 "Managing transition in Afghanistan")
The impending political transition has two aspects. One, there will be elections for a new president, marking the end of the Hamid Karzai era and, therefore, the political continuity - if not always predictability - that it represented. Two, there is the fate of the peace and reconciliation process, which seeks to integrate the Taliban and other militants into the political and constitutional mainstream. These two dimensions of the political transition are interlinked.
The third major transition will transform Afghanistan from an aid-driven economy to an investment- and trade-driven one, leveraging the country's location at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia as well as its more recent emergence as a resource- and mineral-rich country.
It should come as no surprise that the success of each of these transitions is linked to the other two. Political instability or renewed violence, for example, would render the achievement of the economic objective impossible.
So, what is the current status of each transition, and what could India contribute to enhance the prospects of success?
The reconciliation process is going nowhere. The representatives of the Mullah Omar-led Quetta Shura are in Doha, but no structured talks have been held so far either with the US or with the Karzai government. It had been reported that Pakistan had had a change of heart and was actively supporting the peace and reconciliation process. However, a recent interaction with Afghan government officials indicated that, rather than play a supportive role, Pakistan was looking at 2014 as an opportunity to get back into so-called "strategic relevance", become the dominant arbiter of Afghanistan's future and, in particular, marginalise India's considerable presence in that country. In recent talks with the Karzai government, Pakistan demanded that Indian presence in the country be limited only to its embassy in Kabul; that training for Afghanistan's security forces should be sought from Pakistan and not from India; and that Indian involvement in infrastructure projects should cease - only then would Pakistan assist with the peace process by leaning on the Taliban and the other Pakistan-based militants such as the Hekmatyar group and the Haqqani group to take part.
It is also noteworthy that a much-touted meeting of senior clerics from Pakistan and Afghanistan, which was sponsored by the Afghan High Peace Council last month, did not take place eventually. A leading Pakistani cleric even publicly declared that suicide bombings were justified in a so-called liberation struggle. Despite persistent hopes expressed in Western capitals, this process is a dead end and India should work on the assumption that Pakistan and its Taliban proxies look upon 2014 as an opportunity to regain a dominant and strategic foothold in the country. We need a strategy to forestall and frustrate this outcome.
In this context, the second aspect of the political transition is of crucial importance. India should join hands with the international community to facilitate free and fair elections, both for the presidency in 2014 and Parliament in 2015. This will provide the incoming political leadership legitimacy and credibility with a stronger hand to pursue a more effective peace process. It is also important for India to use its strong political links with the Pashtun and non-Pashtun ethnic groups, so that a genuine inter-ethnic coalition not only survives but is consolidated in the course of the electoral process. Any fragmentation on ethnic or sectarian lines would make the country more vulnerable to inimical forces operating from across the border with Pakistan.
The most difficult decisions may confront India on the security front. There are differing opinions about the capacity of the Afghan security forces to withstand an insurgency campaign by the Taliban and their Pakistani sponsors that will likely intensify after 2014. The Afghan army has demonstrated its fighting capabilities in recent operations, but is hampered by the lack of equipment - particularly long-range artillery and air capability. In case of a major ground assault, will the Afghan forces be able to call for air support from the residual ISAF? This is in doubt since no combat is envisaged after the drawdown of ISAF troops is complete. It may be necessary for India to work with like-minded regional partners to help overcome the disabilities the Afghan army faces in this respect, short of putting boots on the ground.
India is on a much better wicket as far as the economic transition is concerned. It has contributed significantly to building much-needed infrastructure in Afghanistan and has been engaged in capacity building in virtually all sectors. India hosted a well-attended international investment summit on Afghanistan in 2012. The government has been encouraging Indian business to look at investment opportunities in the country. If the political and security situation there remains relatively stable, Afghanistan could become a significant trade partner for India and a platform for India's expanded engagement with Central Asia.
While Indian interests will certainly be impacted by the ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan, India does possess levers to help shape developments in this strategically important neighbouring country. A carefully crafted strategy that must embrace some calculated risks is essential to prevent Afghanistan from relapsing into persistent turmoil and becoming once again a base for Pakistan-supported cross-border terrorism against India.
The writer, a former foreign secretary, is chairman of the National Security Advisory Board. He is also chairman of RIS and a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi