Despite substantial cultural and religious diversity in both countries, India and China have been largely successful in nation-state building, as evidenced by the strong and unshakable national identity and pride among the Indians and Chinese. Indeed, nationalism has become an essential source of inspiration for both the Indians and Chinese in their endeavours to build up a strong and prosperous country.
However, unlike western nationalism, which was associated with pride and jubilance for the triumph of capitalism and industrialisation, nationalism in both India and China arose due to defeats, humiliations and injustice endured during the age of western imperialism — India was under the British Raj and China was a victim of gunboat diplomacy. It was because of their unbearable suffering that the Indians and Chinese became self-conscious of their nationhood.
Nationalistic resentment was especially profound in India and China. Unlike the previous conquerors (mostly the nomads from the northwest), who quickly integrated in the Indian and Chinese civilisations, the westerners not only conquered territories but also aimed to subjugate the native population to western norms and values. This resulted in a deep-seated agony and growing sense of “national crisis”, giving rise to the independence movement in India and communist revolution in China. Ironically, the leading elites of the national movements in both India and China embraced western ideas and adopted western political methods in their fight to be rid of “foreign exploitation and operation”. Subsequently, these leaders led their countries towards the western path of modernisation. This deep-seated love-hate mentality towards the West and the bitter roots of their national consciousness have made the Indians and Chinese especially sensitive towards national sovereignty and independence — after all, they were determined never to let history repeat itself.
Nowadays, as India and China ascend to the global power status, we witness a new wave of nationalistic sentiment. Stellar economic growth has given rise to a new-found confidence and pride among the Chinese and Indians. Not surprisingly, some politicians and activists have found it politically profitable to ride this new wave of nationalism, in both domestic and international affairs. However, with the lingering and painful memories of the bitter past, nationalistic sentiments could easily turn into an emotionally driven political impetus in which a hardline policy would prevail over a more rational and coolheaded approach. In India-China relations, a wise and astute leader would want to avoid involving nationalistic sentiments on the issues — border disputes, trust deficit, mismatched geopolitical concerns, and inconsistent interests in energy, food and water security — that have handicapped the bilateral relationship. Doing so would only deprive the leaders of both the states of the rationality and manoeuvring room necessary for achieving a mutually acceptable solution for, or at least the practical management of, the existing problems in bilateral relations. Furthermore, playing the nationalism card would have dire consequences on political stability at home, as a nationalistic approach would, more often than not, benefit the extremists in domestic politics.
Indeed, fast economic growth amidst globalisation has brought about an unprecedented transition in both China and India, giving rise to new contradictions, dilemmas and challenges, or exacerbating old ones, in domestic politics as well as bilateral relations. In this regard, both India and China share the same fundamental concern. That is, while the majority of the fundamental problems for, and potential threats to, national security and stability are found at home (e.g., Tibet, Xinjiang, demands for democracy, human rights, socio-economic disparity, etc. for China; terrorism, fundamentalism, food security, localism, etc. for India), the explosion of these problems could be triggered by the activities abroad. This all-bombs-are-at-home-but-triggers-are-outside situation has made domestic stability and security in both India and China vulnerable to external changes. Thus, both the states have an extraordinarily large home agenda on the one hand, and a challenging external environment on the other. In such circumstances, any attempt to utilise nationalism for political gains would not only be counterproductive, but could also bring about unintended and damaging consequences for the respective nation-states.
Both Delhi and Beijing must make a conscious commitment to contain nationalistic sentiments in the bilateral relationship, especially when the interests of the two countries are inconsistent or in conflict. Political leaders have to realise that playing the nationalism card would produce no benefits. As history has taught us repeatedly, nationalism is always a double-edged sword and it could potentially produce a backlash on those who ride on it for short-term gains. However, wisdom, rationality and good intentions are insufficient to keep a check on nationalistic sentiments. Given the lingering nationalistic sentiments in both the countries, as well as the substantial differences in socio-economic dynamics, cultural traditions and political systems, the need for mutual understanding and confidence can be effectively achieved through the development of an Asian Group 2 (AG2) framework based on institutionalised high-level dialogues, consultations, and cooperation.
This AG2 framework is not meant to, and should not, create the kind of political alliances witnessed during the Cold War period. Rather, it is to foster institutional arrangements that would not only help promote mutual understanding and confidence, but also provide practical and bilateral consultative mechanisms for the two countries to consult and coordinate their approaches and policies, especially when there is a potential for tension over the disputed issues. The essential aim is to secure a rational and cool-headed approach towards the challenges and problems in the bilateral relationship so as to reach a common ground and minimise the risks caused by the inevitable conflicts of interest.
The simultaneous rises of the two great neighbouring powers have brought about unprecedented opportunities as well as challenges. The AG2 framework is to provide the institutional arrangements to secure the prevalence of wisdom over emotions in the bilateral relationship, so that the two nations can optimise the opportunities and handle the challenges with a rational and cool-headed approach.
The author is professor, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Singapore. The column written with assistance of David Ooi Tian Rong