There is little doubt that, at the moment, China has the strategic upper hand. India may appear to be resurgent, but doubts persist about the degree to which it can and will cooperate with other Asian and Pacific Rim powers such as Australia and Japan — and, above all, questions are still being asked about how far the United States, which looks to be in a long-term retreat from engagement, could serve as the lynchpin of any such coordination. Given that, it is not the best time perhaps for any bold step forward on the border or on any other problematic and outstanding issues. China is in a powerful bargaining position and needs to be seen as rising to satisfy a noisily nationalist internal constituency. So from that point of view, the very lack of progress on the border is itself something of a relief. There is no telling how, given current relative positions, it would have turned out.
The question remains: how has Mr Modi’s apparent willingness to keep India open as a “swing state” in great-power politics worked out? Certainly, China’s welcome to India in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and as a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation suggests that Beijing is willing to give New Delhi’s taste for multilateralism the benefit of the doubt. It may be too much to read into a relatively unarticulated foreign policy, but it seems likely that Mr Modi, expected earlier to be “tough” on China, will instead keep India’s options open in multilateral terms — at least until partial success in his domestic agenda gives India more bargaining power globally. If this is the plan, it seems sensible. China appears to be responding — the statement’s emphasis on bilateral nuclear talks may indicate a qualitative change in the relationship. Or it may not, depending on how the internal agenda works out. Only time will tell if any of these are real, or just optics.