira Gandhi occupied the hot seat much faster than anyone had anticipated - the Syndicate of senior Congressmen foisted the prime ministership on her after Lal Bahadur Shastri's early death, mainly to stall the unpopular Morarji Desai's claim and also because as a woman she was considered pliable enough to do their bidding.
Having coasted for two unimpressive years, she decided to take on the Syndicate, forming around her a coterie of left-leaning advisors, masterminding a successful presidential election that split the Congress and prompting her to call early elections in 1970. Her lurch to socialism was sheer realpolitik that, Mr Sanghvi writes, "painted the Syndicate as being in the grips of crony capitalists" and raised the novel idea of taking the "old edifices of the failing capitalistic structures" and nationalising them on behalf of the people.
Socialism helped Indira Gandhi win the 1971 elections with a thumping majority and destroy the Syndicate. But "four years after this massive triumph for Indian democracy, Indira Gandhi went on to suspend democracy itself". Mr Sanghvi provides useful perspective on who was responsible for the idea. Many thought it was Indira Gandhi's egregiously powerful son Sanjay. Although Sanjay Gandhi certainly supported the move wholeheartedly, we now know that it was her confidant Siddhartha Shankar Ray. A lawyer, he advised Indira Gandhi to declare a state of Emergency through an ordinance and without consulting the Cabinet. As Mr Sanghvi reasonably points out, the Gandhi scion had no knowledge of the Indian constitution to think up such an idea.
The decision to suspend the Emergency and call elections in 1977 was just as unexpected. Mr Sanghvi adds the interesting sidelight that Indira Gandhi rejected Sanjay's idea of setting up a French-style presidential system by changing the Constitution, so that he could become prime minister. Her son did not think in terms of elections at all. But the real reason for this change of heart was an Intelligence Bureau report that convinced her that she would win - Mr Sanghvi writes that it was commonly believed the report was doctored to keep her happy.
On the Punjab insurgency that eventually cost Indira Gandhi her life, Mr Sanghvi clearly sets out how she mishandled the threat from Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, the extremist preacher. She relied on the advice of her home minister Zail Singh who promoted Bhindranwale as a bulwark to the powerful Akali Dal and its stranglehold on the gurudwaras in Punjab. As the separatist Sikh movement grew, Indira Gandhi dithered. In 1983, for instance, she missed the chance to send security forces into the Golden Temple to apprehend the killers of A S Atwal, the police officer who was shot on the premises. When she finally decided to act in 1984, she asked the army to move in the temple despite the fact that the "Indian Army had no previous experience of fighting in built-up areas packed with civilians", while the "generals showed foolish overconfidence, bragging that the operation … would all be over in a few hours". The rest is history.
Mr Sanghvi's account falls short, however, when it comes to understanding why the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government was defeated in 2004 after one term in power despite the "India Shining campaign" and pollsters' predictions of a comfortable victory. Perhaps he was short of space, but he does not go beyond well-worn reasons in the media, sweeping generalisations such as the rural-urban divide, farmer suicides and alienated Muslims after the Gujarat riots of 2002. But then, recounting recent history when public memory is fresh is always hazardous.
Still, it is interesting to know that in 2009, Pranab Mukherjee came close to fulfilling a life-long ambition of becoming prime minister. In that year, it was widely predicted that the Bharatiya Janata Party would come to power and then prime minister Manmohan Singh was on his way out. The Congress reckoned that its best-case scenario was to maintain its numbers in Parliament with some help from the Left, which it would not get if Singh was around (the Left had opposed the Indo-US nuclear deal that Singh had concluded). So an informal agreement was reached - the Congress would put forward the name of Pranab Mukherjee as prime minister and the Left would back him. But the Congress won more seats than before, it did not need the Left and Singh was back for a second term.
Mr Mukherjee's appointment as president of India was the consolation prize for one of the Gandhi dynasty's most faithful retainers.