<b>Mahesh Sachdev:</b> What does 2017 hold for South West Asia?

Multiplicity of actors and their shifting roles make it difficult to predict the outcomes

For South West Asia, 2016 was a year on steroids: from full-blown civil wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen to the simmering one in Afghanistan. The area was affected by global developments such as a doubling of oil prices after over two years of depression; the return of Russia to Syria and Afghanistan; a near coup d’état in Turkey; terrorism in France, Germany and Turkey; Brexit and Donald Trump’s election to the White House. 

Will 2017 offer some respite to the region? An early prognosis foretells the impending denouements of many of the ongoing acts. The multiplicity of actors and their shifting roles, however, make it nearly impossible to predict the outcomes.  

Although the limited ceasefire in Syria brokered by Russia and Turkey is still fragile, it could, if succeeded by planned negotiations, herald the beginning of the end of the civil war for a number of reasons. First, it allows President Bashar Al-Assad to claim a tactical victory in having broken the ranks of the motley Sunni coalition arrayed against him. Second, the weariness of the Al-Assad regime’s regional and western detractors tilts the scales in favour of Damascus. Third, in the short-to-medium term, Syria could possibly become an uneasy confederation of semi-autonomous cantons with a weak centre. After six years of civil war, no one should have any doubt about a comprehensive political settlement being round the corner. Fourth, this anticlimactic end to the most violent manifestation of the “Arab Spring” without regime-change would have profound consequences well beyond Syria’s borders. Last but not least, it would reintroduce Russia into West Asia after a quarter of a century of Pax Americana, with a new geo-political template being created. 

With a centrist Shia-backed government trying to roll back Daesh (or ISIS), developments in neighbouring Iraq mirror those in Syria. However, Baghdad enjoys the strong albeit discreet support of the same western countries that are opposed to the government forces in Syria. Baghdad has also been more successful than Damascus in marshalling a tactical coalition in its favour. All the same, Damascus has had a more decisive backer in Russia than any Baghdad has managed to garner. Unlike Syria, where Daesh controls a large swath of territory, its last redoubt in Iraq is Mosul, currently under attack by pro-government forces.

At the same time, progress in liberating Mosul has been slow and costly. Although most observers foresee Daesh being eventually driven out of Mosul, they also expect Iraq’s political stability to be tested afterwards. If the coalition holds after the military victory over Daesh, it could underpin Iraq’s decade-long quest for a tolerant federal political structure. As the only Arab country with oil, water and ample human resources, Iraq would then be able to recover from nearly four decades of wars and economic sanctions. On other hand, if the coalition breaks down, Iraqi society could revert to violent sectarianism with disastrous consequences. 

The situation in Afghanistan has been adrift since last year’s withdrawal of most US forces. While the central government continues to hold major centres of population, the resurgent Taliban are able to mount frequent attacks and occasionally hold territory. For the moment, US airpower and tactical support tilt the scale in favour of the government. Over the past few months, Daesh has also made its present felt in Afghanistan and launched some spectacular attacks. Their presence has prompted fears that they could be relocating their base from Iraq-Syria to the badlands of Afghanistan, much the same way that Al Qaeda did. Pakistan has exploited these fears to get China and Russia to call for a “more flexible approach” towards the Taliban. The emergence of new alignments cannot be ruled out.

The lifting of most economic sanctions against Iran following the signing of the P5+1 Nuclear Agreement in early 2016 facilitated Iran’s reconnection with the international community for the first time since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Thanks to its large market, Iran has become the cynosure of many providers. Despite US assurances of continued defence ties, the GCC states have felt forsaken, particularly in these times of a buyers’ market for oil.

Iran and Russia have now emerged as the two ascending countries. They played their cards consummately in 2016 and could rewrite the regional geo-politics to their advantage. It is too early to tell if the US under a Donald Trump Presidency will reverse Washington’s slow withdrawal from SW Asia or accelerate it. As candidate, Mr Trump had given a mixed and often contradictory intent for the region — from denouncing the Iran Nuclear Agreement to willingness to work with Russia, from criticising US military involvement in the region to reinvigorating the fight against Daesh. Many of these intentions will soon undergo reality checks.  

India has vital interests in neighbouring SW Asia, whose security and stability is intertwined with our own. The geo-strategic importance of immediate neighbours Pakistan and Afghanistan to us cannot be overstated. SW Asia supplies the majority of our hydrocarbon needs and hosts over seven million Indians, mostly in the GCC states. It is also the source of nearly half of our remittances and a large market for our exports. India’s total trade with this region is well over $100 billion. India needs to be vigilant in guarding its interests. Besides, we should leverage opportunities, such as those for post-conflict reconstruction. At the same time, we need to tread with care to avoid being sucked into the vortex, as the region has been the nemesis of foreign adventurers.  

The writer is a retired Indian diplomat with expertise in West Asia, and author of therecently-published UAE: A Business Manual